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ABSTRACT. 
 
The increasing precariousness of working arrangements within advanced capitalist 
economies, such as that of the United Kingdom, has been the focus of much study 
within academic social science. This research has conveyed the empirical reality of 
zero-hours contract, temporary agency, gig economy, and other forms of precarious 
work, where one’s working patterns and income stream are unpredictable and 
insecure. However, there has so far been insufficient sustained consideration of the 
political significance of such working arrangements within contemporary labour 
markets. This thesis rectifies this, constructing a distinctly political theory of 
precarious work. I first consider how precarious work could be analysed within the 
leading schools of contemporary political thought – libertarianism, Rawlsian liberal 
egalitarianism, Marxism, and feminism – before explaining why a republican theory 
of precarious work most successfully captures the full political significance of such 
working arrangements. According to this republican theory, precarious working 
arrangements should be understood as generating specific forms of domination, both 
interpersonal and structural, that compromise individual liberty. Not only do 
precarious working arrangements convey particular employers with extraordinary 
levels of discretionary power over their employees, but they also serve to trap workers 
within a wider ecosystem of potential interference and dependence. Finally, I explore 
how this significant threat to freedom could be rectified practically through the 
construction of an economic republic. This would involve a combination of state 
regulation, effective exit rights, and institutionalised worker voice, in order to provide 
workers with the ‘antipower’ sufficient to confidently resist the kinds of domination 
associated with precarious working arrangements.  
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-   CHAPTER 1   - 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
Travel to any town or city in the United Kingdom and it will not be hard to find the 
ubiquitous traces of an increasingly precarious labour market. The teal-coloured 
jackets of the Deliveroo riders weaving through traffic or killing time outside a fast 
food restaurant. The Uber driver idling in a side-street, waiting for the smart phone 
notification that will signal where the next job will be. The seasonal workers bused 
into the gargantuan Amazon ‘fulfilment’ centres on the outskirts of town, hired only 
until the period of high-demand is over. The high-street employment agency with their 
window display of job listings overwhelmingly labelled ‘temporary’; ‘fixed-term’. 
The hospitality worker, walking home from her zero-hours contract job because she is 
no longer needed for today’s shift.  
But, look further. You will see the entire eco-system that this way of organising work 
sustains. The mouldering flats of the ‘rogue landlord’, often the only choice for those 
without a secure, salaried income. The pay-day loan adverts, high-street pawn shops, 
and the extortionate prices of ‘rent-to-buy’ appliance stores. The food banks. This is a 
system that exists, in large part, to service a workforce that can only plan their lives as 
far as their next, unpredictable pay check. Where having a job no longer means having 
stability and security in one’s life. 
Precarious work has long been a focus of academic research within social science. As 
far back as the 1960s the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was describing the ‘précarité’ 
associated with casualised work in Algeria (1963, p.361). And precarious work has 
continued to be defined, described, and categorised by those who seek to capture the 
empirical reality of this particular way of structuring working life (e.g. Antunes, 2016; 
Deranty, 2008; Dörre et al., 2006; Fantone, 2007; Kalleberg, 2008; Neilson and 
Rossiter, 2006; Schram, 2015; Standing, 2011; Vosko et al., 2009; Waite, 2009; etc.). 
However, despite this academic focus on precarious work among empirical social 
scientists, there has so far been an insufficient interrogation or analysis of the 
normative, political significance of organising and governing working life in this way 
by analytical political theorists and philosophers1. What does the presence of 
precarious working arrangements tell us about the dynamics of power within a labour 
market? 
The comparable lack of interest in the phenomenon of precarious work by political 
theorists and philosophers is surprising given the saliency of precarious work as an 
issue within real-world political discourse. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
permissibility of precarious working arrangements, in particular zero-hours contracts, 
has become one of the key issues debated during recent election campaigns (e.g. BBC 
News, 2015; MacAskill and Helm, 2017). British trade unions and labour 
organisations have also campaigned heavily against precarious work in the 
 
1 Näsström and Kalm (2015) and Birnbaum (2017) have begun to bring the phenomenon of precarious 
work somewhat within the purview of political theory in their article-length papers. However, there has 
as yet been no sustained or systematic analysis of precarious working arrangements from the standpoint 
of analytical political philosophy.   
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contemporary labour market (e.g. TUC, 2016), and the Living Wage Foundation have 
recently launched a Living Hours campaign in response to research showing that one 
in six workers in the United Kingdom are now in insecure work, with unstable hours 
or short-term contracts (cf. Living Wage Foundation, 2019). Given that the purpose of 
political philosophy is to reflect on “how best to arrange our collective life” (Miller, 
1998) it is important that political philosophers and theorists also contribute to these 
live debates about how to organise our collective working lives. That is the task of this 
thesis.  
Specifically, this thesis is an exploration of the political significance of precarious 
working arrangements in the contemporary labour market. Although in this thesis I 
draw from an international palette of illustrative examples, this thesis is self-
consciously addressing a local phenomenon: the ubiquity of precarious working 
arrangements in Britain during the opening decades of the twenty-first century. How 
should such work be conceptualised as a political phenomenon? What are the 
implications for power? What political values are at stake in the precarious labour 
market?  
By applying the conceptual resources associated with the central traditions of 
contemporary political thought – libertarianism, Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism, 
Marxism, feminism, and republicanism – it is possible to construct a distinctly political 
theory of precarious work.  
The central argument of this thesis is that the republican concept of domination best 
captures the specific power-dynamics, and political significance, of precarious 
working conditions. Precarious work should be understood as generating specific 
forms of domination that pose a significant threat to the liberty of those individuals 
subject to it. This republican theory, in contrast to the considered alternatives, 
successfully captures the precarious worker’s vulnerability to the extraordinary levels 
of discretionary power wielded by their particular employer. It understands the power 
of employers to demand, deny, or discontinue work from their employees with little 
or no notice or reason represents the kind of capacity for arbitrary interference that 
republican theorists such as Philip Pettit (1997a; 2012; etc) consider abrogative of 
freedom as non-domination.   
However, the republican theory of precarious work constructed here also captures the 
structural vulnerability caused by precarious working arrangements, the effects of 
which ripple outwards into various other areas of the worker’s life, constituting a 
distinct form of structural domination. The insecurity and instability of precarious 
work can make individuals vulnerable to a wide hinterland of agents beyond the 
confines of a particular employment relationship: customers, landlords, payday 
lenders, and so on. This structural situation, with the inherent potential that multiple 
forms of arbitrary interference can arise, represents, in and of itself, an arbitrary, 
dominating form of structural power that can constrain the ability of individual 
workers to live an independent life of their own. Indeed, this structural vulnerability 
contains the potential to arbitrarily trap workers, intensifying their dependence on 
precarious work and the relationships of domination that they are subject to at work 
and elsewhere.  
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This is not to suggest that precarious working arrangements are the only kind of 
working arrangements that generate freedom-compromising forms of domination in 
the labour market, or that precarious working arrangements necessarily generate the 
worst forms of domination present in contemporary labour markets. The argument, 
instead, is that precarious working arrangements generate specific kinds of domination 
that deserve to be highlighted and better understood. Once these forms of domination 
are identified, I explore how they can be resisted, by embedding the eradication of 
precarious work within the wider republican political programme of counter-
domination.  
Importantly, this thesis does not attempt to identify an all things considered ideal 
model for organising and governing working life. Instead, it aims to (i) consider which 
political concepts, if any, enable us to better comprehend the significance of actually-
existing instances of precarious work in the contemporary labour market; (ii) consider 
which political values, if any, are threatened by such instances of precarious work; and 
(iii) consider what practical responses, if any, could realistically be deployed to rectify 
these threats, even if these responses are far from perfect. As such, it should be 
understood as a project in nonideal, applied political theory. 
It is a project in nonideal political theory to the extent that my aim is not, like Rawls, 
to identify and realise “the principles that characterise a well ordered society under 
favourable circumstances” (1999, p.216), but instead to understand, evaluate, and 
improve the conditions we are faced with in the ‘real’, and far from perfect, world 
around us. In this sense, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis is much 
closer to that articulated by Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice (2009), which (as 
paraphrased by Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson) “suggests that we need to focus 
on developing a clear metric that will allow us – actual persons in actual societies with 
actual histories – to judge whether marginal changes of policy and resource 
distribution do or do not lead to more just outcomes” (O’Neill and Williamson, 2012, 
p.2). This approach is valuable for, firstly, understanding the normative distinctions 
between precarious working arrangements and other forms of employment 
relationships within capitalist labour markets; and, second, identifying measures to 
improve the status quo within the confines of actually-existing political reality.  
It is a project in applied political theory to the extent that I seek to utilise the existing 
conceptual resources offered by the central traditions of contemporary political 
thought to better understand a real situation or problem that confronts us in our 
societies (cf. McGrane and Hibbert, 2019). Indeed, a main task of this thesis is to apply 
the conceptual frameworks offered by libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, Marxism, 
feminism, and republicanism to the case of precarious work in order to discern its 
political significance; to use these theoretical resources as lenses through which to 
interpret and make sense of precarious work as it exists in the real world.  
But as much as the conceptual resources offered by political theory can help us bring 
new perspectives to issues such as precarious work, the application of such concepts 
to empirical case studies also provides an opportunity to refine and advance our 
understanding of these concepts. This is the case in this thesis, where the application 
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of the republican conceptual framework of freedom as non-domination to the case of 
precarious work illuminates a unique form of structural domination.  
Following this methodological approach, this thesis makes a number of important 
contributions to the academic literature. The first contribution relates to the study and 
comprehension of precarious working arrangements in the contemporary labour 
market. As intimated above, there is a sizeable canon of empirical social scientific 
literature on precarious labour practices. This thesis engages closely with this existing 
empirical literature in order to offer a detailed, analytical, normative evaluation of the 
phenomenon. Whilst there has always been an element of critique inherent to much of 
the existing sociological literature, its primary purpose has been to document, define, 
and describe precarious working practices as they exist within real labour markets. My 
contribution is to isolate and articulate, through considered analysis of the 
phenomenon under the conceptual microscopes made available by the leading schools 
of contemporary political thought, the normative, political significance of organising 
and governing working life in this way. Specifically, I show the extent to which 
precarious working arrangements generate politically significant power-dynamics that 
pose a threat to the political value of individual liberty.  
A second major contribution of this thesis relates to the study of republican political 
theory. Not only does this thesis apply the conceptual framework associated with the 
republican theory of freedom as non-domination to the novel case of precarious 
working arrangements in the contemporary labour market, but it also contributes to an 
emerging debate within contemporary republican scholarship as to the 
conceptualisation of structural domination. In particular, I show how the case of 
precarious work illuminates a specific form of structural domination that is generated 
by the structural vulnerability of precarious workers to manifold forms of potential, 
arbitrary interference beyond the confines of their particular employment relationship. 
The conceptualisation of structural domination articulated here is constructed through 
close reflection on feminist accounts of structural vulnerability (e.g. Okin, 1989, 
p.134; Young, 2011, p.45) and other accounts of structural power and constraint (e.g. 
Haslanger, 2016, p.123; Hayward, 1998, p.12) external to the republican tradition in 
order to expand the republican concept of domination in new directions and apply it 
to new contexts. In doing so I am able to identify a distinctive form of structural 
domination unlike that previously described by other contemporary republican 
scholars (e.g. Einspahr, 2010; Pettit, 2012; Coffee, 2015; etc.).  
Most strikingly, the form of structural domination I identify within the precarious 
labour market differs from the more general form of structural domination that Alex 
Gourevitch has shown was integral to the nineteenth century American ‘labor 
republican’ critique of capitalist wage-labour (cf. Gourevitch, 2015). Whilst labor 
republicans considered all workers to be structurally dominated to the extent that they 
are structurally compelled to sell their labour to one employer or another (Gourevtich, 
2015, p.109), in this thesis I show how precarious workers in particular are 
structurally dominated to the extent that the nature of precarious working 
arrangements subject those workers to potential, arbitrary interference from a 
multitude of agents both within, and beyond the labour market. As a result of this 
structural position, precarious workers are ensnared in a ‘precarity trap’, a vicious 
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cycle of vulnerability and dependency that constrains the opportunity for precarious 
workers to break out of their situation by intensifying their dependency on precarious 
work.   
A third, and related, contribution of this thesis is to consider how opposition to the 
forms of domination associated with precarious working arrangements can be realised 
institutionally through a combination of state regulation, exit rights, and worker voice. 
In doing so, I contribute to a significant literature relating to how the republican value 
of freedom as non-domination can be politically realised and institutionally constituted 
(e.g. Pettit, 1996; ibid., 1997a, p.106; ibid, 1999; Skinner, 2012, p.60; Gourevitch, 
2011, p.432; McCormick, 2011; etc.). In particular, I contribute to ongoing debates 
within republican scholarship regarding how freedom as non-domination can most 
successfully be promoted within the labour market (e.g. Hsieh, 2005; Dagger, 2006; 
Breen, 2015; Gourevitch, 2015; Thomas, 2016; Taylor, 2017; etc.). Specifically, I 
argue that counter-dominating ‘antipower’ should be embodied in robust labour law, 
a generous welfare state, and a “promotive stance” (cf. O’Neill and White, 2018) 
towards trade unionism, thus providing the foundations of an economic republic that 
would enable workers to confidently resist the forms of domination identified in 
existing precarious labour markets. However, not only is this a contribution to ongoing 
debates within contemporary republican scholarship, but it is also a contribution to 
live debates within ‘real world’ political discourse as to how the issue of precarious 
work can be practically addressed.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two sets out how the concept of precarious 
work will be defined throughout the thesis. By surveying the existing academic 
literature on precarity, precariousness, and precarisation, as well as selected 
illustrative examples, I conclude that the concept of ‘precarious work’ should refer to 
forms of work that are organised and governed so that (i) one’s access to work is 
uncertain; and, as a result, (ii) one’s income is made unstable and unpredictable. 
Paradigmatic cases of precarious work, as defined here, therefore include zero-hours 
contract, temporary agency and so-called “gig economy” work. Such work is 
precarious to the extent that it generates a specific combination of uncertainty, 
jeopardy, and dependence; a combination that has underpinned the meaning of ‘the 
precarious’ throughout the development of this idea in both common usage and the 
conceptual language of social science. Within this chapter I also explore how the 
precarity generated by particular working arrangements can be intensified or mitigated 
by contextual factors such as rates of pay, independent wealth, or the presence of 
labour rights and protections. I also explore the extent to which such working 
arrangements have been associated with stress, anxiety, and psychological distress. 
Whilst this psychological response is not a necessary feature of precarious working 
arrangements, it does intuitively alert us to the importance of considering whether or 
not organising working life in this way is normatively permissible.  
In Chapter Three I begin to consider on what grounds such a normative evaluation 
could be based. I explore the extent to which we can analyse and understand the social 
and political significance of precarious work through the existing approaches to work 
and employment found within the leading schools of contemporary political thought: 
libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, Marxism, and feminism. Whilst I suggest that 
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free-market libertarians would tend towards ambivalence, if not the outright 
promotion of precarious working arrangements, liberal egalitarian, Marxist, and 
feminist conceptual frameworks allow us to begin evaluating precarious working 
arrangements as instances of injustice. However, I argue that neither liberal 
egalitarianism, Marxism, or feminism provides a wholly sufficient basis for 
successfully identifying the distinct and specific political significance of precarious 
work.  
The liberal egalitarian approach to thinking about working life, following Rawls (cf. 
1999, p.464), considers the extent to which work acts as a distributive vehicle for some 
particular value - for example human flourishing, autonomy, or self-respect – 
associated with the meaningfulness of life. I show that whilst some instances of 
precarious work may offend against these values, cases of precarious work will not 
always and necessarily offend against these values. Moreover, I suggest, that treating 
work as a vehicle for some particular liberal value risks empowering further those who 
control access to work, and highlight the paradoxically illiberal, perfectionist 
implications that could be associated with institutionalising a particular conception of 
meaningful work. Nevertheless, I also explore the extent to which the economic and 
social model associated with Rawlsian justice might inherently eradicate precarious 
working arrangements regardless of whether such work is ‘meaningful’ or not.  
Whilst the Marxist and feminist traditions explicitly treat work as a distinct sphere of 
politically significant power relations, neither tradition, I argue, provides the 
conceptual resources necessary to articulate the distinct harm associated with 
precarious working arrangements as opposed to other forms of organising work in our 
existing societies. For Marxists, all workers under capitalism are subject to the 
exploitative power of their employer, and the capitalist class as a whole, regardless of 
how precarious their employment is. Similarly, feminist scholarship shows us that all 
women are structurally vulnerable in the labour market as a result of the power-
dynamics associated with patriarchal society. To the extent that precarious working 
arrangements are compromised by such power, they are no different to any other form 
of work that women perform, both in the home or the formal labour market.  
By reflecting on the conclusions reached in Chapter Three, I argue in Chapter Four 
that the conceptual framework associated with the republican theory of freedom as 
non-domination most successfully allows us to illuminate, comprehend, and, 
ultimately, condemn, the specific power-dynamics associated with the precarious 
labour market. According to this republican-inspired theory, precarious work can now 
be seen to represent a politically significant threat to individual liberty. Indeed, 
specific forms of freedom-compromising domination can be seen as essential, 
constitutive features of precarious working arrangements. In the first instance, 
precarious working arrangements necessarily involve employment relationships that 
subject the worker to extraordinary levels of discretionary employer power. Precarious 
working arrangements also make workers vulnerable to further instances of 
interpersonal domination beyond the employment relationship itself, by transforming 
relationships with family, friends, and economic agents such as landlords, payday 
lenders, and so forth, into dominating relationships of dependency. Finally, as a result 
of the structural position precarious workers occupy in this system of domination, they 
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are vulnerable to a further, distinctly structural form of domination. This arises as a 
result of precarious workers’ liability to a ‘precarity trap’, or the vicious cycle of 
insecurity and dependence that encourages precarious workers to submit further to 
their disadvantaged position.  
Crucially, this domination-based analysis of precarious work allows us to normatively 
distinguish between precarious and non-precarious forms of capitalist wage-labour. 
Whilst neither may be considered all-things-considered just, or even completely free 
from domination, we can see that the particular tone and tenor of domination 
associated with precarious work is absent from more formally secure forms of salaried 
employment in capitalist labour markets. This distinction enables us to make 
normative judgements in nonideal circumstances, and identify where improvements 
to the status quo, even those that may otherwise seem marginal, can be made. 
In Chapter Five, I explore the political programme associated with the republican 
tradition of political thought, the practical policies and institutional regimes through 
which republicans aim to promote the value of freedom as non-domination, and 
explore how opposition to the specific forms of domination associated with precarious 
work can be embedded within this republican political programme. I propose that a 
combination of regulation, exit, and voice, embodied in robust labour law, a generous 
welfare state, and a promotive stance towards trade unionism, would provide an 
institutional framework and political ecosystem that would enable precarious workers 
to begin resisting the specific forms of domination that they experience within their 
working lives, and provide a space in which to contest the permissibility of precarious 
working arrangements in the contemporary economy. 
Finally, in Chapter Six I conclude by summarising the central findings of the thesis 
and mapping the potential avenues for future research that these findings have opened.  
In sum, this is a thesis that emphasises the reasons why the way that working life is 
organised and governed matters. Work is a context in which politically significant 
power is exercised and endured. How we organise work, the labour market, the 
economy, and the wider political community determines the shape of these power 
dynamics and the extent to which these power dynamics promote or compromise the 
liberty of individuals subject to them. As political theorists, we are interested in 
interpreting the significance and meaning of these power dynamics, but also in 
theorising how we might effectively address those real-world phenomena that we 
understand to be normatively problematic and unjust. Precarious work, I argue, 
generates specific forms of domination that significantly compromise individual 
liberty, and thus represents a pressing injustice within contemporary collective life. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain, carefully and systematically, why this should 
be resisted, and how.  
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-   CHAPTER 2   - 
DEFINING PRECARIOUS WORK. 
 
Introduction. 
There is an increasing sense that, for a growing number of people, work is becoming 
more precarious. Within industrialised nations such as the United Kingdom, there is 
now palpable concern that, as the employment systems established in the mid-
twentieth century continue to transform in multiple ways, individuals can no longer be 
certain that their work will provide the basis of a relatively secure and stable life. 
Indeed, this concern is reflected in the increasing prevalence of “precarious work” as 
a focus within public political discourse. However, despite this increased prominence 
of “precarious work” within political debate, the precise meaning of this concept can 
often remain insufficiently clear. This is particularly true within academic political 
philosophy, where the concept of precarious work remains largely novel and 
underexplored. Without a careful mapping of its conceptual contours, then, there is a 
danger that “precarious work” could become a vague, all-encompassing term, 
deployed to capture an ever-expanding variety of phenomena and experiences 
associated with contemporary economic life. It is therefore necessary to clearly outline 
the object of investigation in this thesis by providing a detailed account of how the 
concept of precarious work should be understood. 
In this chapter I will argue that the concept of ‘precarious work’ should refer to forms 
of work that are organised and governed so that (i) one’s access to work is uncertain; 
and, as a result, (ii) one’s income is made unstable and unpredictable. Such work is 
precarious to the extent that it generates a specific combination of uncertainty, 
jeopardy, and dependence; a combination that has underpinned the meaning of ‘the 
precarious’ throughout the development of this idea in both common usage and the 
conceptual language of social science.  
I will also show how the precarity generated by particular forms of work can 
subsequently be made more or less intense by contextual factors such as the level of 
remuneration offered for work, one’s level of private wealth, the availability of labour 
rights and protections, and so on. Such factors are not, therefore, necessary features of 
precarious work, but can be shown to play an important role in exacerbating or 
mitigating the impact of organising work precariously.  
Finally, I will explore the emotional and psychological impact that is often associated 
with precarious work. To be clear, whether or not work is precarious is not determined 
by any given individual’s personal psychological response to their working life. But it 
is important to recognise that empirical literature, as well as first-hand testimony, often 
associates instances of precarious work with significant distress. It is the stress and 
anxiety experienced by many precarious workers that intuitively alerts us to the fact 
that the organisation and governance of contemporary working life in this way is 
demanding of sustained political theoretical investigation. What is the political 
significance of a system of work that often promises emancipation, but all too often 
delivers anguish?  
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I will investigate these ideas with reference to several paradigmatic cases of precarious 
work that can be identified within the contemporary labour market, including 
examples of zero-hours contracts, temporary agency work, and work in the so-called 
“gig economy”. Whilst these are not the only forms of precarious work that exist 
within the contemporary economy, they are the most ubiquitous, and illuminate the 
defining features of precarious work clearly.       
Defining the precarious. 
What does it mean to describe something as precarious? By looking at how this term 
has been developed and deployed, both in common usage and the more specialist 
conceptual vocabulary of social science, we can see that the precarious is consistently 
associated with three key ideas or themes. The first is jeopardy. There is a realistic 
danger or risk of an event taking place, or a situation arising, that would result in 
significant costs or harms. The second is uncertainty. There is a likelihood that this 
injurious event could happen, but it might not; fate hangs in the balance. In this sense 
there is an ambiguous temporal dimension to the precarious. Harm could arise 
unpredictably, at any time or not at all. But the potential for harm is omnipresent. 
These themes are reflected in contemporary English usage, where the adjective 
‘precarious’ is applicable to a multitude of contexts in which there is some insecurity, 
instability, or risk of danger. In the specialist language of social science, too, the 
concept of ‘precarity’ is associated with these key themes of uncertainty and jeopardy. 
However, the etymological roots of this term suggest that the precarious should also 
be associated with a third theme. In particular, the idea of the ‘precarious’ has 
historically been deployed to describe the social vulnerability and lack of control that 
is created by particular relationships of dependence.   
Indeed, the English word ‘precarious’ derives from the original Latin term, 
‘precārius’, meaning “given as a favour, depending on the favour of another, (of 
property) held by tenancy at will, uncertain, doubtful, suppliant” (OED, 2007b). This, 
in turn, is linked to the Latin, ‘prex’, meaning prayer or entreaty (ibid.). More 
specifically, the English usage of ‘precarious’ can be associated with the noun 
‘precarium’, a concept taken from Roman law that described a “loan granted on 
request but revocable whenever the lender wishes” (OED, 2007c). Typically, a 
‘precarium’ referred to a right of tenancy, whereby land or property was loaned to 
another “during the pleasure of the superior” (ibid.). It this idea of uncertain tenure 
that was also first denoted by the English adverb ‘precariously (OED, 2007d). As the 
Oxford English Dictionary states, ‘precariously’ was first used to describe being “at 
the mercy or pleasure of another person” and was historically deployed “in technical 
use with reference to tenancies” (ibid.).  
However, the idea of ‘the precarious’, in its historical English usage, was not solely 
used to describe the insecurity or uncertainty of tenancy or debt, but also how this 
insecurity could be exploited. The Oxford English Dictionary also describes a concept 
of ‘precary’, a medieval English term denoting the additional services that a lord of 
the manor could rightfully demand of his tenants (OED, 2007e). This in turn derived 
from the post-classical Latin term ‘precaria’, which was often used in twelfth century 
British texts in reference to forms of boon-work, that is, unpaid labour that lords could 
demand of their tenants, particularly around the harvest (ibid.; cf. OED, 2007a). In this 
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sense, the idea of ‘the precarious’ was, historically at least, specifically tied to the 
realm of work and the exploitation of labour.  
We can therefore see how, when first introduced to the English language, the concept 
of ‘precarious’ implied a specific interpersonal relationship between two or more 
particular agents. The tenant is in a position of dependence on the goodwill of their 
landlord, who grants access to property but retains the ability to revoke this access at 
whenever they wish. Thus, a person is precarious when they are “vulnerable to will or 
decision of others” (OED, 2007b), reliant on their favour and continued beneficence. 
The etymological links to the Latin ‘prex’ or prayer compares the experience of the 
precarious to that of supplication to the gods; the need to prostrate oneself and entreaty 
with a superior power in order to continue enjoying that which has been granted. This 
dependence connects with the uncertainty over when/if the landlord will elect to 
reclaim their land or impose additional demands on their tenants. The element of 
jeopardy is demonstrated when we consider that tenants will be existentially reliant on 
maintaining their access to the landlord’s property in order to sustain themselves. With 
its roots in the Roman law of the precarium, we can therefore see how the idea of ‘the 
precarious’ was, firstly, an economic concept that described a particular structure of 
property rights, as well as the power this granted one agent over others.  
Unsurprisingly perhaps, this legal-economic concept was also deployed as a metaphor 
to describe particular forms of dependence associated with political power. Indeed, 
the Oxford English Dictionary lists an obsolete adjective, ‘precary’ or ‘precarie’ which 
was used synonymously with ‘precarious’ (OED, 2007f). The first known usage of 
this term was in Richard Knolles’ 1606 English translation of The Six Books of the 
Republic written by the French political philosopher, Jean Bodin. Here Bodin uses the 
idea of ‘the precarious’ to challenge the idea that one is sovereign when it is possible 
for their power to be revoked. He writes, for example, that the power of the Roman 
duumviri was precariously dependent on the goodwill of the Prӕtor: 
“Whereby it is euident them to haue had no iurisdiction or power by vertue of 
their own magistracie, but onely part of the Prӕtors iurisdiction, and that also by 
leaue and sufferance. But they which haue nothing but such deputed or precarie 
iurisdiction, can of right call nothing theirof their owne: Wherefore whether the 
power of the Duumuiri consisted onely in hauing power to commaund , or in 
iurisdiction, it was vndoubtedly but by leaue and sufferance: whereby it is to be 
vnderstood, these Duumuiri not properly to have been at all magistrats” (Bodin, 
1606, p.296).  
Again we can see that the idea of the precarious here captures a combination of 
jeopardy (the costly loss of political power), uncertainty (whether or not the duumviri 
will be able to exercise political power), and dependency (that the capacity to exercise 
power is reliant on the will of some other agent, the Prӕtor).   
Daniel Lee has further shown how the idea of the precarium was crucial to much early-
modern thinking with regards to the concept of popular sovereignty. Lee shows how 
Bodin argued that the Roman people remained sovereign even during periods of 
dictatorship. To the extent that autocratic leaders held sovereignty, this was “as a 
precarious grant on sufferance” (Lee, 2016, p.222). Lee also highlights this idea of 
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sovereignty as a precarium in the political thought of seventeenth-century Dutch 
philosopher Hugo Grotius’, whereby the power of princes is granted as a “revocable 
right” on a “precarious tenure” by the people (ibid., p.270). During the seventeenth 
century, then, the meaning of the ‘precarious’ began to be extended beyond the 
particular economic relationship of the landlord and the tenant farmer. It could now 
also be deployed metaphorically to describe the similarity of precarious tenancy and 
the political relationship between citizens and the state. 
Since the seventeenth century, the meaning of ‘precarious’ has seen a further, 
significant shift within the English language. From a term that previously described 
“dependency on another person’s pleasure or whim” (Gilliver, n.d), a more general 
sense evolved throughout the eighteenth century to include dependency on “chance or 
circumstance” (ibid.). From this meaning, ‘precarious’ has subsequently developed 
into a contemporary meaning of “insecurity or physical instability” (ibid.). For 
example, we might describe crossing a dilapidated and structurally unsound bridge, 
the uneasy peace between two rival nations, or a risky stunt performed by a high-wire 
artist, as “precarious”. In this way, the term’s contemporary usage continues to capture 
the core ideas of uncertainty and jeopardy that have long been attached to the 
‘precarious’. The dilapidated bridge could collapse at any minute, war could break 
out, or the high-wire artist could fall. There is a realistic potential for these harms to 
arise, unpredictably, at any time. Yet, even if danger is avoided in the present, the 
potential for harm and injury persists.  
However, in common contemporary usage, the idea of the precarious has largely been 
shed of its more specific, interpersonal, legal and economic meaning, and its 
association with particular relationships of dependence. Instead the idea of the 
precarious exists as a more expansive metaphor that can describe various forms of 
risk, insecurity, and vulnerability. Whilst this more general, metaphorical 
understanding of ‘precarious’ certainly plays a key descriptive role when deployed in 
the case of ‘precarious work’, we will see that important connections can also be made 
between ‘precarious work’ and the jeopardy and uncertainty specific to economic 
relationships of dependency, that the concept of ‘precarious’ originally captured.  
The evolution of the meaning of ‘precarious’, from the specific to the more general, is 
mirrored in the way this idea has been deployed within the specialised language of 
academic social science. The variety of overlapping and contrasting 
conceptualisations of ‘precarity’2 found in the existing literature can be confusing and 
could give the impression that this concept is deployed more for its rhetorical force 
than its conceptual clarity. Nonetheless, the various conceptualisations can, broadly, 
 
2 Despite attempts to draw clear conceptual distinctions between ‘precarity’ and ‘precariousness’ (e.g. 
Neilson and Rossiter, 2006; Lorey, 2015, pp.11-12), these labels are often used interchangeably within 
the existing literature. For example, ‘precariousness’ has often been used, contrary to attempts at 
distinction, to describe the particular insecurity associated with specific forms of work (e.g., Dörre, et 
al., 2006; Rodgers, 1989, p.3). Similarly, ‘precarity’ has been used to describe the more expansive 
account of vulnerability (e.g. Ettlinger, 2007; Lorey, 2015, p.12; Puar, et al., 2012 p.168). For the sake 
of simplicity I will instead uniformly refer to varying conceptualisations of ‘precarity’ rather than 
suggest that there is any essential distinction between the terms ‘precarity’ and ‘precariousness’. 
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be categorised according to one of two main models (cf. Waite, 2009, p.413; Jokinen, 
2015, p.88).  
The first of these models reserves the concept of ‘precarity’ to describe an effect of 
organising work and the wider economy in certain ways. The first usage of ‘precarity’ 
in this context can be traced back to 1963 when Pierre Bourdieu used the French term 
‘précarité’ to describe the condition of casual workers in Algeria in relation to others 
who were permanently employed (1963, p.361; cf. Waite, 2009, p.414). This close 
association between the French concept of précarité and particular ways of organising 
work continued through the 1970s and 80s. As Jean-Claude Barbier outlines, by the 
late-1970s the meaning of ‘précarité’ was established in French sociological literature 
to describe a social condition or process whereby people were at risk of poverty. 
Employment was quickly identified as a key contributing factor to economic 
‘précarité’, particularly when people were engaged in precarious employment or 
‘emploi précaire’ rather than secure, full-time open-ended contracts or ‘contrats à 
durée indéterminée’. Indeed, by the early-1980s the concept of ‘précarité’ had been 
adopted by the French state as an official term to describe these new forms of insecure 
and temporary contracts (Barbier, 2002, pp.7-8). When first introduced into the 
technical language of social science, then, the concept of precarity was used to 
describe the specific vulnerability encountered by those whose employment 
conditions are uncertain or unpredictable, and therefore the jeopardy that is created 
when one cannot reliably meet their basic needs and risks falling into poverty. 
 
This understanding of precarity continues to be the most predominant one found 
within contemporary social scientific literature (c.f. Rodgers, 1989; Vosko, et al., 
2009; Waite, 2009; Antunes, 2016; Birnbaum, 2017; etc.). Importantly, on this model, 
precarity is always considered a particular form of vulnerability or insecurity that 
arises as a result or product of particular social conditions, particularly those associated 
with work and the wider economy. For example, Arne Kalleberg has associated 
precarity with the effects of “uncertain, unpredictable, and risky” forms of 
employment (2009, p.2). Similarly, Klaus Dörre, Klaus Kraemer and Frederic Speidel 
link precarity with “heterogeneous employment modes like temporary work, fixed-
term contract work, forced part-time work, little jobs, badly paid jobs, state-subsidised 
jobs (“one-euro-jobs”) and unpaid practical trainees” (2006, p.99). As with the earliest 
uses of precarity, the concept remains one that is specifically associated with the forms 
of insecurity or vulnerability created by particular forms of work.   
 
Others, however, have expanded upon this specific conceptualisation of precarity to 
suggest that, whilst precarious forms of work remain a paradigmatic case of precarity, 
this vulnerability and insecurity can increasingly be found throughout society in a 
variety of guises. For example, the political theorists Sofia Näsström and Sara Kalm 
explain: 
“Precarity is a term that has become increasingly popular as a way to capture the 
material and psychological vulnerability arising from neoliberal economic 
reforms. Although the forms are shifting and plural, these new vulnerabilities 
result largely from neoliberal policies aimed at making employment conditions 
more flexible, at gradual replacement of welfare protection with workfare 
obligations, and at the promotion of market solutions to ever more spheres of 
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society… Scholars are today doing important work to examine the impact of 
precarity on such areas as work, citizenship, welfare, education, class, gender, 
North–South relations and life expectancy” (Näsström and Kalm, 2015, pp.556-
557) 
Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter suggest that precarity similarly extends beyond the 
vulnerability associated with certain forms of work. They claim:  
“The term [precarity] refers to all possible shapes of unsure, not guaranteed, 
flexible exploitation: from illegalised, seasonal and temporary employment to 
homework, flex- and temp-work to subcontractors, freelancers or so-called self-
employed persons. But its reference also extends beyond the world of work to 
encompass other aspects of intersubjective life, including housing, debt, and the 
ability to build affective social relations” (Neilson and Rossiter, 2006, p.10). 
This broader understanding of precarity also underpins Guy Standing’s influential 
theory of the ‘precariat’ (2011). Here Standing understands precarity as the insecurity 
affecting a distinct class of people who are defined by their position within the 
contemporary capitalist system (2011, pp.9-11). On this account, whilst precarity is 
closely correlated with particular forms of precarious work, it is not necessarily limited 
to a description of the particular effects of particular models of work (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, on all of these accounts, precarity is considered as a specific form of 
vulnerability, a condition unique to or paradigmatically associated with particular 
ways of organising work, the labour market, and the wider economic sphere. It is this 
model of precarity that will inform the account of precarious work and, in turn, 
represent a central focus of this thesis. For this reason, it is important that we 
distinguish this model of precarity from a distinct, rival conceptualisation. 
This second model diverts sharply from the idea that precarity is a specific condition 
or product of particular social and economic factors. Instead precarity is viewed as an 
essential and inescapable property that is common to all humans. Human beings, it is 
argued, are inherently precarious by virtue of our contingent, mortal lives and the fact 
that our survival often depends on others in a variety of ways. Precarity is not unique 
to particular social or political situations – every one of our lives is always precarious 
to a certain degree - but instead this essential human precarity can be exacerbated 
depending on the extent to which it is recognised and respected by others.  
 
This understanding of precarity is perhaps best captured by Judith Butler, who argues 
it should be conceptualised as “a common human vulnerability” (Butler, 2004, p.31). 
Here the notion of ‘the precarious’ is intended to capture the fragility and contingency 
of all human life. We are mortal, vulnerable to injury, and thus we are inherently 
precarious beings. This “corporeal vulnerability” (ibid., p.19) becomes socially and 
politically important when we realise that, as social creatures, our lives are often 
dependent on others (ibid., p.xii). Precarity, then, involves the social positioning and 
distribution of our common vulnerabilities and the recognition of these vulnerabilities 
granted by others. As Butler states, the meaning of precarious lives is bound up in the 
question, “Whose lives count as lives” (ibid., p.20). We must therefore stress our 
universal, shared corporeal vulnerability in order to prevent the political 
dehumanisation and devaluation of the lives of some Others. 
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Indeed, Butler greatly clarifies her approach to ‘the precarious’ in the 2012 article 
‘Precarity Talk’: 
“We can make the broad existential claim, namely, that everyone is precarious, 
and this follows from our social existence as bodily beings who depend upon one 
another for shelter and sustenance and who, therefore, are at risk of statelessness, 
homelessness, and destitution under unjust and unequal political conditions. As 
much as I am making such a claim, I am also making another, namely, that our 
precarity is to a large extent dependent upon the organization of economic and 
social relationships, the presence or absence of sustaining infrastructures and 
social and political institutions. In this sense, precarity is indissociable from that 
dimension of politics that addresses the organization and protection of bodily 
needs. Precarity exposes our sociality, the fragile and necessary dimensions of 
our interdependency” (Puar, et al., 2012, p.170) 
Butler does not deny that economic relations and work are a part of the story; she 
describes precarious workers as those who are “replaceable and disposable” (Puar, et 
al., 2012, p.167). However, we should also, for example, see the lives and bodies of 
citizens as precarious when “they are exposed to police force” (ibid., p.168). As such, 
we can see that, here, precarity is not understood as a concept that captures the 
particular effect of economic and social life on certain individuals. Instead precarity is 
an existential property of humanity. It is intended to capture the multiple forms of 
existential “corporeal vulnerability” (Butler, 2004, p.19) that all humans experience, 
and direct us to interrogate the uneven ways that these vulnerabilities are distributed 
socially so that some lives are protected and respected more than others (Puar, et al., 
2012, p.170).  
A broader conceptualisation of precarity is similarly deployed by Isabell Lorey, who 
argues it “means more than insecure jobs, more than the lack of security given by 
waged employment. By way of insecurity and danger it embraces the whole of 
existence, the body, modes of subjectivation” (Lorey, 2015, p.1). Indeed, Lorey 
presents a complex three-dimensional account of the precarious. This, firstly, 
encapsulates “precariousness” as a “socio-ontological dimension of lives and bodies” 
(ibid., p.11), that is the inescapable fragility of our lives of human beings. Secondly, 
it includes “precarity” which describes the “social positionings of insecurity” (ibid., 
p.12) or the unequal distribution of precariousness. Finally, it also includes 
“precarization” as an active mode of governing through the “destabilization of the 
conduct of life and thus of bodies and modes of subjectivation” (ibid.). ‘The 
precarious’ as an object worthy of social scientific study is therefore conceptualised 
by Lorey as a state or property held by all human beings, a social relationship between 
more and less secure individuals, and a social process through which lives are made 
more insecure as a form of government control. It is not a specific condition associated 
with work, but a universal property of humanity experienced in greater and lesser 
degrees throughout society.  
Nancy Ettlinger also adopts this more general and expansive understanding of 
precarity, arguing that whilst it is most widely understood as referring to the insecurity 
of more casual forms of labor, she understands it as “a condition of vulnerability 
relative to contingency and the inability to predict”. Importantly, Ettlinger emphasises 
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that her account extends “precarity beyond the specific understandings relative to 
periodized labor regimes” (Ettlinger, 2007, p.320). In doing so, Ettlinger, like Butler 
and Lorey, argues that precarity is an inherent feature of human life, and one that is 
not limited only to the context of employment or particular economic relations. She 
states:  
“no one escapes precarity, although one might argue that some people who 
experience more constraints than others also experience more dimensions of 
precarity. Precarity is engendered by a wide range of processes and, as it extends 
across space and time and also materializes (differently) in social, economic, 
political, and cultural spheres, it is an enduring feature of the human condition. 
It inhabits everything from the global political economy to the vicissitudes of 
employment, health, social relations, self-perception” (Ettlinger, 2007, p.324). 
Butler, Lorey, and Ettlinger therefore suggest we should understand precarity as the 
unescapable existential vulnerabilities and insecurities that all humans experience as 
a result of living mortal, social lives. Whilst the political significance of this kind of 
precarity should undoubtedly be taken seriously, it will remain outside the immediate 
purview of this thesis. My focus, instead, will be on the way that precarity is generated 
by particular ways of organising and governing working life. Nevertheless, by 
exploring both of the models of ‘precarity’ that exist within contemporary social 
scientific literature, we can see clearly that, in both instances, the concept of precarity 
is underpinned by the key recurring themes of jeopardy, uncertainty, and dependence 
that are also foundational to the way the precarious is understood in more common 
usage. Both models capture the vulnerability that arises when we are dependent on 
others to protect us from harm – either harm to our fragile, mortal bodies (e.g. Puar et 
al., 2012, p.170), or the personal financial harm that could arise from un- or under-
employment (e.g. Barbier, 2002, pp.7-8). Having identified these key elements and 
traced them through the conceptual evolution of ‘the precarious’, we can now turn to 
exploring the ways in which certain forms of work generate precarity - that 
combination of jeopardy, uncertainty, and dependence - within the contemporary 
labour market.  
The features of precarious work. 
What is it about certain forms of work, precisely, that makes them precarious, and how 
do we identify precarious forms of work from non-precarious forms?  
In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to define what we mean by work. 
This can, in and of itself, be a difficult and potentially controversial task. Given the 
expansive variety of possible forms that work can take, as well as the variety of ways 
we can experience the work we do, a single unifying definition is always likely to be 
vague (cf. Muirhead, 2009, p.4). Some theorists have, for example, defined work in 
relation to the employment relationships commonly found in the formal labour market, 
“involving income of some kind, a pattern of working hours, and structured job 
requirements” (Roessler, 2012, p.73). Others emphasise work’s productive purpose, 
representing the means through which we transform the world around us to create 
something new (e.g. Kovacs, 1986, p.198; van Parijs, 1995, pp.137-138). However, I 
will define work here as the activity through which we attain the resources with which 
to meet the (at least) basic needs and desires of ourselves and others. Whilst, in this 
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thesis, I will focus predominantly on paid work in the formal economy, I do not mean 
to suggest that work need necessarily only take place in the waged labour market, and 
nor need it always be productively creative or useful3. As Russell Muirhead argues, 
“[w]ork might be done better or worse, with joy or with pain, from pride or from 
resignation, but it is done because it has to be done…[it is a] response to need and the 
demands of life” (2009, p.5). Work, in other words, is the process by which we sustain 
ourselves and our communities. It is how we make ends meet.  
Crucially, on this definition we can agree that the self-sufficient farmer works when 
she grows vegetables to feed herself and her family. Similarly, the farm labourer works 
when she performs the same task (growing vegetables) for her employer in return for 
the wages she will use to meet her needs. However, we can also distinguish this work 
from forms of leisure, such as when I decide to grow vegetables in my garden for fun, 
or when Marie Antoinette plays at being a peasant farmer in the grounds of Versailles. 
What distinguishes work, then, is not the nature of the task, but the necessary purpose 
which compels us to perform it: we work to survive, to support others, to attain 
something valuable. Again, Muirhead summarises this idea when he argues that “work 
stands as an instrumental activity, good not for what it is but for what it brings. It is 
what we must do to make ourselves safe in the world and, if we are lucky and strong, 
also comfortable” (2009, p.6).  
Another important implication of this definition is that it does not necessarily assume 
that work is defined by any connection to formal income. Instead work is merely the 
activity we perform in order that we can satisfy the needs and desires of ourselves and 
others in our families and communities. Certainly, this would include the work 
performed by individuals in return for wages that will then be used to purchase the 
goods and services that we deem important. However, on this view, the category of 
‘work’ would also encapsulate the forms of unwaged domestic, caring, and 
reproductive labour performed, disproportionately by women, and often in addition to 
more formal waged labour (cf. Pateman, 1988; Okin, 1989; Hochschild and Machung, 
2003). Unwaged caring labour plays an important role in society that ensures that the 
needs of certain others are met. For example, parents must prepare meals for children 
who cannot otherwise feed themselves. But we should also recognise that individuals 
may feel that it is necessary for them to (disproportionately) perform such labour, not 
just in order to support the interests of those they care for, but also to meet the 
expectations and norms associated with their gender and avoid conflict or violence 
that could arise within traditionally patriarchal households if this work is not 
performed.  
Similarly, this definition of work would also capture the bureaucratic tasks individuals 
are forced to perform in order to receive the state benefits that they require to meet 
their basic needs. So too the jobs performed as part of the unpaid internships that are 
felt to be an increasingly necessary step towards paid work. So too the learning and 
 
3 Consider the kinds of “generally pointless” (Fowler, 2014, p.81) work often required of the inhabitants 
of workhouses and prisons in Victorian Britain. For example, prisoners might have to spend their days 
working to turn “The Crank”, a machine that “served no other purpose than to exhaust and punish a 
prisoner” (BBC, 2014). In such cases, work is not necessarily productive, but is performed because it 
must be done – to retain access to the shelter and food supplied by the workhouse, or to avoid further, 
harsher punishment.  
24 
 
research conducted by students in order to fulfil their education. Most importantly, 
this definition encapsulates the forms of unpaid labour performed by chattel slaves 
and indentured servants under the threat of violence. Such activities should all be 
conceptualised as examples of work. Even though such activities do not provide an 
income in the same way as formal employment, they should nonetheless be thought 
of as ‘work’ to the extent that performing these activities is necessary in order to meet 
the crucial needs and desires of ourselves or others. It is important to highlight this as, 
even though I will focus here on contemporary forms of precarious work that arise 
within formal labour markets, I do not want to deny that forms of unwaged labour can 
be precarious. Indeed, there may be reasons to think that forms of unwaged work could 
be among the most precarious in society.  
Limiting our focus now to the formal labour markets of the present-day, we can see 
that ‘precarious work’ can manifest in a number of ways and in a variety of contexts 
(cf. ACTRAV, 2012, p.27). Nonetheless, ‘precarious work’ is primarily a description 
of how work is organised, and not necessarily the nature of the work activity or task 
being performed. It describes those particular ways of organising and governing work 
that generate the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence that, as we have already seen, 
are associated with precarity. Within the formal, waged economy we are able to 
discern two necessary, defining features that will be common to all examples of 
precarious work. These necessary features are (i) uncertain access to work; and (ii) 
unstable income. Where these necessary features are present, we can reliably diagnose 
a case of precarious work4. In addition, we will see that the precariousness of such 
work can be made more or less intense as a result of certain contextual factors, such 
as the rate of remuneration offered for work, the presence of additional sources of 
income, or the availability of labour rights and protections. I will also show how 
precarious work has often been associated with a particular emotional and 
psychological impact. Whilst not a necessary feature, this dimension is often 
indicative of precarious work and should be appreciated to the extent that it alerts us 
to the need to understand the normative significance of the presence of precarious 
work in contemporary labour markets.  
(i) Uncertain access to work. 
The feature most commonly associated with precarious work is the insecurity of the 
particular working arrangements that an individual finds themselves in (cf. Dörre et 
al., 2006, p.99; Vosko et al., 2009, p.1; Standing, 2011, p.11; ACTRAV, 2012, p.27; 
etc.). That is, unpredictable or unstable patterns and durations of work that can, in turn, 
make it difficult for people to reliably plan their lives or make ends meet. For example, 
Arne Kalleberg defines precarious work as “employment that is uncertain, 
unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the worker” (2008, p.2). Similarly, 
 
4 This is not to deny that elements of precarious work could be found, to a greater or lesser degree, 
throughout the entire labour market – indeed, there may be reasons to think that the norms and logics 
associated with precarious forms of work are increasingly generalised throughout the labour market as 
a whole (cf. Bourdieu, 1998a, p.95; ibid., 1998b, p. 82). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis I 
will attempt to distinguish precarious from non-precarious work according to the two necessary features 
identified here.   
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Gerry Rodgers argues that “[p]recarious jobs are those with a short time horizon, or 
for which the risk of job loss is high” (1989, p.3). 
Such insecure working arrangements are far from new and have long been a prevalent 
feature of more informal economies (cf. Kalleberg, 2008, p.2; ACTRAV, 2012, p.30). 
However, this feature of precarious work is also now increasingly present in the 
contemporary labour markets of industrialised nations, such as the United Kingdom, 
due to the prevalence of “atypical”5 forms of work that deviate from the model of long-
term, full-time, stable employment that had become the established norm during the 
middle of the twentieth century (cf. Eurofound, 2017). Some paradigmatic examples 
of this “atypical” work include: 
• Zero-hours contract work: “zero-hours contract” is a general term used to 
describe various employment contract models that provide the worker no 
guaranteed minimum hours of paid work. Instead employees are “on call”, 
unpaid until requested to work by their employer (European Parliament, 2016, 
p.123). 
 
• Temporary work: This includes those employed on a seasonal, or other fixed-
term basis, who have little control over the duration of their contracts, and no 
guarantee that they will find work after their current position ends. Temporary 
workers are often hired through third party employment agencies in order to 
fill vacancies that require little training at short notice, as and when they arise. 
However, there is no guarantee that a stable supply of work will be provided 
by these agencies (European Parliament, 2016, p.99; p.110). 
 
• “Gig economy” work: this includes those self-employed freelancers or 
“independent contractors” who are hired on a project by project, or job by job 
basis. In particular it is associated with the emergence of online platforms, such 
as Uber or Deliveroo, that allow individuals to find small, discrete jobs on-
demand (cf. Balaram, 2017). However, such work does not provide a 
guaranteed minimum of paid work or a predictable source of steady income. 
Instead the onus is on the individual to find the next job if they want to enjoy 
continued access to paid work. 
Whilst some see the recent rise of insecure, “atypical” work as a return to capitalism 
as normal after a brief, exceptional period of relative security and stability for a 
privileged few (cf. Neilson and Rossiter, 2006, p.11; Fantone, 2007, p.10; Schram, 
2015), we should nonetheless keep sight of the way in which the contemporary face 
of insecure work is shaped by various ongoing social and political transformations. 
Indeed, the presence of such work today can be seen as the result of an ongoing shift 
in how enterprises organise and operate within contemporary capitalism. The 
emergence of globally integrated markets has allowed corporations to more easily 
outsource labour to lower-wage countries in order to keep product prices competitive 
(Kalleberg, 2008, p.2). The impact of such globalization has meant that the relatively 
 
5 Though, it can be argued that the increasing prevalence of such work means it is less pertinent to 
describe it as “atypical” (e.g. Albin and Prassl, 2016, p.209). 
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secure employment systems established in many industrialised nations during the 
middle of the twentieth century have been rapidly transformed.  
Many have described this process as post-Fordism, where the high levels of 
employment and consumption created by the Fordist mode of mass production has 
given way to a system of more specialised, small-scale production that requires less 
human labour (Jokinen, 2015, p.88). Indeed, many workers have been shifted away 
from stable, well-paid manufacturing jobs to low wage service sector jobs that are 
often only casual, part-time or temporary (Hacker, 2008, pp.80-83). This shift away 
from large, permanent workforces has further been facilitated by transformations in 
information and communication technologies that have enabled firms to coordinate 
complex labour arrangements with independent contractors and employment agencies 
(Weil, 2014, p.10), and have facilitated the on-demand hiring associated with the “gig 
economy. 
More proximately still, the shift towards “atypical” work can be seen to have been 
further exacerbated by the financial crisis of 2007/08, with employers responding to 
economic uncertainty by shifting towards the use of more insecure temporary or part-
time contracts (cf. European Parliament, 2016, p.10). For example, the number of 
people employed on zero-hours contracts in the British labour market increased from 
just 147,000 in 2006 to 883,000 in 2017 (ONS, 2017). Overall, the Trades Union 
Congress [TUC] estimates that, insecure forms of work such as zero-hours contract 
work, temporary work, and the low-paid self-employment associated with the gig 
economy now represents a tenth of the UK workforce (3.2 million people) – a rise of 
27 percent since 2012 (TUC, 2017a, pp.4-5). 
These forms of “atypical” work all exhibit the first necessary feature of precarious 
work to the extent that continuing access to work is insecure and uncertain. The zero-
hours contract worker could, theoretically, manage to arrange a regular pattern of 
working hours. But there is no guarantee that this pattern will continue given the fact 
that their employer has no obligation to provide even a minimum of paid work. 
Similarly, the temporary agency worker or “gig economy” freelancer could be lucky 
enough to enjoy a steady stream of paid work, but there is a constant risk that 
employment could dry up at any time. Indeed, given that volatility and impermanence 
are in-built features of such work, this risk is very much a tangible reality.  
Certainly, even those hired on open-ended contracts could suddenly and unexpectedly 
face involuntary unemployment through factors such as economic crisis, the 
introduction of particular government policies, or the impact of disruptive 
technologies. However, such individuals, unlike those employed in forms of atypical 
work, can reliably expect, all things being equal, that their access to paid work should 
continue unhindered for the long term. What is particularly precarious about forms of 
atypical work, in contrast, is the proximate potential that work could be demanded, 
denied, or discontinued completely, unpredictably and without reason or notice. The 
ever-present and normalised likelihood that your access to work could be disrupted is 
a central feature of precarious work in the contemporary economy.   
This unpredictability can make it difficult for those employed in precarious forms of 
work to plan their lives effectively. These individuals must be always “at the beck and 
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call of potential users of their labour” (Standing, 2011, p.129), on call and on standby 
for the next job. For example, in the United Kingdom, the TUC has documented the 
unpredictable working arrangements experienced by those on zero-hours contracts. 
One individual working as a nanny and housekeeper on a zero-hours contract 
described her situation:  
“I’m often not sure when my work will start until 9pm the night before and 
sometimes work random shifts and hours…I never know when I will have a day 
off…My hours are often changed at very short notice, which means my earnings 
for the week can suddenly be cut in half” (TUC, 2017a, p.26).  
Another individual employed as a waitress on a zero-hours contract told the TUC:  
“I get given shifts last minute and other times turn up only to be told to go home 
(without pay)…Many occasions, a shift has been cancelled 30 minutes before it 
was due to start. Also, started a 5-hour shift, sent home 30 minutes or on average 
2 hours later” (TUC, 2017a, p.32). 
Another example of the uncertainty associated with precarious, atypical work can be 
seen in the forms of temporary employment used by the online retail company, 
Amazon. The British journalist, James Bloodworth, has written about the uncertainty 
he experienced whilst working at Amazon’s warehouse (or “fulfilment centre”) in 
Rugeley, Staffordshire. Bloodworth was hired to work at Amazon through an 
employment agency on a temporary contract: 
“After nine months, Amazon would either take you on permanently or cast you 
aside with no more compunction than if you had been a sack of rotten potatoes. 
In practice, you were extremely lucky even to make it to nine months” 
(Bloodworth, 2018, p.19). 
In this respect, the contingency and instability of atypical employment reflects the 
central theme of uncertainty that has long been associated with the meaning of 
‘precarious’. However, we can also see how this dynamic can be seen to create forms 
of dependence. Indeed, the ability for employers, temporary employment agencies, or 
“gig economy” platforms to unpredictably provide or withhold work is reminiscent of 
the Roman precarium and the dependency of the tenant farmer on a landlord who 
retains the power to revoke the lease of their land at any time.  
As a result of this dependency, those who control access to work have the power to 
make more demands upon those they employ and who are at their mercy. Indeed, as 
Standing writes, precarious workers “are induced to intensify their effort and the hours 
they spend in their labour, for fear of falling short of expectations” (2011, p.118). If 
you fail to bend to the whims of your employer, there are no guarantees that your 
temporary contract will be renewed or that you will be offered any more shifts. For 
example, Bloodworth has described how Amazon would use the prospect of taking on 
temporary workers as permanent employees, providing them with so-called ‘blue 
badge’ status, to encourage those temporary workers to accept inconvenient shift 
changes or meet exhausting performance targets (Bloodworth, 2018, pp.16-20).  
The ability for employers to demand ever more exacting levels of performance has 
also been facilitated by the introduction of new technologies. This has been described 
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as “algorithmic management” or “Taylor on steroids” (O’Connor, 2016) as new 
technology, combined with the vulnerability of individuals hired on atypical work 
contracts, allows for an acceleration of the performance monitoring and efficiency 
maximisation associated with the scientific management theories of Frederick 
Winslow Taylor (1911). For example, Bloodworth describes how temporary staff at 
Amazon warehouses are given a hand-held device that allows company managers to 
track them and monitor their efficiency and productivity: 
“instructions, usually an admonishment to speed up, would filter through to our 
devices in an instant: ‘Please report to the pick desk immediately’ or ‘Your rates 
are down this hour, please speed up.’ We were ranked from highest to lowest in 
terms of the speed at which we collected our items from the shelves…I was 
informed during my first week that I was in the bottom 10 per cent in terms of 
picking rate. ‘You’ll have to speed up!’ I was told by one of the agency reps” 
(Bloodworth, 2018, p.16). 
When you’re employed on a flexible or temporary contract, when you cannot be 
certain that your access to work will not be rescinded at any moment, you have little 
choice but to accept the demands made of you, no matter how intense. Indeed, at 
Amazon, any workers who fail to “make rate” and keep up with the performance 
demanded by their manager, can easily be released from their temporary contracts (cf. 
Jamieson, 2015). As one former Amazon employee interviewed in the United States 
has explained: 
“We had to make Rate. We had to unpack and repack a certain number of product 
per hour. Our UPH, or units per hour, was what determined whether or not we’d 
get a talking to by one of our many bosses. When I first got hired on, we had to 
make a Rate of 85, which was doable, if challenging at first. By the time Peak 
season came around the rate was about 180. After Peak, it stayed at 180…And 
when you didn’t make Rate, you would get a talking to by a manager, and they 
did not appreciate it if you explained that you could not make Rate with a pallet 
of hundreds of dishes that had to be individually wrapped and boxed. That did 
not matter. Rate was Rate, and if you couldn’t make it, you were in trouble” (in 
Nolan, 2016). 
This dynamic of dependency, and the specific forms of vulnerability this creates, can 
also be seen to arise from the uncertain working practices experienced by 
“independent contractors” working in the so-called “gig economy”. For example, the 
app-based technology used by the transport company, Uber, is able to monitor the 
performance, usage rates, and customer feedback of each driver that uses their 
platform to access work. Although Uber’s drivers are self-employed the company 
retains the power to suspend anyone from the platform whose performance they 
consider to be insufficient (cf. O’Connor, 2016).  
Using algorithmic monitoring technology in this way, importantly, can be seen to 
implicate customers as well as managers into the architecture of dependency to which 
workers are vulnerable. As Alex Wood argues, “customers, rather than managers, are 
[…] the ones who must be pleased, whose orders must be followed, whose ideas, 
whims and desires appear to dictate how work is performed” (2019, p.3). Because they 
are dependent on good customer ratings to maintain access to the Uber platform (and 
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thus maintain their access to work), some Uber drivers have adopted practices such as 
providing customers with drinks and snacks in an attempt to cultivate a sufficiently 
high customer rating (cf. Knight, 2016). In addition, in the case of Uber, managers are 
able to use the app-based technology to communicate directly with drivers and 
encourage them to work longer and harder (cf. Scheiber, 2017). Given this dynamic, 
some Uber drivers have come to self-describe themselves as “Uber slaves” (e.g. 
Dubuis, 2016; Green and Levin, 2017; etc).  
We can therefore see that having uncertain access to work is a key defining feature of 
precarious work. Not just because the tangible risk of unpredictable changes to the 
amount of work one has reflects the key theme of uncertainty that is central to the 
meaning of ‘precarious’, but also because this dynamic can create specific forms of 
dependency between individuals and the people they work for.  
However, having uncertainty about one’s access to work is not therefore a sufficient 
feature of precarious work in and of itself. Forms of flexible or temporary work need 
not be essentially or inherently precarious. And, indeed, there is no reason to valorise 
the rigidity of the typical long-term, nine-to-five career model of working life. In 
certain circumstances, more casual working patterns can be particularly beneficial for 
those who have other commitments such as parents with young children, or students 
that must balance their work and education. Moreover, if there was no jeopardy 
associated with having uncertain access to work then we would not be able to describe 
such work as truly precarious. For example, imagine that a worker is hired on a flexible 
contract, though is nonetheless guaranteed a fixed income by her employer as a 
retainer for her services. That worker may experience uncertainty – she may still not 
know, for example, when and for how long she will be asked to work each week – but 
she will not experience the jeopardy that arises when this uncertain access to work 
threatens one’s ability to make ends meet. Where a worker has a secure income from 
their job – when they can predictably make ends meet – then even if they have 
uncertain access to work, their situation is not precarious. For this reason, we must 
consider uncertain access to work a necessary, though not sufficient, feature of 
precarious work.  
 
(ii) Unstable income. 
In order to be truly precarious, then, uncertain access to work must be associated with 
the risk of significant costs. There must be jeopardy. When it comes to waged work in 
the formal labour market, this sense of jeopardy most often manifests around the 
danger that work may not provide an income sufficient to make ends meet; that the 
link between work and survival (the definitional, social reason why we work) becomes 
threatened. There is a risk, rather, that work becomes a Sisyphean task whereby one 
can only live pay cheque to pay cheque, never able to escape the potential for, or reality 
of, falling into debt or, indeed, significant poverty.  
Certainly, precarious work has long been associated with in-work poverty. For 
example, recall Barbier’s analysis of the association in France between emploi 
précaire and an increased risk of poverty in the 1970s. Moreover, as we will see in the 
next section of this chapter, precarious work continues to be closely linked with 
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insecure, low-income work. However, the crucial feature for our purposes is not 
whether precarious work is poorly paid, but that it provides an unstable, unpredictable 
and insecure source of income.  
We can therefore distinguish precarious work from low-paid work more generally. 
Whilst life for individuals working low-income jobs is certainly hard, and whilst there 
may be independent reasons to condemn forms of work that do not pay workers at 
least a sufficient living wage, this should be kept distinct from what it means for work 
to be precarious. If I have a stable, secure position, even if it is poorly paid, I have the 
capacity to plan my life according to the reasonable expectation that my financial 
circumstances will not deteriorate dramatically in the short-term due to a sudden 
change in my hours or the non-renewal of a temporary contract. I am able to 
reasonably plan how to best live within my means. In this sense, low-income work 
need not always be precarious. In order for it to be precarious, work must exhibit the 
unpredictability and potential instability of income that results from having only 
uncertain access to work. In other words, precarious work denotes a precipice, 
whereby, even if one is able to avoid the worst forms of indebtedness and financial 
hardship, their immediate security hangs by a thread which could be cut at any time.  
Indeed, the combination of uncertain access to work and unstable income leads us to 
the conclusion that even relatively well-paid work, such as that associated with 
temporary or freelance work in industries such as financial services or the performing 
arts, can be precarious. As a particular example, we could look towards the increasing 
precarity among academic staff in the UK, with the proliferation of short-term 
temporary contracts, particularly among those at the beginning of their careers (cf. 
Gill, 2010). Such work is highly skilled and, as a result, is still often relatively well-
paid in comparison to the majority of the national workforce6. For example, the median 
annual salary offered for a fixed-term ‘Research Fellowship’ position in the United 
Kingdom is £32,397 (PayScale, 2019). This compares favourably with the median 
annual salary of £29,588 for all full-time employees in the UK (ONS, 2018). However, 
to contrast this with other precarious workers, figures gathered by the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) suggest that, for example, the average zero-hours contract worker in 
the UK will earn an annual salary of just £10,010 from that work (Collinson, 2019)7.  
Although fixed-term academic work can be relatively well-remunerated, the instability 
of income experienced by an early-career academic desperately trying to bounce from 
one research fellowship or associate lectureship to the next means that their work can 
nonetheless be considered just as precarious as the Uber driver or Amazon temp. Their 
uncertain access to work, and the knock-on effect this has on the stability of their 
income will still generate jeopardy, there is a clear risk that a disruption to one’s 
income will arise that will mean making ends meet will become difficult or even 
impossible. A contract may not be renewed, a new position may not be found in time, 
 
6 This is not to deny that there are, of course, also many working in British academia today who receive 
extremely low incomes for their work (cf. Weale, 2016).  
7 This is calculated by multiplying the average hourly payrate for zero-hours contract workers (£7.70), 
by the average number of hours worked per week by zero hours contract workers (25) and multiplying 
the result (£192.50) by the number of weeks in a year (52). However, this figure does not take into 
account any other sources of income that may be available to these workers.  
31 
 
and, as a result, an individual may find themselves unable to pay the rent, the 
mortgage, the utility bills, and so on. This may particularly be the case when the high 
rate of remuneration for one’s work has allowed an individual to afford a high cost of 
living, for example locking themselves into an expensive rental contract, that can no 
longer be sustained when work dries up. Whilst this kind of expenditure would have 
previously been within their means, it will quickly become unsustainable should their 
income be disrupted. With bills to pay, even relatively well-paid precarious workers 
become dependent on the goodwill of their employers to, for example, extend their 
contracts if they are to continue to make ends meet and stay afloat in the profession to 
which they may have already dedicated years of  their time and energy. Whilst in this 
thesis I will focus on the most paradigmatic, and in my opinion the most pressing, 
cases of precarious work that exist at the end of the labour market where pay is lowest, 
I want to again emphasise here that the pertinent feature for defining precarious work 
in the abstract is the instability of income, not the level of remuneration offered for 
work.  
For those employed in precarious forms of work, incomes could be made volatile by 
the gaps between temporary contracts that could last an unpredictable duration, or the 
uncertainty of a zero-hours contract with working patterns that fluctuate or dry up 
completely at short notice. Incomes can also be made unpredictable due to the 
potential for underpayment or late payment of wages earned (for example, see 
Bloodworth, 2018, pp.38-39). Similarly, the potential may exist for employers to alter 
pay rates completely with little notice. For example, in 2016 Uber drivers in New York 
City protested at a 15 per cent price cut that had been unilaterally introduced by the 
“gig economy” firm even though this would significantly impact the amount that 
drivers would be able to make from their work (Vaiana, 2016). One Uber driver was 
even filmed confronting the company’s then-CEO, arguing: “you’re raising the 
standards, and you’re dropping the prices…I’m bankrupt because of you…You keep 
changing every day” (Wong, 2017). Similarly, when Uber launched their food delivery 
arm, UberEats, in London in June 2016 they initially offered to pay couriers £20 an 
hour. However, this was soon reduced to a complex piece rate formula, offering £3.30 
a delivery plus £1 a mile travelled, minus a 25 per cent “Uber service fee”, plus a £5 
“trip reward”. This was cut even further when the “trip reward” was later reduced (cf. 
O’Connor, 2016). 
The instability of income created by flexible or temporary working practices can have 
dire consequences, emphasising the jeopardy faced by those in precarious work. For 
example, some Uber drivers in the United States have been made homeless, resorting 
to living in their cars full-time as a result of low and unstable wages, as well as the 
high costs associated with maintaining the vehicles that they require to work (cf. Green 
and Levin, 2017). Similarly, the TUC has highlighted how unpredictable incomes 
faced by zero-hours contract workers in the United Kingdom can lead to fears that 
they will be unable to afford essential expenses such as rent (2017a, p.32). One care 
worker interviewed by the trade union, UNISON, had actually lost her house after 
moving onto a zero-hours contract which meant she could no longer afford to pay her 
mortgage (UNISON, 2013, p.16). Indeed, insecure working arrangements have also 
been highlighted as one of the factors that have contributed to an increase in the 
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number of people using food banks in the United Kingdom (Cooper et al, 2014, pp.13-
14). Not all those employed in forms of unstable, insecure work will necessarily suffer 
this fate. Nevertheless, we can see that a consequence of work for which the 
remunerated income is unstable is to generate the jeopardy, as well as uncertainty, that 
is associated with precarity. The significant costs that could arise due to unstable 
income become a tangible an omnipresent possibility for precarious workers.  
However, a further consequence of work that provides an unpredictable source of 
income is that it makes individuals vulnerable to further forms of dependence. This is 
captured perfectly by Bloodworth’s description of his experience as a temporary 
employee for Amazon: 
“Life was characterised by the constant circling presence of landlords and 
capricious employers. A missed pay cheque, a debtor or some trivial 
misdemeanour at work were often all it took for a once respectable individual to 
be kicked down from a modicum of freedom and security into the hole of a soggy 
cardboard box on a street corner” (Bloodworth, 2018, pp.69-70).   
Placed on the precipice of poverty by unstable, often low-wage, work, you can become 
increasingly dependent on other people to keep you from falling any deeper. Beyond 
the workplace itself, the financial insecurity associated with precarious work can lead 
individuals to become reliant on the mercy of landlords when it comes to increasing 
the rent or turning a blind eye in the event of a late payment. Others may need to rely 
on family members, or the bureaucracy of the welfare state, in the event of financial 
difficulties. Perhaps more troubling still, many individuals may fall victim to the 
payday loan industry with its extortionate interest rates and intimidating enforcement 
of repayment. Indeed, recent research by Citizens Advice found that, in Britain, those 
with volatile incomes are five times more likely to turn to high-cost credit services, 
potentially leading to unsustainable levels of personal debt (Citizens Advice, 2018). 
This is likely to lead to a vicious circle whereby individuals become indebted to high-
interest credit providers through their attempts to make up for the insufficiencies of 
their paid work, and yet in this way they become even more dependent on their 
precarious work due to the need to repay their debt.   
The potential for such forms of dependence, that extend outwards beyond the more 
immediate confines of the work environment itself, emphasises the scale of the impact 
that precarious work can have in our lives, and reinforces the significance of the costs 
that it can impose. Moreover, this financial dimension accentuates, again, that work is 
made precarious to the extent that it reflects the core elements of uncertainty and 
jeopardy, but also the dependencies that can arise as a result of this dynamic.  
Contextual factors and the intensification of precarity.  
Within the formal labour market, then, work is made precarious when there is (i) 
uncertain access to work; and (ii) it provides an unstable source of income. However, 
it is important to recognise that the precariousness of such work can be exacerbated or 
mitigated by a number of different contextual factors. Such factors do not determine 
whether or not work is precarious in the abstract, but they can play an important role 
in influencing the intensity and severity of precarious work. 
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As intimated above, one important factor will be the level of remuneration offered for 
work. As we have seen, precarious work has long been associated with in-work 
poverty, and continues to be most associated with low-wage work (Rodgers, 1989, 
p.3; Vosko et al, 2009, p.2; Standing, 2011, p.10; etc.). Indeed, precarious, ‘atypical’ 
work has been found to be disproportionately concentrated in sectors of the economy 
that are typified by low-wages, such as retail, catering, and care work (Eurofound, 
2015, pp.61-63). In addition, in the United Kingdom, the TUC has estimated that, on 
average, those employed by temporary employment agencies earn 20 per cent less an 
hour than the average British employee. For those employed on zero-hours contracts 
this pay disparity is 34 per cent (TUC, 2017a, p.14). 
Where income is not only unstable, but also meagre to begin with, the jeopardy 
associated with this instability, as well as one’s vulnerability to various forms of 
dependence, is intensified. If you are already struggling to make ends meet, then any 
disruption to your income will have dire consequences for your ability to afford basic 
necessities such as food and shelter. Placed on the precipice of absolute poverty in this 
way, individuals are more likely to become dependent on turning to payday lenders, 
pawn brokers, or foodbanks to stay afloat. For example, a 2014 report published by 
Citizens Advice Scotland described cases of individuals for whom the financial 
instability of zero-hours contract work had contributed to spiralling debts, an inability 
to afford food, and destitution. The report concluded that the growth of zero-hours 
contracts represented a direct contributing factor to the rapid increase in food bank use 
and reliance of payday lending services in Scotland (Gowans, 2014, pp.2-3). For such 
individuals, the precariousness of their situation is, clearly, severe.  
We can contrast this situation with precarious workers in comparably well-
remunerated jobs. For example, Hollywood movie directors will often experience 
elements of uncertainty and insecurity in their careers. They often work on a 
temporary, project-by-project basis, with few real guarantees that they will be 
contracted to work on another film in the future. Nonetheless, given the high financial 
rewards available to those who work on multi-million-dollar global blockbusters, and 
the opportunity to accrue significant reserves of personal wealth this provides, the risk 
of sudden, unpredictable job loss does not carry the same magnitude of jeopardy as 
that faced by, for example, the typical zero-hours contract worker for whom this 
strategy of building up a personal safety net of saved income is unavailable due to the 
paucity of their income.  Whilst I am content to acknowledge that the project-based 
work of Hollywood directors is, in the abstract and to a certain extent, precarious, we 
must also recognise that the immediate risk of a disruption to their income can be 
mitigated by their ability to build a ‘nest egg’ of savings and investments to keep them 
afloat should the work dry up. In such circumstances, the true precariousness of their 
situation could be so slight so as to be, in effect, negligible.  
But the precariousness encountered by those employed in precarious forms of work 
need not only be mitigated by large incomes earned through that precarious work. 
Additional sources of income, for example state welfare regimes8 or interest on capital, 
 
8 The relationship between state welfare regimes and precarious work is addressed more expansively 
in Chapter 5. 
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can also, contextually, lessen the severity and intensity of precarious work. To 
illustrate this, we can imagine the case of a university student who accepts a zero-
hours or temporary contract during their summer vacation. Suppose this student is not 
dependent on this work to meet their immediate basic needs. Buoyed by adequate 
student funding, or the generosity of a wealthy family, this student accepts the job as 
a way to generate extra money, to meet new people, or to build up their work 
experience. In such an example, although this individual similarly faces uncertainty 
about their access to work – for example, on a zero-hours contract, there would be no 
guarantee that they will receive any minimum number of shifts at all – they are less 
susceptible to the same forms of dependence. They are more able to, ultimately, take 
or leave the job because, for them, there is much less jeopardy associated with job loss 
thanks to their access to additional sources of income. Their working arrangements 
may be precarious, but, again, the intensity of their precarity could be minimal.  
A final contextual factor that I will consider here is the availability of labour rights 
and protections available to precarious workers. Often, the financial hardship 
threatened by precarious work is further compounded by a lack of such rights and 
protections, leaving precarious workers with few safety nets to keep them out of 
poverty (cf. Rodgers, 1989, p.3; Kalleberg, 2008, p.3; Vosko et al, 2009, p.2; etc.). 
This lack of legal and social protection therefore intensifies the jeopardy, as well as 
the vulnerability, experienced by those with precarious working arrangements.  
In the United Kingdom, although the government has attempted to clarify workers’ 
statutory rights to an extent (e.g. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, 2015), the TUC has estimated that 1.5 million British workers - many 
employed on casual, zero-hours contracts or through temporary employment agencies 
- struggle to access key protective employment rights such as the right to return to the 
same job after a period of parental leave, protection from unfair dismissal, or the right 
to statutory redundancy pay (TUC, 2017a, p.14). Meanwhile, nearly 500,000 in the 
UK employed on insecure contracts do not qualify for statutory sick pay or paid 
parental leave and have no right to be automatically enrolled into a workplace pension 
(ibid., p.15). Many more face further difficulties accessing these rights due to a lack 
of clarity about their entitlement, or through the sheer obfuscation of their employers.  
 
For example, one zero-hours contract worker interviewed by the TUC explained: “My 
boss has never made it clear if I am entitled to sick pay (even when I asked) so I’ve 
worked through illness before because I was worried that I wouldn’t get paid” (ibid., 
p.26). Particularly when your income is low and your work contract insecure, it can 
seem extremely risky to take time off work through illness as this could mean missing 
out on much needed pay, as well as the potential for retributive action by an employer. 
For example, Bloodworth has documented one case of a temporary agency employee 
who was sanctioned under Amazon’s points-based disciplinary system for taking time 
off work while suffering from a migraine. The same worker was pointed again after 
she was injured in a car accident, even though it was Amazon who had sent her home 
(Bloodworth, 2018, p.40). At Amazon, workers who receive six disciplinary points 
are fired. When Bloodworth questioned whether it was legal to discipline workers for 
being sick, he was told, “It is what Amazon have always done” (ibid., p.43). 
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One crucial reason it has become more difficult in economies such as that of the UK 
for increasingly precarious workers to access key legal and social safety nets is the 
decline of the role of trade unions and collective bargaining. This has meant that 
employers have been able to erode worker rights and protections with less resistance 
from labour (Hacker, 2008, pp.66-67; Kalleberg, 2008, p.3; Albin and Prassl, 2016, 
pp.213-214). However, the evolution of the employment relationship itself has been 
another factor that has contributed towards the diminution of worker rights and 
protections. There has been a shift from the traditional, vertical model of direct 
employment within firms. Instead, the employment relationship has become more 
blurred, as corporations establish increasingly complex and opaque, horizontal labour 
arrangements that involve subcontractors, employment agencies, or direct market 
transactions with self-employed “independent contractors” (ACTRAV, 2012, p.27; 
Weil, 2014, p.7; Albin and Prassl, 2016, p.210).  
Because employment regulations have often been designed on the assumption of 
simple and direct employment relationships, this “fissuring” (Weil, 2014) or 
“fragmentation” (Albin and Prassl, 2016) of employment means that businesses are 
able to more easily escape the requirement to provide an array of rights and protections 
to those who provide them with labour. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
contract of employment is the vehicle through which labour rights can be accessed. 
However, courts will not recognise casual work as contracted employment because 
there is no ‘mutuality of obligation’. In other words, there is no formal obligation for 
the employer to provide work on a regular and continuous basis, and, conversely, there 
is no contractual obligation for the individual to perform any work that is offered. This 
means that even if those hired to work on a casual basis have a de facto continuous 
relationship with a particular employer, they are less able to claim legal protection 
(Albin and Prassl, 2016, pp.220-221). As Einat Albin and Jeremias Prassl argue, “the 
effect is a deeply counter-intuitive one: the more precarious (and thus prima facie in 
need of external protection) a working relationship is, the less likely will the courts be 
able to characterize it as one that deserves such protection” (ibid., p.222). 
This effect has been particularly visible within the so-called “gig economy”. For 
example, delivery cyclists working for the firm eCourier are hired as self-employed 
contractors. As a result, they are excluded from most key employment rights such as 
holiday pay, and sick pay. One eCourier rider interviewed by The Huffington Post 
explained the impact of this lack of rights and protections:  
“You’re constantly having to invest in your equipment, and trying to save money 
because when you’re sick - which is quite often, particularly when you start and 
have a lot of injuries because your body is adapting to the workload - or your 
bike gets stolen, then your week’s wages are gone. For the first few years that I 
was working, I was constantly in debt” (Maggie Dewhurst in Hinsliff, 2018). 
This example emphasises the intense jeopardy that arises when work is not only 
insecure, but also bars workers from accessing crucial rights and protections such as 
sick pay. The risk of under- or un-employment - through illness, arbitrary dismissal, 
or family crisis – as well as the deep economic hardship that this would bring, is 
intensified when you are uncertain that you will have robust protections to help you 
through difficult times. Crucially, this dynamic is even more acute for precariously 
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employed undocumented migrants, who have even fewer opportunities to claim 
statutory rights and must also work under the constant threat of detention or 
deportation by the state (cf. Neilson and Rossiter, 2006, p.11; Lewis et al, 2015, p.14).  
However, it is not just that a lack of rights and protections increases the jeopardy 
associated with uncertain and insecure forms of work. This lack of rights and 
protections also contributes towards increasing the likelihood of dependence. 
Dependence on the charity of organisations such as foodbanks, or on high-interest 
payday lenders who are among the only sources of credit to the precariously employed. 
But this lack of protection also increases the level of dependence on the job itself. To 
adapt a phrase used by Standing, the lack of rights and protections at work contributes 
to a “precarity trap” (2011, pp.48-49). The individual, bereft of a reliable safety net, 
becomes increasingly reliant on their own profitability in order to protect themselves 
from potential emergencies. They become beholden to maintaining their job, 
regardless of how low-paid and insecure it may be. When this becomes the only way 
to stay afloat, one’s vulnerability is entrenched ever deeper, and, thus, the severity and 
intensity of one’s precarious work is even more acute.  
We can therefore see how, even though work is always precarious when it provides (i) 
uncertain access to work; and (ii) an unstable source of income, the intensity of this 
precariousness can be exacerbated or mitigated by a variety of contextual factors. 
Where precarious work is well-paid, complemented by additional sources of income, 
and accompanied by a wide array of labour rights and protections the intensity and 
severity of that precarious work can be minimised – potentially so as to be all but 
negligible. However, for the most paradigmatic cases of precarious work today – those 
that will be the central focus of this thesis – this is not the case. Low wages, and few 
protections combine with the precarious organisation of work to leave workers on the 
precipice of severe poverty, ratcheting up the intensity of the uncertainty, jeopardy, 
and dependency that they face in their working lives.   
The emotional and psychological impact of precarious work. 
Given the severity of the precariousness faced by many precarious workers in the 
contemporary economy, it is important to highlight a non-material feature of 
precarious work that is often emphasised in the existing sociological literature, as well 
as many first-hand accounts of precarious work. Importantly, this feature is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of precarious work, it is nonetheless usually 
indicative of its presence and thus plays a valuable epistemic role for identifying cases 
of precarious work. It also alerts us to the fact that precarious work is deserving of 
immediate and sustained normative evaluation by political philosophers. This feature 
is the subjective experience of precarious work; the particular emotional and 
psychological impact of working life in an increasingly precarious labour market. 
More specifically it describes the fear and anxiety of life on a precipice, combined 
with the stress and pressure of the more intense working environment this often creates 
(cf. Kalleberg, 2008, p.2; Standing, 2011, pp.18-20; Näsström and Kalm, 2015, 
pp.556-557; Moore and Robinson, 2016, p.2776; etc.).  
As Richard Sennett has argued, in an environment where individual workers are 
expected to “behave nimbly, to be open to change on short notice, to take risks 
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continually, to become ever less dependent on regulation…It is quite natural that 
flexibility should arouse anxiety” (Sennett, 1998, p.9). Guy Standing articulates this 
stress and anxiety even more forcefully when he describes precarity as involving 
“chronic insecurity…teetering on the edge, knowing that one mistake or one piece of 
bad luck could tip the balance…The precariatised mind is fed by fear and it is 
motivated by fear” (2011, p.20). In this sense, for many people, precarious work means 
constant anxiety – worrying what will happen if your shifts are cut; what will happen 
if you miss the call to work that day; the tyranny of an unexpected bill landing on your 
doorstep and up-ending your ability to make ends meet.  
The often inherent stress and anxiety associated with occupying an insecure position 
in the labour market, the worry that week on week you may not get enough work to 
pay the bills, also manifests in the pressure to perform, compete, and succeed in this 
precarious environment. In this way, working life can come to colonise our personal 
lives, and lead our personal and professional identities to become intertwined. 
Workers can experience an ever-present need to self-improve and self-promote, to sell 
themselves, to refine their personalities, network relentlessly and spend leisure time 
gaining skills in order to set themselves apart from others and increase their perceived 
employability (Standing, 2011, p.122). Indeed, their context encourages them to act 
strategically, “cultivating goodwill and trying to pre-empt bad will” (ibid., p.121). To 
maximise their position they must always ‘go the extra mile’, ‘wear a smile’ and wait 
by the phone ready to work as soon as they are required. In this way, the disciplinary 
pressure to perform and compete that is normalised in the workplace, for example 
through the use of algorithmic management technology (cf. Moore and Robinson, 
2016), comes to represent a way of life as precariously positioned individuals struggle 
to succeed and break away from the jaws of the ‘precarity traps’ they find themselves 
in.  
As the norms and logics associated with precarious work become increasingly 
prevalent within the formal labour market, these pressures can often be felt even before 
individuals enter the labour market. For example, the activist organisation Precarious 
Workers Brigade has highlighted the increasing emphasis on ‘employability’ within 
educational institutions such as universities. Here, individuals are “pressurised to 
continuously do more, perform better and demonstrate passion and commitment in the 
hope that they will be rewarded with a ‘good’ job. As such, the person who is asked 
to demonstrate employability enters a relationship with capital before even necessarily 
being employed” (Precarious Workers Brigade, 2017, p.8). In this way, we can see 
that the impact of precarious work can radiate outwards, extending beyond particular 
instances of such work. It can, indeed, have a wider, more general social impact, 
structuring how human beings interact with each other inside the workplace and the 
labour market, as well as day to day life.  
Although it will be important to consider the implications of this more subjective 
vulnerability, a particular emotional and psychological response is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient feature of precarious work. Indeed, a similar subjective response could 
be experienced for reasons entirely disconnected with the way in which work is 
organised. For example, a paranoid billionaire could, theoretically, experience similar 
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levels of stress and anxiety even though their working life is entirely secure and there 
is a negligible risk that they will not be able to meet their basic needs.  
More pertinently, this subjective response is not a necessary feature of precarious work 
precisely because it is subjective. Some individuals may respond differently to 
inhabiting forms of precarious work. Indeed, some could even respond entirely 
positively to this situation. For example, Bojana Cvejic and Ana Vujanovic have 
highlighted the ways in which workers in the performing arts sometimes romanticise 
low-paid, insecure work, associating it with the avant-garde, innovation and creativity 
(in Puar et al., 2012, p.167). Similarly, a 2016 blog post by then-CEO and co-founder 
of Uber, Travis Kalanick highlighted the positive response certain drivers supposedly 
have towards their “gig economy” working conditions. He even quoted one driver who 
allegedly claimed, “I would quit if they tried to make me an employee, because I value 
my freedom as an independent contractor too much” (Kalanick, 2016, italics in 
original). Although, according to the definition set out in this chapter, these workers 
are employed in forms of precarious work, it is not necessary that they experience the 
negative impact of stress, anxiety, and pressure to perform that such conditions usually 
create. It is entirely possible that some precarious workers may experience their 
situation as subjectively enjoyable or exhilarating. However, to reiterate, one’s 
subjective experience of work does not define whether or not it is precarious. What is 
important for our purposes is that many do experience precarious work as extremely 
distressing, coercive, and consuming. This should be an important reason for us to take 
it seriously, and to investigate its political significance in more detail.  
Conclusion.  
Precarious work is a concept that describes a particular way of organising and 
orientating working life within wider society. Within the contemporary labour market, 
zero-hours contract, temporary, and gig economy work have been identified as typical 
examples of such precarious working arrangements. Such work is precarious because: 
(i) access to work is uncertain; and (ii) the income from this work is low and unstable. 
The precariousness of such work can subsequently be exacerbated or mitigated by 
various contextual features, including the level of remuneration offered for work, the 
availability of additional sources of income, and the presence of labour rights and 
protections. When work is organised in this way, it may impose particular emotional 
and psychological burdens of stress, anxiety, and a persistent pressure to perform, 
though the presence of this subjective experience is not required in order to diagnose 
an instance of precarious work.  
When work is organised in this way it is precarious because: (i) it creates significant 
amounts of uncertainty for those subject to it; (ii) this uncertainty is further associated 
with significant amounts of jeopardy given the significant financial and social costs of 
both un- and under-employment; and (iii) this dynamic can lead to various forms of 
dependency – with the job itself, with one’s employer, with debt collectors or 
landlords, with one’s family members, and multiple other potential agents and 
organisations.  
Having outlined the defining features of precarious work, and having explained why 
these features, in particular, reflect ideas and themes that have long been central to the 
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meaning of the precarious, I can now more methodically analyse the political 
significance of organising work in this way within our contemporary labour markets.  
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-   CHAPTER 3   - 
POLITICAL THEORY AND PRECARIOUS WORK. 
 
Introduction 
Until recently, analysis of precarious work has largely been confined to academic 
sociology, with Sofia Näsström and Sara Kalm’s 2015 paper, ‘A democratic critique 
of precarity’ and Simon Birnbaum’s 2017 paper ‘Equality of opportunity and the 
precarization of labour markets’ representing some of the only explicit discussions of 
the topic by political theorists. In this chapter I will begin to bring the concept of 
precarious work more comprehensively into the realm of political theory, and consider 
on what grounds a normative evaluation might be based. In particular I will explore 
the extent to which we can interpret and analyse the social and political significance 
of precarious work by utilising the conceptual resources and theories of work found 
within the leading schools of contemporary political thought: libertarianism, liberal 
egalitarianism, Marxism, and feminism. This ground-clearing exercise will help to 
emphasise later on in the thesis why an analysis based on republican conceptual 
resources most successfully captures the distinct political significance of precarious 
work. 
I will begin by showing how free-market libertarians are likely to be ambivalent, if not 
actively supportive of precarious working arrangements. In particular I will show how 
libertarians would reject the idea that we can ever challenge the outcome of voluntary 
contracts or demand protection from economic risk on the grounds of justice without 
undermining the liberty and independence of individual economic agents.  
I will then explore how contemporary liberal egalitarian theorists, following the work 
of John Rawls9, are likely to respond to the phenomenon of precarious work. I will 
argue that liberal egalitarianism provides some conceptual resources to identify some 
(though, crucially, not all) instances of precarious work as unjust, and offers potential 
suggestions for how to restructure working life and the wider economy in response. 
However, I will suggest that the liberal egalitarian approach to work, where its 
normative social and political significance is tied to the role that work plays as a 
vehicle for distributing certain liberal values, risks making work centrally important 
to our lives in a way that could have paradoxically illiberal implications.  
I will then turn to Marxist approaches to work and how these could be used to 
understand the political significance of precarious work. Here I will suggest that we 
can discern two distinct ways of thinking about work within the Marxist tradition, 
providing us with different resources for analysing precarity. The first approach views 
work as an essentially valuable part of human life, the way in which we express our 
humanity and realise our individual potential. However, we can also see the way in 
which, within Marxism, work is considered as a distinct sphere of social power; in 
particular how it forms a context and focal point for class struggle. Whilst viewing 
work as a sphere of power provides us with an important basis for building an 
 
9 For the sake of parsimony, I do not consider here versions of liberal egalitarian thought operating 
outside of a broadly-Rawlsian paradigm. 
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explicitly political theory of precarious work, Marxist conceptual resources alone do 
not enable us to sufficiently distinguish between different forms of capitalist wage-
labour and therefore articulate the distinct and specific significance of precarious 
working arrangements under capitalism.  
Finally, I will show how feminist scholars, too, have viewed work as space in which 
power is manifested and exercised. Within patriarchal societies, feminist scholars 
suggest, work is both a product of, and context for, gendered power dynamics, leaving 
women structurally vulnerable and disadvantaged. However, as with the Marxist 
approach, an account of precarious work based solely on feminist conceptual resources 
would not necessarily capture the specific power-dynamics associated with organising 
and governing work in this way.  
By exploring the case of precarious work in the light of the conceptual resources 
associated with libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, Marxism, and feminism, it 
becomes clear that in order to successfully capture its distinct political significance, a 
political theory of precarious work must (i) challenge the libertarian idea that working 
life is always an expression of freedom rather than the site of potential threats to 
individual liberty; (ii) focus on the structural context of work rather than the extent to 
which the form of its content is contiguous with specific values; and (iii) capture the 
specific power dynamics that distinguish precarious working arrangements from other 
forms of work.  
Libertarianism. 
Drawing inspiration from classical liberals such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and 
Friedrich Hayek, libertarians hold that property rights and commercial freedoms are 
central to justice, and view redistribution and regulation as a violation of rights (cf. 
Kymlicka, 1990, pp.95-96; Tomasi, 2012, pp.xi-xxvi; Valentyne and van der Vossen, 
2014; etc.). For this reason, right-wing libertarians10 and other contemporary free-
market political theorists are likely to permit, or even endorse, the presence of 
precarious work in the labour market. One might think it regrettable, but, ultimately 
for these libertarians, economic risk and insecurity, such as that associated with 
precarious working arrangements, is an acceptable – if not inherently valuable – 
outcome of enjoying individual liberty and untrammelled property rights.  
Taking the political philosophy of Robert Nozick as paradigmatic of this free-market 
approach, we can explore why concerns about the prevalence of precarious work in 
the contemporary economy may be anathema to many libertarian political theorists. 
Nozick starts from the Lockean idea that within a perfect state of nature, human beings 
are completely free and have total self-ownership. They are in control of their own 
lives and are free to do as they see fit (Nozick, 1974, p.10; cf. Locke, 1963, p.309). 
The political aim of libertarianism, then, is to protect these natural rights and liberties. 
As Nozick argues, “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group 
may do to them (without violating their rights)…the state may not use its coercive 
apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit 
activities to people for their own good or protection” (ibid., p.ix). For this reason, 
 
10 For the sake of parsimony, I will not here consider here how more egalitarian “left-libertarians” might 
understand precarious work differently to “free market” libertarians such as Nozick and Tomasi. 
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Nozick argues that only a minimal state - one that is “limited to the narrow functions 
of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on” (ibid.) - 
can be justified. Any state more extensive than that necessary to manage free market 
exchange would involve forms of unjustifiable interference and coercion that violate 
individuals’ natural rights. 
Building on this prioritisation of natural rights, Nozick constructs a theory of 
distributive justice that enshrines private property rights and free market exchange. 
This “entitlement theory of justice” argues that “Whatever arises from a just situation 
by just steps is itself just” (Nozick, 1974, p.151). In particular, Nozick argues that an 
individual is justly entitled to their material holdings so long as those holdings have 
been attained through a process of just acquisition or just transfers that respect 
individuals’ natural rights (ibid., p.152).  
In this sense, it is a theory of justice focused on, and sensitive to, history. Nozick urges 
us to consider how a distribution came about, rather than judging that current 
distribution against some external ideal of distributive justice, such as individual merit, 
or material equality (ibid., p.153). This is because, in order to create or maintain any 
ideal distribution, the state would be required to override individuals’ natural rights 
and liberties. As Nozick explains, “To maintain a pattern one must either continually 
interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or 
periodically) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason 
chose to transfer to them” (ibid., p.163). 
Adopting this vision of justice affects how libertarians can think about precarious work 
for two important reasons. First, the entitlement theory of justice enshrines work, and 
especially capitalist employment relations, as a valuable function, and active exercise, 
of individual liberty. This means that even if we are concerned by an individual’s 
precarious employment conditions, we are unable to say that these conditions are 
unjust as they are the result of a voluntary, and uncoerced contract. Second, the 
entitlement theory of justice prohibits the state from engaging in the forms of social 
protection that appear to play a role in mitigating labour precarity (cf. Rodgers, 1989, 
p.3; Näsström and Kalm, 2015, pp.556-557). This means that precarious work could 
be an essential feature of any libertarian labour market. The state is required by justice 
to refrain from paternalistic interference. Therefore, so long as it is the result of “just 
steps” (Nozick, 1974, p.151), any conditions of economic uncertainty, jeopardy, and 
dependence, such as those generated by precarious working arrangements, must be 
left for sovereign individuals to navigate themselves. 
We can explore these ideas in turn. First, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick goes 
to great lengths to show that the capitalist employment relationship is both just, and 
entirely consistent with the enjoyment of our natural right to self-ownership. He argues 
that preventing “capitalist acts between consenting adults” (Nozick, 1974, p.163), 
would require regular state interference that would violate the individual right to 
choose how best to live one’s life (ibid.). For example, Nozick presents an almost 
deterministic vision of capitalism, arguing that even in an ideal socialist society, 
capitalist employment relations would inevitably emerge unless they were suppressed 
through unjust state coercion (ibid.). Nozick further rejects the idea that capitalist 
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wage-labour might be inherently exploitative, arguing that so long as a private sector 
labour-market could emerge as a result of voluntary, uncoerced transactions then we 
have to conclude that selling your labour to a capitalist must represent a manifestation 
of individual choice (ibid., pp.254-255). This emphasises the extent to which, for free-
market libertarians such as Nozick, work – specifically that which takes place within 
capitalist markets – is inherently valuable as a space in which to exercise our 
individual liberty, to engage in free exchange with others, and decide what we each 
wish to do with our lives. 
Nozick extends the idea that working within a capitalist labour market represents our 
capacity to exercise individual freedom by arguing that even work that offers what 
may seem like objectively less favourable conditions can nonetheless be accepted 
voluntarily. To this extent, such work must not be regulated by the state or others for 
paternalistic reasons. To do so would fail to respect the freedom of individuals to 
choose and act for themselves. Nozick makes this argument by drawing an analogy 
with a marriage market. If A is able to freely choose to marry her preferred partner 
(A’), then B is no longer able to marry A’. B instead must marry her second choice 
(B’). This may continue until, ultimately, Z and Z’ have no other choice but to marry 
each other, even though neither was the other’s first choice of spouse. However, 
Nozick argues: “The fact that their only other alternative is (in their view) much worse, 
and the fact that others chose to exercise their rights in certain ways, thereby shaping 
the external environment of options in which Z and Z’ choose, does not mean that they 
did not marry voluntarily” (Nozick, 1974, p.263). In other words, although Z and Z’ 
have chosen to marry a partner that was not their first preference, they were not forced 
to marry each other even though their option set was limited by external factors. 
Moreover, were we to intervene in this market to ensure that Z or Z’ could marry their 
ideal partner, we would have to constrain the freedom of choice and action of others 
in a way that would violate their individual rights. As Nozick reflects: 
“Similar considerations apply to market exchanges between workers and owners 
of capital. Z is faced with working or starving; the choices and actions of all other 
persons do not add up to providing Z with some other option…Does he choose 
to work voluntarily?...Z does choose voluntarily if the other individuals A through 
Y each acted voluntarily and within their rights…A person’s choice among 
differing degrees of unpalatable alternatives is not rendered nonvoluntary by the 
fact that others voluntarily chose and acted within their rights in a way that did 
not provide him with a more palatable alternative” (Nozick, 1974, pp.264-264). 
For libertarians, then, even if people find the content or conditions of their working 
life less than preferable, this is irrelevant with regards to justice as the capitalist 
employment contract is the result of uncoerced market exchange, with people acting 
on the basis of their own idea of their self-interest within the choice architecture that 
results from other individuals pursuing their own free choices and actions. Indeed, 
Nozick makes this idea explicit during his short discussion on meaningful work in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia: “Not everyone wants the same things, or wants them as 
strongly. They choose their employment activities on the basis of the overall package 
of benefits it gives them” (Nozick, 1974, p.249). If people wanted to enjoy some 
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abstract ideal of meaningful work, Nozick argues, they would accept lower wages in 
order to get it (ibid., p.248).  
Nozick’s argument is that we should respect individual choices and the ability for 
people to intelligently decide what is best for them among a range of possible options. 
Individuals navigate the labour market on the basis of what is important to them. They 
are able to weigh various factors and modify their preferences accordingly. If some 
type of work or particular working conditions are important to people, then they will 
be able to seek it out or negotiate it through free contract with an employer. To treat 
people as unable to make such market decisions for themselves would be to violate 
their right to self-ownership and self-direction.  
This argument is strongly echoed by the libertarian-leaning11 theorist, John Tomasi. 
Tomasi reasons that if we hold that individuals should have the economic liberty to 
choose their occupation, we should also value the right for them to decide other 
important aspects of their working life, such as the terms and conditions of their 
employment contracts, their working hours, and so on. Failing to respect individuals’ 
freedom to choose such conditions for themselves would deny them the autonomy to 
be “authors of their own lives” (Tomasi, 2012, p.77). Tomasi concedes that the state 
could legitimately have a role in regulating against workplace conditions that might 
risk the health and safety of employees (ibid., p.110), however, beyond this, he rejects 
any patronising, paternalistic forms of constraint on individuals’ choices and actions 
within the labour market. In particular, Tomasi believes that the economic growth and 
individual prosperity that can be achieved within contemporary capitalism12 makes the 
need for any “economic paternalism”, offered by the state or the collective bargaining 
power of labour unions, redundant (ibid., p.110, pp.60-61). Workers are free to stand 
on their own two feet in the labour market, negotiate working conditions as they see 
fit, and exit employment relationships that are found to be unsatisfactory. Interfering 
in this free market wage-labour exchange would otherwise erode “a special form of 
self-esteem that comes when people recognize themselves as central causes of the 
particular lives they are living – rather than being in any way the ward of others, no 
matter how well meaning, other-regarding, or wise those others might be” (ibid., p.61). 
We are therefore presented with a very clear picture of the libertarian approach to work 
and the labour market, a picture that can tell us a lot about how libertarians can think 
about the phenomenon of contemporary precarious work. If we accept the view that 
 
11 Whilst Tomasi is clear that he is “drawn to the libertarian tradition”, in particular because of the 
emphasis this tradition places on the importance of capitalist economic freedoms, his task in Free 
Market Fairness is to reconcile this libertarian tendency with “left-liberal” accounts of social justice 
(cf. Tomasi, 2012, pp.xiii-xiv). In contrast to true libertarians Tomasi argues that, whilst important for 
the enjoyment of freedom, property rights are not moral absolutes that should limit us to accepting 
completely unregulated economic action (ibid., p.xvii). 
12 This claim seems questionable given the below average growth in many industrialised countries since 
the 2008 financial crisis (cf. IMF, 2017). In addition, environmental limits raise further questions about 
the capacity for, and desirability of, perpetual economic growth (cf. Jackson, 2011). However, beyond 
this, why should we assume that any recent prosperity associated with economic growth has been 
enjoyed evenly (cf. Piketty, 2014; Roberts and Lawrence, 2017)?  How can those without access to 
reserves of private property bestowed by economic growth, who live in expensive rental 
accommodation, or find themselves with high levels of debt, enjoy the freedom, security, and personal 
confidence that Tomasi and others see as linked to the ownership of private property? 
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working life represents an important space in which sovereign individuals exercise 
their right to choose and act as they see fit, then precarious working conditions can 
amount to no more than the morally neutral outcome of free market exchange. On the 
libertarian account, those employed on contracts that offer little job or income security 
have not been coerced into accepting such conditions. Indeed, some workers may 
value the opportunity to substitute job security for conditions that they personally find 
more important, for example flexibility. What is crucial for libertarians is that we 
respect the freedom of individuals to decide for themselves, without paternalistic 
external interference. Indeed, it is such assumptions about the value of free choice that 
underpin the (at least formal) justifications for many precarious forms of employment, 
such as those associated with the so-called “gig economy”. For example, the co-
founder and former CEO of Uber, Travis Kalanick has argued that the company’s 
drivers “value their independence—the freedom to push a button rather than punch a 
clock, to use Uber and Lyft simultaneously, to drive most of the week or for just a few 
hours” (Kalanick, 2016). In this sense, what we have conceptualised in the previous 
chapter as precarious work could, for libertarians, represent a valuable expression of 
individual liberty.  
One could perhaps make the argument that precarious working conditions, in and of 
themselves, undermine the rights and liberties that libertarians seek to protect. For 
example, Nozick is clear that we should respect the Kantian notion that individual 
human beings should not be treated as mere resources to be used by others (Nozick, 
1974, p.33). Libertarians may therefore be concerned when employers hold the power 
to treat their workers as disposable - hiring them on a temporary or casual basis for as 
long as they are profitable, rather than providing a secure and stable livelihood. For 
example, in Amazon’s ‘fulfilment centre’ warehouses, temporary staff are hired to 
meet peak, seasonal customer demand. However, under these contracts, staff can be 
let go at short notice when they become surplus to demand (cf. Jamieson, 2015; 
Bloodworth 2018). Precarious work in such instances, one could argue, violates the 
rights and liberties that are central to libertarian thought by allowing employers to treat 
workers as resources rather than ends in themselves.  
However, it seems that any such claim would be in tension with the overriding 
libertarian value in market freedom, and the historical focus of the entitlement theory 
of justice. As we have seen, Nozick holds that “whatever arises from a just situation 
by just steps is itself just” (1974, p.151). In addition, we have seen with Nozick’s 
marriage market analogy that, for libertarians, working conditions can be just even 
when they do not satisfy the ideal preferences of the employee (ibid., pp.263-264). 
Therefore, so long as precarity is the result of uncoerced market exchange, it would 
be considered permissible on libertarian grounds.  
However, in addition to this approach to free contract and the justice of working 
conditions, a further aspect of libertarian thought that would inform any potential 
account of precarious work is their attitude towards redistributive forms of social 
security and welfare states. As we saw in the previous chapter, the presence, scope, 
and scale of various labour protections should be appreciated as factors that play an 
important role in mitigating or exacerbating precarity within contemporary labour 
markets (cf. Rodgers, 1989, p.3; Jokinen, 2015, p.88; Näsström and Kalm, 2015, 
46 
 
pp.556-557). In particular, state welfare regimes can be seen to offer individuals access 
to additional sources of income that could help lessen the dependency on precarious 
jobs, as well as the immediate jeopardy of variable working patterns and an 
unpredictable income13. However, for libertarians, social democratic welfare states, 
with generous labour rights and welfare protections, are viewed as abrogative of 
individual freedom and natural rights. Their decimation would be welcomed by 
libertarian theorists.  
Nozick’s rejection of redistributive welfare protections arises from the claim that 
material equality, or indeed any distribution of resources according to some ideal 
pattern, is incompatible with liberty (1974, p.160). This idea is illustrated with the 
famous Wilt Chamberlain example, which suggests that a patterned distribution of 
resources, such as material equality, would quickly be upset if we respect people’s 
freedom to do as they choose with the resources they hold under that distribution – for 
example, deciding to each pay twenty-five cents to watch Wilt Chamberlain play 
basketball (ibid., p.161). For this reason, Nozick argues that maintaining some abstract 
principle of a just distribution “one must either continually interfere to stop people 
from transferring resources as they wish or continually (or periodically) interfere to 
take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to 
them” (ibid., p.163). In order to respect individual liberty from interference, the pure 
form of the ‘negative’ understanding of freedom outlined by Isaiah Berlin (1969), the 
state must refrain from the forms of redistributive taxation that could fund a social 
safety net. 
This argument is made even more explicitly when Nozick states that “Taxation of 
earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (1974, p.169). This is because, for 
Nozick, taxation is equivalent to working without pay for the good of someone else. 
He argues that:  
“If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period 
of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve 
apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you 
makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you. Just as 
having such partial control and power of decision, by right, over an animal or 
inanimate object would be to have a property right in it” (Nozick, 1974, p.172). 
To this extent, the interference required to set up a redistributive welfare state would 
unjustly prevent individuals from enjoying freedom of choice an action. It would erode 
people’s natural right to self-ownership and instead allow others to treat them as a 
resource rather than a sovereign individual.  
Tomasi similarly challenges the rationale for forms of social protection, and the 
redistributive taxation that would be required to fund them. Although he claims that 
some forms of tax-funded safety nets may be justifiable (Tomasi, 2012, p.109)14, 
 
13 The relationship between state welfare regimes and precarious work is addressed more expansively 
in Chapter 5.  
14 Indeed, Tomasi (in a move similar to that made by “left-libertarians” such as Philippe Van Parijs 
(1997)) argues against many free market libertarians by claiming that a tax-funded guaranteed basic 
income could help promote libertarian values by providing a widely-shared environment of private 
economic liberty to all citizens (ibid., p.230). Whether a basic income system within an economy 
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elsewhere he argues that European models of social provision “insulate people from 
economic risks”, and deny them “opportunities to feel the special sense that they have 
done something genuinely important with their lives” (ibid., p.80).  
To illustrate this idea, Tomasi draws on Charles Murray’s (cf. 2009, pp.7-9) example 
of a janitor who – by working a difficult job to provide for their family – is able to feel 
that they do something important with their life. However, Tomasi argues, that if this 
janitor lived in a state that provided a social safety net to protect citizens from 
economic risks, this sense of making an important contribution would be undermined. 
This leads Tomasi to conclude that “The experience of risk seems to be an essential 
precondition for…self-respect” (2012, p.80). This intuition echoes the sentiment 
expressed when Tomasi argues that American economic life “exposes people to risks 
of failure and by that very fact offers them a chance for accomplishments genuinely 
their own…Americans can take pride in knowing that their life is significantly one of 
their own creation” (ibid., p.xiii).   
Tomasi challenges forms of social welfare further still, describing such social 
democratic institutions as “a gilded cage”, comparing social safety nets with forms of 
patriarchal marriage – both, he argues, deny individuals private economic liberty and 
thus the ability to direct our own lives (Tomasi, 2012, p.113). Again, the idea here is 
that forms of protection from economic risk prevent people from exercising their 
freedom to choose and act within the market as they see fit. By incubating people from 
the risks of the labour market, welfare states make individuals impotent, dependent on 
the state, with insufficient control over their own lives. For Tomasi, this is a 
patronising and stifling experience that constrains our natural autonomy and destroys 
our self-esteem. “A society that denies people the chance to take up questions of long-
term financial planning for themselves, or that restricts the ways in which individuals 
and families can respond to such questions, thereby diminishes the capacity of citizens 
to become fully responsible and independent agents” (ibid., pp.80-81). Or in other 
words, welfare states prevent us from making our own decisions about how much 
money to save for financial emergencies, and undermine the social importance of work 
as a source of self-respect. 
However, by rejecting forms of social protection from economic risk as unjust, 
libertarians are in principle embracing essentially precarious labour markets. Without 
a sufficient safety net, all workers – but particularly those in insecure forms of low-
paid work – will be perpetually aware of their proximity to poverty and destitution. In 
the event of unemployment or medical emergency they have no protection. 
Nevertheless, libertarians are reconciled to accepting this outcome as it has emerged 
through free market exchange and without the paternalistic interference of the state 
violating anyone’s personal or private property rights. More than this, they may be 
prepared to actively promote forms of precarious labour in order to give people more 
 
organised on otherwise libertarian economic values could help make people’s working lives less 
precarious is a difficult, and ultimately empirical question. However, as we have seen, despite 
supporting a basic income, it is unlikely that Tomasi would seek to eradicate risk and insecurity from 
the labour market completely, as this provides an important source of meaning in people’s lives. For 
libertarians like Tomasi, the threat of economically costly market failure is inherently valuable.  
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private economic liberty and the sense that they are doing something important with 
their lives (cf. Tomasi, 2012, p.80). 
We can therefore see how libertarian thinkers view work – and economic activity more 
broadly - as crucial to our individual exercise of freedom and the maintenance of our 
rights. For this reason, libertarians are confined to accepting the outcomes of (as they 
see it) uncoerced employment contracts and rejecting calls for external interference in 
free market exchange and the resulting distribution of resources. On the libertarian 
view, precarious working arrangements are an entirely acceptable outcome of free and 
just market transactions. To interfere in this outcome would be to humiliate and 
patronise sovereign agents who should be left to make their own decisions about how 
to navigate the labour market – regardless of how unappealing the choice architecture 
may be. To the extent that precarious working arrangements allow employers to treat 
employees as mere resources, this is permissible on the libertarian account of justice 
because such employees are not coerced into accepting these conditions, and retain 
the formal freedom to exit the labour contract at any time. Attempting to protect people 
from risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability in the labour market by establishing forms of 
redistributive social protection would, for libertarians, represent an unjust violation of 
individual rights and liberties, that erodes autonomy and undermines self-respect. 
I find this view unconvincing for a number of reasons. Whilst the libertarian aversion 
to humiliating and patronising constraints on our agency is appealing, the presumption 
is that such constraints are predominantly the reserve of state interference, while the 
power of employers is largely characterised as benign and non-threatening to 
individual liberty. This is because libertarians do not distinguish between arbitrary and 
non-arbitrary power15, failing to recognise the extent that state regulation of the labour 
market and the establishment of social welfare institutions can provide the basis for 
freedom rather than threaten it (cf. Pettit, 1996)16. For example, in a similar fashion to 
Nozick, Elizabeth Anderson draws an analogy between labour contracts and 
marriages. Men have historically held dictatorial power of women within marriage 
relationships. It seems insufficient to say that women can be emancipated simply 
through gaining the ability to enter and exit marriages voluntarily. Instead we should 
also recognise the freedom-constituting nature of regulation that erodes patriarchal 
domination of married women, for example laws punishing domestic abuse. On this 
view, the claim that such regulation represents a form of paternalistic interference that 
undermines the freedom of women appears absurd. Instead these regulations enhance 
women’s freedom from the power of their husbands (Anderson, 2015, p.65). Similarly, 
forms of labour regulation and protection can empower workers and provide them 
with more freedom against employers.     
Libertarianism, in contrast, represents an attempt to reify a pure version Berlin’s 
negative conception of liberty as non-interference in a labour market free from 
regulation, an approach Anderson refers to as the “laissez-faire baseline” (2015, p.49). 
However, regardless of the extent to which an employment contract can be entered 
and exited voluntarily, we may still baulk at the power it allows employers to wield 
 
15 This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
16 This idea is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
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over their employees. Indeed, labour contracts always “involve a somewhat open-
ended agreement to follow orders” (ibid., p.65; cf. Gourevitch, 2015, pp.111-112), 
granting the employer a free-hand to dictate the terms of employment not specified 
within the contract. Free-market libertarian thinkers such as Tomasi may feel 
patronised by a government that limits how many hours they can work in a week 
(2012, p.84), but why should they not also feel aggrieved when an employer is able to 
limit their working hours, or offer uncertain and fluctuating shift patterns from week 
to week with little concern of the financial and personal impacts this could have?   
By focussing so heavily on the historical story of how a given situation has come 
about, libertarians fail to challenge the disturbing power dynamics that exist in the 
here and now, behind every office door or factory gate. Nozick is entirely comfortable 
that Wilt Chamberlain’s basketball prowess should allow him the opportunity to amass 
a greater distribution of resources than others. Yet the question of whether this 
inequality should give Chamberlain access to various forms of social power and 
influence is downplayed. Because of this, the libertarian characterisation of 
contemporary market transactions appears naïve in the extreme. Individuals are treated 
as broadly equal in power, able to confidently pursue their self-interest in any given 
context, and resilient to the pervasive effects of social power both before and after 
signing the labour contract. The employment relationship is viewed as apolitical, a 
benign manifestation of the individual exercise of liberty rather than a potential threat 
to it. In contrast to this portrayal of contract negotiations, Anderson argues, “The 
typical worker, upon being hired for a job, is not given a chance to negotiate. Nor is 
she handed a contract detailing the terms of the deal. She is handed a uniform, or a 
mop, or a key to her office, and told when to show up” (Anderson, 2015, p.50).   
The misrepresentation of contract negotiations within libertarian thought is 
particularly apparent in the case of Nozick’s discussion of starvation as an alternative 
to wage-labour (cf. 1974, p.236). Although the distribution of productive resources 
that empowers one person to hire another’s labour, as well as the negotiation of terms 
to a particular employment contract, can take place without any actual interference or 
coercion, we should nonetheless recognise the role that background contextual factors 
as well as wider, impersonal forms of power, play in undermining our freedom in the 
labour market. In other words, libertarians fail to question whether labour contracts 
may be less voluntary than they might formally seem, how realistic or effective a 
formal right to exit a labour contract may be (cf. Anderson, 2015, p.67), as well as the 
full extent to which our working lives are shaped, and our freedom constrained, by the 
particular power dynamics at play in the workplace and the wider labour market.  
Regardless of the control employers may wield over precarious workers, so long as 
work is accepted more or less voluntarily then it satisfies the libertarian demands of 
justice. On the libertarian view, the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence generated 
by precarious working arrangements inspires ambivalence: whatever its shortcomings, 
precarious work can be considered an acceptable price to pay for freedom from state 
interference in the economy. But more than this, precarious work may even be 
explicitly valued by libertarian thinkers as a way of organising and governing working 
life that enables sovereign agents to experience the self-esteem that comes from 
navigating the risk and uncertainty of the labour market by themselves. In this sense, 
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free-market libertarianism provides a poor, and deeply uncritical, theoretical 
framework with which to analyse, let alone respond practically, to the phenomenon of 
contemporary labour precarity. 
Liberal egalitarianism. 
In contrast to the libertarian reification of property rights and the rejection of state 
intervention in the market this entails, most contemporary liberals argue that 
interference can be permissible, if not actively necessitated, on the grounds of justice17. 
This gives contemporary liberal egalitarians significantly more scope than libertarians 
to respond politically to the phenomenon of precarious work; either by challenging the 
content of the work that people should be expected to perform, or by regulating the 
social and economic background structure  in which working life takes place as well 
as the organisational structures of economic enterprises themselves (the context).  
This tendency towards regulation within liberalism can be seen to date back at least to 
John Stuart Mill, who argues in On Liberty that “trade is a social act. Whoever 
undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest 
of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle comes 
within the jurisdiction of society” (Mill, 2008, p.105). Whilst Mill, nonetheless, still 
extolls the utilitarian virtues of free trade, he argues that it is distinct from the question 
of individual liberty. Restraint on trade is therefore undesirable only because of the 
productive benefits non-interference in the market is believed to create. Crucially, “the 
principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade” (ibid.). 
Breaking the intimate link between free markets and individual liberty has allowed 
subsequent generations of liberal thinkers to argue that interference can be justified in 
order to prioritise the protection of individual liberty – especially when the 
inegalitarian consequences of unregulated market activity could be seen to threaten 
freedom (cf. Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz, 2015). 
John Rawls (especially 1999; 2001; 2005) has been hugely influential in shaping how 
contemporary liberals approach work and the economy. Importantly, his political 
theory has helped to renew the debate about the nature and role of “meaningful” work 
within a just society (cf. Rawls, 1999, p.464; 2005, p.lvii). In particular, it has sparked 
discussions about the social and political character of work, in addition to its formal 
economic and productive role. Rawlsian theorists have opened a debate about how 
work, as a shared burden of our cooperative social lives, shapes our identity, social 
status, and agency; as well as which normative values ought to direct the way in which 
work is governed. Crucially, however, for the most part, the question of meaningful 
work has been treated as a problem of distributive justice (cf. Schwartz, 1982, p.641; 
Arneson, 1987, p.535; Walsh, 1994b; Moriarty, 2009, pp.443-446; Arnold, 2012, 
pp.97-103; Roessler, 2012, p.91; Yeoman, 2014, p.236; Veltman, 2015, p.726; Gheaus 
and Herzog, 2016, p.70; etc.). In other words, contemporary liberal discussions about 
meaningful work seek to answer two questions: (i) what values must be promoted in 
 
17 Note that this interference is still considered an offence to freedom by most liberals, but one that is 
justified on grounds of equality (cf. Anderson, 2015, p.50).  
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order for work to be meaningful; and (ii) to what extent does justice demand that such 
work should be enjoyed more equally? 
Within this contemporary liberal literature on meaningful work, three core values have 
been routinely invoked to act as the central normative principles that should be 
promoted through our working lives: (i) human flourishing; (ii) individual autonomy; 
and (iii) self-respect. This is not to suggest that these theorists solely pursue one value 
to the detriment of all others. Indeed, it is often the case that satisfying other values is 
seen as a crucial precondition of securing one overarching, primary value in working 
life. As such, I argue that we can categorise the different theories of work that underpin 
contemporary liberal accounts of meaningful work according to the normative values 
that are held to take priority. 
The first of these theories prioritises the value of human flourishing. Here work is 
viewed as an important space in which to develop the skills, capacities, and social 
relationships that are integral to living a full, rewarding, and truly human life. This 
tradition of thinking about work can be seen to build on Aristotelian notions of 
eudaimonia, or the happiness that is achieved when we realise our specifically human 
capacities, in particular the capacity for reason (Aristotle, 2000, p.12; cf. Shields, 
2016). Indeed, Aristotle directly challenged forms of ‘mechanical’ work that “renders 
the body or intellect of free men unserviceable to virtue” (Aristotle, 1981, p.454). Such 
work, that requires “too great a concentration…too much mastering of detail” and, 
thus, prevents individuals flourishing and realising their full potential as it keeps “the 
mind preoccupied, and unable to rise above lowly things” (ibid.)18.  
The importance placed by Aristotle on living a life in which we are able to exercise 
our human skills and capacities has informed, and been reinterpreted within, Rawlsian 
political theory. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers his “Aristotelian Principle” to 
explain why individuals are motivated to do some things more than others (1999, 
p.374-375). Rawls writes, “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of 
their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases 
the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity” (ibid, p.374). He goes 
on to explain that “complex activities are more enjoyable because they satisfy the 
desire for variety and novelty of experience, and leave room for feats of ingenuity and 
invention…simpler activities exclude the possibility of individual style and personal 
expression which complex activities permit or even require” (ibid., pp.374-375). In 
other words, Rawls believes that individuals gain greater satisfaction from more 
complex activities as well as those activities that require creative thinking and leave 
room for improvement over time.   
This Aristotelian heritage is now often referenced explicitly within the contemporary 
literature on meaningful work. For example, Andrea Veltman presents an account of 
“eudemonistically meaningful work, or work that contributes to human happiness or 
flourishing by developing or exercising agency, skills, or capabilities, especially 
 
18 However, we should note that, for Aristotle, any paid work or productive labour was considered 
incompatible with living an authentically human life. Such action is conducted merely as a necessity of 
survival, rather than as part of a truly free human life devoted to politics and contemplation (cf. Arendt, 
1958, pp.13-14). 
52 
 
insofar as this exercise meets with recognition and esteem” (2015, p.726). Similarly, 
Adrian Walsh offers an account of meaningful work as “eudaimonian activity” 
(Walsh, 1994, p.241), in which it is important that working life allows individuals to 
realise their intellectual and creative potential. In particular, Walsh stresses the 
importance of exercising “theoretical input”, the ability of individuals to apply their 
own capacity for reason when faced with a task, and respond with ingenuity to 
problems that arise (ibid., p.243).   
Ruth Yeoman, too, seeks to challenge forms of non-meaningful work that undermine 
human flourishing by failing to develop particular human capacities. In particular, 
those capacities necessary for autonomy and self-respect (2014, pp.237-239). Indeed, 
the central claim in her paper, ‘Conceptualising Meaningful Work as a Fundamental 
Human Need’ is that “it is incumbent upon a liberal democratic state to take seriously 
the moral concern that the interior content of much contemporary work stunts the 
human flourishing of workers by failing to meet their fundamental human interests in 
autonomy, freedom and social recognition (ibid., p.237). For example, Yeoman 
suggests that forms of routine, unskilled factory work can extinguish an individual’s 
ambition and stunt their capacity to act autonomously, a capacity that is necessary if 
they are to realise their full human potential and flourish (ibid., pp.237-239). This 
approach is similarly highlighted by Russell Muirhead when he argues that repetitive, 
boring, and dangerous work, such as that associated with assembly line manufacturing, 
fails to provide individuals with the opportunities to develop their capacities and 
potential that they deserve (Muirhead, 2004, pp.170-171).  
Finally, Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzog, in their 2016 paper ‘The Goods of Work 
(Other Than Money!)’, take a slightly different approach. Here they argue that work 
can provide a number of ‘goods’ that are “central to individuals’ flourishing lives” 
(Gheaus and Herzog, 2016, p.80). Importantly, one of these goods is ‘excellence’. This 
refers to the fact that work provides a context in which individuals can strive, improve, 
and accomplish: “Excellence includes the development of one’s skills – for example, 
good judgment – but also the accomplishments resulting from the exercise of these 
skills – for example a good piece of craftsmanship” (ibid., p.74).  
We can therefore see that, as with Veltman, Walsh, Yeoman, and Muirhead, work is 
valued to the extent that it represents a vehicle for individuals to achieve well-being 
and realise their human potential through the exercise and development of important 
skills and capacities. These theorists are therefore more likely to view the work of a 
heart surgeon more favourably than the work of a fruit picker. The heart surgeon is 
required to exercise a wider range of capabilities through her work, much more than 
the fruit picker whose work is often simple, routine, and intellectually unchallenging. 
In addition, practicing heart surgery provides a much greater scope for improving these 
capabilities over time. 
However, in addition to this focus on the exercise and development of human 
potential, these theorists also often emphasise the important social features that 
underpin the ability to flourish in working life. For example, on Veltman’s account of 
meaningful work, work that separates workers from their families or communities 
further disrupts the personal, social relationships necessary for human flourishing and 
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happiness (2015, p.733). Similarly, for Gheaus and Herzog, the other non-pecuniary 
‘goods’ of work that contribute to individual flourishing are: (i) making a social 
contribution; (ii) experiencing community; and (iii) gaining social recognition. The 
first of these describes the satisfaction of knowing that your actions are necessary for 
the smooth functioning of society, and the sense of purpose that results from making 
a difference (Gheaus and Herzog, 2016, pp.75-76). The second describes the feeling 
of belonging available to workers when they do things “together with people with 
whom they stand in relatively free and equal relationships” (ibid., p.76). Finally, social 
recognition refers to the sense of status that is enjoyed when one’s work earns high 
regard from others (ibid., pp.78-79). It is suggested, therefore, that we should value 
forms of work that enable fulfilling social relationships and provide a sense of 
belonging to those who share in joint achievements, as well as those that receive 
positive feedback from both colleagues and wider society. For example, we can see 
how industries like fishing which have traditionally been firmly embedded within 
local communities, whilst also engendering camaraderie and respect between co-
workers, could be seen to provide the social basis through which individuals are 
enabled to flourish. 
We can therefore determine a clear trend within contemporary liberal thinking on 
meaningful work. Here, work is valued to the extent that it enables individuals to 
flourish – to develop skills, exercise capacities, and engage in the social relationships 
that make our lives distinctly human. For such theorists, the fact that much of the work 
within contemporary labour markets fails to provide this space for human flourishing 
raises important questions for justice.  
A second theory of work that underpins contemporary liberal approaches to 
meaningful work, however, instead centres on the importance of autonomy. Here work 
is viewed as posing a potential threat to an individual’s independence, and their ability 
to decide for themselves how best to live their own lives. To the extent that individual 
autonomy is valued in this way, it is possible to discern echoes of the Rawlsian idea 
that each person should be free to rationally design and pursue their own “plan of life” 
in response to the particular conditions that they find themselves faced with (Rawls, 
1999, pp.79-80). We can see this reflected, for example, when Adina Schwartz 
describes non-meaningful work as those forms of work that prevent individuals 
“formulating aims”, or “deciding on means for achieving their ends” (1982, p.634). 
Respecting the autonomy of every individual, Schwartz argues, is incompatible with 
the kinds of jobs where workers have no opportunity to shape the direction of the 
enterprises in which they are employed; where they cannot decide how best to perform 
the tasks that confront them; or where individuals must pursue the ends of their 
employers through predetermined and closely scripted “mechanical activity” rather 
than completing tasks according to their own ideas and initiative (ibid., pp.635-637). 
For Schwartz, living autonomously means “planning effectively to achieve one’s aims 
instead of simply reacting to the circumstances that face one…autonomous agents take 
responsibility for decisions and rationally choose actions to suit their goals” (1982, 
p.635). Richard Arneson can also be seen to value the importance of such autonomy 
at work, when he describes meaningful work as “work that is interesting, that calls for 
intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job that gives the work considerable 
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freedom to decide how the work is to be done” (1987, p.522). Similarly, Beate 
Roessler, in her paper ‘Meaningful Work: Arguments from Autonomy’, defines 
autonomy as “being able to reflect about how one wants to live on the basis of reasons, 
beliefs, motives and desires which are one’s own – not imposed by others for personal 
or political reasons – and to live one’s own life accordingly” (2012, p.73). Again, what 
matters is that individuals are not dictated to, that their ability to think and act for 
themselves is protected. For this reason, work should be designed so as to respect the 
self-determination of each individual by allowing them to influence the processes and 
outcomes of their labour through their own decision-making (ibid., pp.86-88; cf. ibid., 
p.73).  
For these theorists, then, work is considered normatively objectionable when it 
requires individuals to suspend their autonomy and unthinkingly perform actions that 
have been specified by others. Meaningful work is about not simply following the 
decisions of others, but enjoying the ability to decide for oneself how best to overcome 
the challenges associated with working life. For this reason, we can see that such 
theorists would consider the self-directed, creative work of the artisan as more 
meaningful than the simple, micro-managed work of production line manufacturing. 
To this extent, we can consider the extent to which this account of meaningful work 
offers a rival interpretation of the concept of self-ownership found within the 
libertarian literature above. In both instances the sovereign, self-directing individual 
is valued, only libertarian and liberal egalitarian theorists diverge on the sources of the 
potential threats to this independence. For libertarians, autonomy is threatened by 
market regulation and other interference with the free exercise of property rights. For 
liberal egalitarians, such as Schwartz, it is the monotonous content, and hierarchical 
organisation of working life that erodes autonomy (1982, pp.641-642). 
Importantly, for Schwartz, the nature of our work does not just undermine our 
autonomy within the discrete context of the job itself. Instead work can threaten our 
autonomy in all aspects of life. As she argues: 
“When persons work for considerable lengths of time at jobs that involve mainly 
mechanical activity, they tend to be made less capable of and less interested in 
rationally framing, pursuing, and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their 
time. They are thereby caused to lead less autonomous lives on the whole 
(Schwartz, 1982, p.637). 
We can think of this as an account of the ‘formative’ effect of work, the way the nature 
of work shapes individuals, influencing how they see themselves and how they interact 
with the world (cf. Roessler, 2012, p.82). In this instance, the nature of our work 
shapes who we are to such an extent that a lack of autonomy in the workplace makes 
us less likely to pursue lives of self-governance elsewhere. This idea can be 
substantiated with reference to empirical research. For example, Schwartz directs us 
towards the research of Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler whose study of working 
men in the United States suggests a relationship between the complexity of one’s work 
and the degree to which they are able to cope with intellectually demanding situations 
elsewhere in life (Schwartz, 1982, p.637; cf. Kohn and Schooler, 1978, pp.43-48). 
Schwartz argues that these findings show that a lack of autonomy at work undermines 
an individual’s ability to live autonomously the rest of the time as such work hinders 
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them from “developing the intellectual abilities that they must have if they are 
rationally to frame, adjust, and pursue their own plans” (Schwartz, 1982, p.638).  
Samuel Arnold similarly draws on the empirical research of Kohn and Schooler to 
argue that access to forms of complex work that involve a more significant degree of 
individual creative control is necessary for the cultivation of agency (2012, pp.101-
103). For this reason, Arnold concludes that Rawlsians should recognise complex 
work as a primary good, to the extent that it represents one of the “social bases of the 
internal resources of self-governing and social capacities” (ibid., p.98). Therefore, the 
division of labour itself should be subject to Rawls’ difference principle of justice in 
order to reduce the “occupational inequality” that undermines the value of individual 
autonomy (ibid., p.108). Such arguments thus highlight the extent to which work is 
viewed as a potential threat to our ability to live independent lives as autonomous 
agents.  
This is particularly important if, like Roessler, we see work as a necessary part of 
social life (cf. 2012, p.77). If work is not necessarily a source of autonomy in and of 
itself, it is certainly seen by these theorists to inform the extent to which we are able 
to enjoy the value of our autonomy. When the content of work is prescribed and 
controlled in minute detail, rather than allowing individual workers the self-
determination to formulate and achieve their own rational plans based on their own 
intelligence and initiative, it fails to respect the value of their personal autonomy. If 
we must work, and if work plays a central role in shaping the rest of our lives (cf. 
Schwartz, 1982, p.637; Roessler, 2012, p.82; Arnold, 2012, pp.101-102), then, so the 
argument goes, it should be organised in order to respect the value of individual 
autonomy as much as possible. 
However, in addition to the values of human flourishing and individual autonomy, a 
final value that has been invoked by contemporary liberal theorists as a guiding 
normative principle of meaningful work is self-respect. Here, work is expected to 
provide a central source of esteem, dignity, and status for human beings. This approach 
to meaningful work holds that work should help to provide the basis for our status as 
free and equal members of society rather than undermining it. One theorist that takes 
this approach is Jeffrey Moriarty who, drawing explicitly on Rawls’ political theory, 
argues that access to meaningful work should be considered an important social basis 
of self-respect. In this sense, working life should affirm people’s belief that their 
conception of the good is both attainable and worth pursuing (Moriarty, 2009, pp.441-
442).  
To support this approach, Moriarty points to Rawls’ claim in the introduction to the 
paperback edition of Political Liberalism that “Lacking…the opportunity for 
meaningful work and occupation…is destructive of citizens’ self-respect” (Rawls, 
2005, p.lvii; cf. Moriarty, 2009, p.441). This claim is then fleshed out with reference 
to Rawls’ definition of self-respect in A Theory of Justice, where it is argued that in 
order to have a sense of one’s own worth, one must have “a rational plan for life, and 
in particular one that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle” (Rawls, 1999, p.386; 
Moriarty, 2009, p.442). We can recall that the Aristotelian Principle holds that “other 
things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate 
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or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or 
the greater its complexity” (Rawls, 1999, p.374). Self-respect is therefore seen to be 
linked to having a plan for life that is suitably complex and involves the development 
and exercise of our human capacities (ibid., pp.386-387). If work is “monotonous and 
routine...[and] deadening to human thought and sensibility” and requires us to be 
“servilely dependent on others” (ibid, p.464), then Moriarty argues we should reject it 
on the grounds that it undermines an important basis of our self-respect. Mentally 
stultifying work, that requires little intellectual or creative input from the individual 
worker, cannot offer a plan of life that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle. It cannot 
seem worth doing, and so cannot provide us with a sense of self-respect that we all 
have a right to (Moriarty, 2009, pp.449-450; cf. Rawls, 1999, p.54). 
In addition, Moriarty shows how, by suggesting that people must have access to 
meaningful work, Rawls is in effect privileging the work association as a crucially 
valuable source of self-respect, regardless of how much self-respect they may gain 
through other activities and associations in life (Moriarty, 2009, p.450). Moriarty 
justifies this move by arguing that work is an unavoidable and time-consuming part of 
our lives. If our lives are dominated in this way by work that is repetitive and tedious 
then our loss of self-respect is unlikely to be compensated for by any nonwork 
activities we engage in during our spare time (ibid., pp.451-452). Work can therefore 
be valued by contemporary Rawlsian theorists, such as Moriarty, as a crucial, and 
necessary source of self-respect. Again, this value is best served by work that is 
complex, interesting, and that allows individual workers to exercise their own 
intelligence and initiative. On this view, our self-respect is better protected when we 
practice the work of the Michelin Star chef, employing our own intelligence and 
creativity to overcome complex problems in an environment of autonomous self-
direction, as opposed to the routine work of a fast food restaurant burger-flipper that 
requires few skills and little creativity. The task, according to this account, is then to 
design a labour market in which all citizens can enjoy work that supports rather than 
destroys the crucial value of self-respect.   
We can therefore see how the social and political significance of work can be found 
in its role as a vehicle for the promotion of liberal values; in particular human 
flourishing, individual autonomy, and self-respect. We can also see how this approach 
involves relating work to ideas about distributive justice. Working life should be 
organised so that people can access the sort of work necessary to enjoy these crucial 
values more equally. This typically involves ensuring work can offer high levels of 
complexity, variety, and creativity. Indeed, within the contemporary liberal literature 
on meaningful work, we can find arguments for actively interfering in the market in 
order to restructure the way work is organised and governed and thus better provide 
meaningful work to all workers. For example, Veltman has argued that human 
flourishing and a more equal opportunity for self-development could be better secured 
by “rotating routine forms of work, outsourcing unfulfilling work to machines, 
reducing the working day and fairly enumerating all forms of work” (2015, p.740). In 
this way, Veltman hopes, all people could have an opportunity to fulfil their potential 
if we were to limit the range of occupational choice open to them or the amount of 
time that they can dedicate to non-meaningful work. Such an approach contrasts 
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starkly with the laissez-faire labour market promoted by libertarian and free market 
thinkers.  
Other theorists argue that the values associated with meaningful work could be better 
protected through democratising the workplace and the wider economy, in order to 
provide individuals with greater decision-making control over their work (e.g., 
Schwartz, 1982; Arneson, 1987; Arnold, 2012; Yeoman, 2014; Gheaus and Herzog, 
2016; etc). For example, Yeoman argues that a system of workplace democracy that 
allows all workers to participate in deliberative decision-making processes within the 
firm could provide a context in which workers are able to collectively shape their 
working lives according to their own ideas about how best to flourish (2014, p.243). 
Similarly, Gheaus and Herzog emphasise the extent to which “worker cooperatives 
and other structures that include elements of workplace democracy” are well suited to 
protecting the valuable social connections and relationships that allow people to 
flourish in working life (2016, pp.76-77). The value of autonomy has also been 
invoked to underpin arguments in favour of workplace democracy among 
contemporary liberal egalitarians. For example, Arneson suggests that having a 
democratic influence over how our work is organised promotes the self-direction and 
independence of all workers (1987, p.517). Meanwhile, Schwartz argues that in order 
for all workers to enjoy autonomy, jobs must be “democratically redesigned, tasks 
must be shared out in a way that abolishes the distinction between those who decide 
and those who execute others’ decisions” (1982, p.641). Again, this shows the extent 
to which such theorists are willing to interfere in the organisation and structure of the 
labour market and individual firms in order to ensure work represents a vehicle for 
important liberal values. Untrammelled libertarian economic freedom this is not. 
Having outlined the contemporary liberal egalitarian approach to work, we can now 
explore the extent to which such theorists may be able to offer a normative response 
to precarious work within their political theory. In this respect, we are required to 
analyse the extent to which precarity at work either undermines or promotes the values 
that we have seen to be central to liberal egalitarian accounts of meaningful work.  
Certainly, it may seem that many of the forms of work that are often held up as 
examples of precarious work would seem to offend against the value of human 
flourishing. For example, the precarious work of Amazon temp workers is often 
routine, repetitive, and far from mentally stimulating. One of the main activities that 
takes place in the company’s (ironically named, it seems) ‘fulfillment centres’ is 
packing. One former worker has described this job as: “You stand in one spot all day 
minus the breaks and the lunch break. You put what the pickers "pick" and put it in a 
box” (Nolan, 2013). It seems highly unlikely that this kind of repetitive work that 
involves few opportunities for creative or intellectual input would satisfy the definition 
of eudemonistically meaningful work according to theorists such as Veltman or 
Walsh.  
However, we should also consider the extent that precarious working arrangements 
involve the erosion of the social bases of human flourishing, the communal and 
familial relationships that provide the context in which we are able to enjoy 
meaningful work (cf. Veltman, 2015, p.733; Gheaus and Herzog, 2016, pp.75-76). 
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One could argue that the flexible working conditions associated with precarious work 
could benefit our social relationships. Not having a set shift pattern could, in theory, 
allow workers on zero-hours contracts to organise their working lives around 
important family commitments or valuable social engagements. Moreover, there are 
signs that, despite their precarious working conditions, workers can still build 
relationships with colleagues and share a sense of camaraderie. For example, even in 
the intense, and highly individualised environment of Amazon warehouses there are 
opportunities for temporary workers in certain roles to “relax and talk to other 
workers” (Nolan, 2013). Even precarious workers in the “gig economy” are finding 
ways to turn the app platforms they use for work as tools for worker solidarity. For 
example, some UberEats couriers have used the company’s app as a way to make 
contact with their fellow workers and share information about strike action (O’Connor, 
2016).  
On the other hand, however, we must also recognise that many precarious workers 
find themselves atomised and alone, with few opportunities to build valuable social 
relationships in their working life. None more so than the solo Uber driver or 
Deliveroo rider, on their own in a fragmented workforce of one, waiting for 
instructions from their smartphone. Even if we are able to develop meaningful 
relationships, these remain somewhat contingent on our ability to stay in a job long-
term. Rosalind Gill, for example, has described the effects of increasing precarity 
among academic staff, where those on fixed-term contracts can find themselves 
regularly moving from city to city with every new job, or else forced to “commute 
long distances, or to live apart from partner and friends” in order to find continuing 
employment in the university sector (2010, pp.232-234). Under such conditions, 
valuable social relationships are likely to become hard to maintain or nurture over 
time. Other precarious workers remain constantly on standby, waiting by the phone 
for their next shift. Or else they are overstretched by the need to work multiple jobs in 
order to earn enough to survive. In both cases the result is a “leisure squeeze” 
(Standing, 2011, pp.128-129), where precarious workers find their lives subsumed by 
the concerns of the job and are thus unable to participate equally in social or political 
life (cf. Nässtrom and Kalm, 2015). Such conditions are likely to disrupt your ability 
to fully develop and enjoy the social relationships, at work and elsewhere, that are 
seen by some liberal egalitarians to underpin our ability to live a flourishing life.  
Nevertheless, being able to describe socially-isolated, monotonous work as non-
meaningful does not necessarily tell us anything unique or specific about precarious 
work in and of itself. Surely packing boxes in an Amazon warehouse could be thought 
to undermine the value of human flourishing regardless of whether it is performed on 
an insecure, temporary contract or a stable, full-time one. Conversely, it does not seem 
that precarious work must necessarily be routine and monotonous. In the words of 
Pierre Bourdieu, “la précarité est aujourd’hui partout” [precarity is everywhere] 
(1998a, p.95 (cf. ibid., 1998b, p.82)). Indeed, Jacob Hacker has shown that there has 
been a generalisation of economic instability across the American labour market, 
affecting highly educated and skilled workers as well as those at the bottom of the 
labour market (2006, p.28). This picture of generalised precariousness across the 
labour market is similarly borne out by research conducted by the Think-tank for 
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Action on Social Change (TASC) in the Republic of Ireland. This shows how 
precarious working conditions such as fixed-term contracts and bogus self-
employment are increasingly present within highly-skilled occupations as diverse as 
early years education and childcare, financial services, telecommunications, and 
“craft-trades” such as carpenters and electricians (Pembroke, et al., 2017). Taking 
childcare work as one example, we can see that, despite increasingly precarious 
working conditions, the workforce in this sector are usually highly qualified and are 
engaged in a form of work that regularly requires individual workers to develop and 
exercise a range of skills and capacities (ibid., p.1). Such work, therefore, could be 
considered meaningful by theorists such as Veltman and Walsh. The value of human 
flourishing could be promoted even though the work is precarious. In this respect at 
least, the conceptual vocabulary associated with this approach to work in liberal 
egalitarian theory may be ill-suited to articulating a specific normative account of 
precarious work.  
It may also seem as though precarious work need not offend against the value of 
autonomy. Certainly, we can find examples of precarious work where the content of 
that work could severely restrict individual autonomy. For example, temporary 
workers in Amazon’s warehouses have described the experience of working as a 
‘picker’. This consists of: 
“[going around] with a little cart to a conveyor belt and grab 2 plastic 
tubs. With a scanner in one hand and pushing the cart in the other your 
job is to go around to wherever the scanner tells you and "pick the items" 
This involves scanning the tub, then the location bar code, searching for 
the right item (which most of the time is easy to find but sometimes hard) 
and scanning it. Then doing the same thing for the next 10hours of your 
day minus the 2 15minute breaks and the 30min lunch break” (Nolan, 
2013). 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, the use of technology to monitor worker performance 
in real-time and provide constant step-by-step instructions to workers provides 
employers with a level of control that has been described as “Taylor on steroids” 
(O’Connor, 2016) in reference to the ideas promoted by Frederick Winslow Taylor. 
In his 1911 book The Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor argued that 
managers should specify to workers “not only what is to be done but how it is to be 
done and the exact time allowed for doing it” (Taylor, 1911, p.39). Such examples of 
precarious work can therefore be seen to represent the kind of scripted, “mechanical 
activity” (Schwartz, 1982, p.635), with little “freedom to decide how the work is to be 
done” (Arneson, 1987, p.522), that is thought to be so harmful to individual autonomy. 
Indeed, Amazon workers have spoken of the need to create games and competitions 
out of boring, repetitive work “to keep you from going insane” (Nolan, 2013). This 
can be understood as an attempt to invent “simulations of autonomy” (Yeoman, 2014, 
p.241), and fulfil a need for some form of personal control over what would otherwise 
be mentally-stultifying, micro-managed work.  
However, regardless of the particular content of the work undertaken, precarious 
working conditions, such as those associated with zero-hours contracts or work in the 
so-called “gig economy”, are regularly defended on the grounds that they increase the 
60 
 
independence of workers. Indeed, as we have seen, Travis Kalanick argued that drivers 
choose to work for Uber “because they want to be their own boss. Drivers value their 
independence—the freedom to push a button rather than punch a clock, to use Uber 
and Lyft simultaneously, to drive most of the week or for just a few hours” (Kalanick, 
2016). Indeed, this perception of increased autonomy among Uber drivers was also 
encountered by James Bloodworth during his investigation of working practices in the 
“gig economy” (2018, p.252). This suggests that, despite the lack of job or income 
security provided by work in the “gig economy”, these workers can nonetheless lead 
autonomous lives, where they have a capacity to choose when, where, and how they 
work, as they see fit (cf. Wood, 2019, p.3). 
Such claims, however, seem questionable once we consider the possible effects of a 
life without job or income security on our ability to develop and pursue our own 
“rational plan of life” (Rawls, 1999, p.79; cf. Schwartz, 1982, p.635; Roessler, 2012, 
p.73). Indeed, how can we plan our lives when we have little sense of occupational or 
financial stability? Standing has described how those in precarious work are “defined 
by short-termism…induced by the low probability of personal progress or building a 
career” (2011, p.18). One effect of this may be to prevent some precarious workers 
from being able to make important life plans, such as whether to start a family. For 
example, Gill explains: 
“[the number of female academics foregoing having children] may be 
accounted for in terms of the lower numbers of female academics who 
want children, but...increasing numbers also feel unable to do so and 
sustain an academic career, either because the length of time it takes to 
get a secure job (degree, Master’s, PhD, series of temporary contacts) 
makes it too late, or because the intense day-to-day demands of 
contemporary academic employment make it extremely difficult to 
manage” (Gill, 2010, p.234). 
 
Unable to think long-term and design a plan for the future, the uncertainty of 
precarious working arrangements forces people to live perpetually in the present and 
think only about satisfying immediate needs – to secure the next job and make sure 
the bills are paid. In this respect, precarity makes it much less likely that working life 
will provide individuals with the value of autonomy. They are likely to be less able to 
“rationally frame, adjust, and pursue their own plans” (Schwartz, 1982, p.638), or 
develop their own ambitious desires and life goals. Unable to take control of their own 
lives in this way, they instead must be resigned to a certain passivity and accept that 
their fates will be decided by their employers and the wider exigencies of the labour 
market. 
Finally, we can consider the extent to which precarious working arrangements may 
undermine the value of self-respect. As we have already seen, there are many examples 
of precarious work that represent “monotonous and routine occupations” (Rawls, 
1999, p.464) that, theorists such as Moriarty would argue, prevent work acting as a 
crucial basis of self-respect (2009, pp.449-450). On this view, one could argue that the 
intense, boring, and repetitive box-packing work conducted by some temporary 
Amazon workers could be viewed as so mentally-stultifying that their plans of life 
61 
 
cannot satisfy the Aristotelian Principle. Such work cannot seem worth doing and so 
cannot allow individuals to enjoy an equal sense of self-respect. 
However, there may be additional reasons for thinking that precarious work is harmful 
to our self-respect. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls suggests that in addition to having a 
rational plan of life that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle, our self-esteem is also 
supported when we are “appreciated and confirmed by others” (1999, p.386). The lack 
of public appreciation encountered within many examples of precarious work thus 
further suggests that it may pose a threat to self-respect. For example, one individual 
working for the “gig economy” firm, Deliveroo, reported: “sometimes you don’t feel 
human. You’re just handing a bag over and some people take the bag, don’t look at 
you and close the door” (Parkinson, 2017). This echoes the experience of “social 
invisibility” (Veltman, 2015, p.727) traditionally encountered by refuse collectors and 
others whose occupations often garner low levels of public esteem. As Veltman 
argues, “In a social context in which sanitation work does not merit much esteem, 
sanitation workers lack a major source of self-respect and can, in turn, develop a sense 
of themselves as lowly, degraded people” (ibid.). To the extent that those in precarious 
forms of work experience this lack of public appreciation and esteem, their work is 
unlikely to offer a sufficient vehicle for the value of self-respect.  
In addition to low levels of public appreciation, however, those in forms of precarious 
work also experience a lack of respect and esteem from their employers; regularly 
treated without due consideration or dignity, and ultimately seen as disposable. For 
example, the Huffington Post has reported that temporary workers at Amazon’s 
warehouses have been let go by the company without warning once they become 
surplus to requirement. Indeed, there are instances of workers only learning of their 
dismissal when they turn up to work and find that they no longer have access to the 
warehouse building (Jamieson, 2015). This lack of appreciation is also reported within 
“gig economy” firms. For example, in 2016 a Deliveroo worker in Dublin was 
involved in a cycling accident during her shift. On calling the company’s call centre 
to tell them why her delivery would be delayed, she reported: “No sooner had I said 
to the operator that I'd just fallen off my bike, than they were asking me if the food 
was okay. That was the priority” (Irish Independent, 2016). Similarly, a worker for the 
delivery firm Hermes was sacked after rushing from work to be with his partner who 
had just given birth prematurely. That individual was reportedly told that “parcels 
come first” (Bowden, 2017). Such failures to treat employees with equal care, 
appreciation, and human dignity further emphasise the extent to which precarious 
forms of work may be unlikely to promote the value of self-respect. 
Beyond these particular examples of precarious work, and in contrast to Tomasi’s 
claim that the experience of economic risk represents “an essential precondition 
for…self-respect” (2012, p.80), one could argue that precarious work is, in and of itself 
deleterious to our enjoyment of self-respect. For example, Ursula Huws has argued 
that, in contrast to past eras of relative job security, contemporary workers must face 
the “ritualized humiliation” (2014, p.65) of the job interview much more often. Faced 
with repeated experiences of rejection as we desperately seek new sources of work, 
Huws asks “What kind of armor plating do we require to survive this repeated 
battering of our self-esteem?” (ibid., pp.65-66). Indeed, Rawls himself argues in the 
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introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism that, in addition to the 
opportunity for meaningful work, “Lacking a sense of long-term security…is not only 
destructive of citizens’ self-respect but of the sense that they are members of society 
and not simply caught in it. This leads to self-hatred, bitterness, and resentment” 
(2005, p.lvii).  
In this sense, the quotidian experiences of rejection, disposability, and defeat within a 
systemically insecure and precarious labour market is unlikely to lead to the 
empowering sense of self-worth that Tomasi predicts. Instead it can reasonably be 
thought to lead to feelings of deep shame, an emotion Rawls describes as “the feeling 
that someone has when he experiences an injury to his self-respect or suffers a blow 
to his self-esteem. Shame is painful since it is the loss of a prized good” (1999, p.388). 
Rawlsian liberal egalitarians are therefore able to conceptualise precarity as failing to 
treat all individuals as free and equal citizens to the extent that a working life 
dominated by job insecurity threatens to undermine the primary good of self-respect 
that all members of society deserve.   
We can therefore see the how contemporary liberal egalitarianism can provide 
conceptual resources with which to normatively evaluate precarious work. The 
political significance of work is found in the extent to which it acts as a vehicle for the 
realisation of particular liberal values, namely human flourishing, individual 
autonomy, and self-respect. We can see how instances of precarious work can pose a 
threat to the equal enjoyment of these values; either because they involve non-
complex, monotonous activity, they disrupt the ability to build valuable social 
relationships, they prevent individuals designing a long-term plan of life, or fail to 
provide people with the esteem and appreciation they are due. Liberal egalitarianism 
therefore encourages us to understand the political significance of precarious work as 
a question of distributive justice. If the precarious organisation and governance of 
work prevents us from enjoying these important values in our working lives in a 
sufficiently equal way, then liberal egalitarians have the capacity to consider it unjust. 
However, we should exercise caution with regards to this liberal egalitarian approach. 
By focussing on the importance of providing equal access to meaningful work, these 
theorists risk making work a centrally important source of value in our lives. This 
could have a number of problematic implications. First, we may be concerned that 
making work a crucial source of a particular value could legitimise forms of 
paternalistic interference over individuals’ choice of occupation. In this sense, the 
promotion of meaningful work may be in tension with the liberal concern for neutrality 
by arbitrarily promoting one conception of the good over others (cf. Arneson, 1987, 
pp.517-545). Rawls himself is clear in his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, that the 
“kind of work people do, and how hard they do it, is up to them to decide in light of 
the various incentives society offers” (2001, p.64). However, as we have seen, many 
within the contemporary debates around meaningful work support reorganising work 
in order to ensure certain values are more equally enjoyed in working life. For 
example, Veltman is certain that we should actively transform labour markets in order 
better provide individuals with the opportunity to flourish at work. She argues,  
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“Work impacts the person, and it does not serve the aims of social justice to 
ignore the impact of work upon the worker, or to appeal to a plurality of sources 
of fulfillment in life as a justification of social and economic systems in which 
some have meaningful work and flourish accordingly, while others are mired in 
less meaningful work and suffer the ramifications thereof” (Veltman, 2015, 
p.740) 
Despite this argument, however, we may nevertheless challenge the implication that 
some distant political theorist knows what type of work is best for us – particularly 
when the preferred types of intellectually demanding, autonomous, and creative work 
reflect the form of academic, philosophical work that political theorists presumably 
enjoy performing themselves. How would such a theorist respond to someone who, 
like the janitor example offered by Murray and Tomasi, genuinely feels that their 
unskilled, simplistic, and routine work is meaningful to them (cf. Murray, 2009, pp.7-
9; Tomasi, 2012, p.80)?  
Relatedly, we may question the extent to which work must be such a central source of 
value in our lives. As we have seen, Moriarty suggests that this is the case because of 
the social fact that work currently represents a uniquely necessary and time-consuming 
aspect of life (2009, p.452). However, rather than necessarily weaken the centrality of 
work in human life, we are told to transform its content or organisation in order to 
ensure it represents a vital space in which to find meaning and value. This conclusion 
can seem unattractive given the already ongoing erosion of work-life balance in many 
industrial nations and the concurrent rise of “time poverty” (for example, see 
Burchardt, 2008). Is ensuring that work acts as a vehicle for flourishing, autonomy, or 
self-respect enough if we, nevertheless, have fewer opportunities to explore other 
valuable aspects of life because of our work commitments? Should we instead seek to 
resurrect the twentieth century desire to reduce the grip of work over human life (cf. 
De Grazia, 1962; Keynes, 1963)? 
This question has further important implications. By making work itself a vital source 
of value, would liberal egalitarians implicitly empower those in a position to control 
access to work? Employers could, for example, be able to encourage individuals to 
work longer hours without extra remuneration on the basis that their work is crucial 
for their enjoyment of human flourishing, autonomy, or self-respect. Kathi Weeks, for 
example, has argued that the proliferation of a work ethic that links work with dignity 
and status has played a crucial role in the continuing rationalisation and legitimation 
of long working hours in the United States (2011, p.11). In this way, we should 
consider and normatively analyse the extent to which work represents a context for 
the exercise of power as well as the realization of certain values.  
However, despite the potential problems associated with valuing a certain conception 
of meaningful work, one could nevertheless argue that liberal egalitarianism is not 
only able to provide the basis for a normative critique of precarious work, but also a 
clear solution. As we have already seen, in contrast to free market libertarian thinkers, 
liberal egalitarians think that justice may require significant state interference in the 
structure and organisation of the firm and the wider labour market. It may be argued 
that, by reorganising the labour market in order to better ensure more equal access to 
meaningful work, these liberal egalitarians would also be promoting a labour market 
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that is less precarious in significant ways. For example, as we have seen, a number of 
theorists believe that work is more likely to act as a vehicle for human flourishing, 
autonomy, or self-respect if the workplace is democratically organised (e.g., Schwartz, 
1982; Arneson, 1987; Arnold, 2012; Yeoman, 2014; Gheaus and Herzog, 2016; etc). 
Although models of workplace democracy vary, at the very least they could involve 
providing workers with an element of participation within the decision-making 
processes of an otherwise hierarchically-organised, capitalist-owned firm. Under such 
a system, workers would have an opportunity to exercise their democratic voice within 
the firm to challenge precarious working conditions such as temporary or zero-hours 
contracts. Working conditions would need to conform to the interests of the workforce, 
not just the convenience of the employer. Although precarity may not be the avowed 
reason behind arguments for democratising the workplace within the literature on 
meaningful work, this move towards greater democracy could nevertheless help to 
make our working lives less precarious19.    
Beyond interfering in the market in order to make work more meaningful, however, 
we may ask to what extent the comprehensive restructuring of the economy that is 
required to achieve Rawlsian justice in general could inherently eradicate precarious 
work. For example, Martin O’Neill has emphasised the extent to which Rawls sought 
to transform the economy beyond even the welfare-state capitalism that is regularly 
dismissed by libertarian critics. Instead, realising his theory of justice would require a 
potentially more radical socioeconomic regime of “property-owning democracy” 
(O’Neill, 2009, p.379; cf. Rawls, 2001, pp.138-139)20. Under such a scheme, the 
ownership of wealth and capital will be shared much more evenly across the citizenry, 
rather than allowing a small class to control productive resources and monopolise the 
economic and political power this provides (Rawls, 2001, p.139). In contrast to relying 
on the “ex post redistribution of income and wealth” (O’Neill, 2009, p.383) from a 
rich elite in a system of welfare state capitalism, property-owning democracy would 
involve the “ex ante compression of objectionable economic inequalities” (ibid., 
p.384) by more equally distributing the ownership of “productive assets and human 
capital (that is, education and trained skills)” (Rawls, 2001, p.139) from the outset. 
For Rawls, this system would “put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs 
on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality” (ibid.), rather than 
create passive recipients of welfare payments with no sense of their own agency 
 
19 The value of workplace democracy as a practical response to precarious work is addressed more 
comprehensively in Chapter 5. 
20 Rawls also suggests that his two principles of justice could be met within a “liberal socialist” regime, 
whereby a number of democratically-controlled firms share ownership of the means of production 
between themselves, and compete freely within the market (2001, p.138). In contrast to property-
owning democracy, Rawls gives few details on liberal socialism within Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. Moreover, O’Neill has suggested that there would, in effect, be little difference between 
a regime of liberal socialism and one of property-owning democracy (2009, p.393, note 10), while Alan 
Thomas has argued that any regime of liberal socialism could not satisfy the demands of Rawlsian 
justice unless it emerged from within an already-existing property-owning democracy (2016, p.218). 
However, the relation between liberal socialism and property-owning democracy, or, indeed, the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of either regime is beyond the present scope of this thesis. Instead, I 
only aim to show that some economic regime that justifies interference with laissez-faire market 
freedoms on the basis of Rawlsian principles of justice could, plausibly, address labour market precarity 
in significant ways.  
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(O’Neill, 2009, p.384). Property-owning democracy, unlike welfare state capitalism, 
would therefore allow all to enjoy the shared sense self-respect available to free and 
equal citizens (Rawls, 2001, pp.139-140).  
Whilst Rawls provocatively labels property-owning democracy as “an alternative to 
capitalism” (2001, pp.135-136), it seems that it should instead be considered a more 
equal form of capitalism, or a capitalism without a distinct capitalist class. Productive 
property is still owned privately, only it is less concentrated in the hands of a privileged 
elite. Dispersing ownership of capital in this way not only prevents one part of society 
from dominating economic and political life, but also provides all citizens with the 
means to actively pursue their own valuable plan of life and affirm their free and equal 
status with their fellow citizens. They will be provided with the social bases of self-
respect (cf. O’Neill, 2009, p.384).  
In this respect we can see certain similarities with the free-market theory offered by 
Tomasi. Citizens enjoy an important source of self-respect when they are able to 
exercise agency and represent themselves in the market, rather than rely on the 
beneficence of state regulation or welfare. Whilst Tomasi believes the bounty of the 
free market will provide citizens with the prosperity required to self-confidently 
navigate the market, Rawls thinks that this can only be made possible if we actively 
interfere in the market to ensure the economy is structured in a sufficiently egalitarian 
way. For example, O’Neill suggests that a property-owning democracy would need to 
involve placing significant limits on the ability of citizens to transfer their wealth 
through subsequent generations, in order to prevent the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of an elite over time (2009, p.382).  
Nevertheless, we may have reasons to believe that instituting a property-owning 
democracy could make working life less precarious. The widespread dispersal of 
productive property would allow all citizens to have personal control of (some) private 
wealth. In this sense, even in the event of economic disaster or unemployment, all 
citizens will have a share of personal capital to fall back on. Under such circumstances, 
the intensity of the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence generated by precarious 
working arrangements could be significantly mitigated.  
Moreover, Rawls does not intend to dismiss the provision of welfare completely from 
the property-owning democracy. Indeed as he clarifies, “The intent is not simply to 
assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), 
but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a 
suitable degree of social and economic equality” (2001, p.139, my italics). Therefore, 
even in the worst cases where citizens have no private source of income, they can 
nevertheless rest assured that they will have the right to some public assistance. The 
severity of precarious working arrangements would dissipate when the immediate 
jeopardy of losing one’s livelihood is reduced in this way.  
Finally, by providing all citizens with the material resources necessary to share in 
control of economic life, they may be able to influence working conditions (cf. 
O’Neill, 2009, p.382, p.384) in order to make them less precarious. For example, 
citizens will have the materially-reinforced status to more forcefully, and effectively, 
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challenge employment conditions that they find to be undesirable21. These could 
include conditions that make working life more precarious such as insecure, temporary 
or zero-hours contracts. We can therefore suggest that, regardless of whether the 
prevalence of precarious work is seen to undermine justice in and of itself, liberal 
egalitarians pursuing a Rawlsian vision of economic and social justice are likely to 
promote an economic model that could be much less precarious than those we current 
find ourselves in. 
We can therefore see how we can evaluate precarious work within liberal egalitarian 
theory. Work is a normatively significant to the extent that it can represent a vehicle 
for crucial liberal values such as human flourishing, individual autonomy, or self-
respect. In this respect, the organisation of work becomes a question of distributive 
justice – do citizens have access to the values that make working life meaningful to a 
sufficiently equal degree? As we have seen, examples of precarious work can 
undermine one or more of these values in significant ways. Though it is not clear 
whether labour market precarity in the abstract is always, essentially deleterious to all 
of these values, we can see that precarious work does, in particular, pose a strong threat 
to our self-respect. Insecure working arrangements undermine our sense of self-esteem 
to the extent that they prevent us from interacting with one another on a footing of 
freedom and equality. In this sense, liberal egalitarianism provides us with the 
conceptual resources to say that instances of precarious work can instrumentally 
undermine justice. Precarious work is normatively objectionable in so far as it 
prevents work from representing a primary good and a crucial source of liberal value. 
However, this approach may itself raise normative problems to the extent that making 
work a central source of value in our lives could have paternalistic and even 
exploitative implications.  
In contrast to free-market and libertarian theories, liberal egalitarianism further 
provides us with the conceptual resources to justify extensive interference within the 
labour market and the wider economy. As we have seen, Rawls himself suggests that 
his principles of justice demand the extensive reorganisation of the economy towards 
establishing a property-owning democracy. Rather than reifying the sanctity of private 
property rights and free market transaction, a liberal egalitarian approach to precarity 
could allow us to propose wide-ranging regulations as well as purposive forms of 
(p)re-distribution that could make our economic lives less precarious. To the extent 
that work is a shared burden of social cooperation, it should align with the principles 
of justice owed to all citizens. To the extent that precarity offends against the principles 
of justice, we are justified in remedying it.  
Marxism. 
The Marxist tradition of political thought is one in which the social and political role 
of work is centrally important. By looking across the foundational texts of Marxist 
thought, I will argue that we can discern at least two distinct, overlapping ways of 
thinking about work in this tradition. The first suggests that the significance of work 
rests in its connection to human nature; that our ability to transform the natural world 
 
21 The idea that the availability of additional sources of income could allow individuals to wield greater 
influence over the terms and conditions of their work will be explored more fully in Chapter 5. 
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through productive activity is integral to our humanity. This intrinsic value of work in 
human life, however, is seen to be corrupted by a capitalist mode of production in 
which labour becomes a means of basic survival rather than an exploration, exercise, 
and enjoyment of our unique human capacities.  
However, we can also see how, within the Marxist tradition, the social significance of 
work is understood to stem from the extent to which it represents a distinct context for 
power; in particular, the extent to which work acts as a focal point for class struggle.  
I will now explore these two approaches to work in turn, and show how each can help 
us to think about precarious working arrangements in the contemporary labour market.  
That work is intrinsically tied to what it means to be human is not an idea unique to 
Marxist thought. Indeed, it can be found as a prevalent (though by no means universal) 
theory of work within the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition. Here, God’s creation in 
the Genesis myth has been conceptualised as a “sublime” labour (cf. Le Goff, 1980, 
p.115), but one that was nonetheless an exhausting toil – hence the need for rest 
commemorated through the Sabbath (cf. Rose, 1985, p.28). Given that humanity is 
believed to have been created by God in His own image, the essential purpose of 
human beings on Earth is to act as fellow-workers to God, helping in the completion 
of His creation (cf. Benz, 1967, pp.122-125). However, within this tradition, work has 
also been viewed as intrinsic to the human soul in a more negative sense, with work 
viewed as humanity’s penitence for the sins of Adam and Eve (Le Goff, 1980, p.115; 
Parker, 1983, p.14; Rose, 1985, p.28). In this sense, work is indelibly linked to the 
essence of human life. It is both our spiritual duty and the purpose of our creation. To 
work is to be truly human. Indeed, this understanding of work still finds influence in 
the contemporary church. For example, in his Laborem Exercens, Pope John Paul II 
argued: 
“Man is made to be in the visible universe an image and likeness of God himself, 
and he is placed in it in order to subdue the earth. From the beginning therefore 
he is called to work. Work is one of the characteristics that distinguish man from 
the rest of creatures, whose activity for sustaining their lives cannot be called 
work. Only man is capable of work, and only man works, at the same time by 
work occupying his existence on earth. Thus work bears a particular mark of man 
and of humanity, the mark of a person operating within a community of persons. 
And this mark decides its interior characteristics; in a sense it constitutes its very 
nature” (John Paul II, 1981) 
In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Karl Marx makes an argument 
for a similarly central role of work in defining what it means to live a truly human life. 
This is most clearly articulated in discussion of the way in which the capitalist system 
of production alienates us from our “species being” (MECW, 3, pp.275-277)22. Here 
Marx makes the claim that, for human beings “the productive life is the life of the 
species” (ibid., p.276). In other words, our innate humanity rests in our ability to 
transform the natural world through productive activity. Moreover, Marx recognises 
 
22 Citations from MECW hereafter refer to a volume and page number in Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1975-
2005) Collected Works, 50 volumes, London: Lawrence and Wishart, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
New York, N.Y: International Publishers. 
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that, unlike animals, human beings produce beyond the extent necessary for mere 
survival (ibid., pp.275-276). Other creatures may build shelters, but only human 
beings create cathedrals, universities, and other structures that serve no immediate 
purpose to our basic survival. To produce, then, is the unique essence of what it is to 
be human, As Marx states: 
“It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves 
himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through 
this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour 
is, therefore, the objectification of man's species-life: for he duplicates himself 
not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and 
therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created” (MECW, 3, p.277) 
In this sense, it is distinctly and essentially human to alter nature through work in order 
to make our ideas reality – to turn earth into bricks, bricks into buildings, buildings 
into cities. Our human nature is to exercise our particular physical and mental 
capacities to observe the world around us and to change it through productive activity. 
However, Marx argues that under capitalism, where labour is bought and sold as a 
commodity, work fails to represent an expression of our unique human essence and 
instead becomes an instrument of basic survival (MECW, 3, p.277). Rather than 
working beyond the necessities of our physical needs in order to shape reality 
according to our imaginations, we must instead sell our labour power to others and 
work only so that we may attain the wages necessary to continue our existence23. Work 
thus becomes instrumental rather than intrinsic to human life. As Marx argues, 
“estranged labour makes man’s species life a means to his physical existence” (ibid.). 
Similarly, The Communist Manifesto describes “a class of labourers, who live only so 
long as they find work” (MECW, 6, p.490). Workers are dehumanised, and 
commodified. Indeed, Marx claims the worker “sinks to the level of a commodity 
and…becomes the most wretched of commodities” (MECW, 3, p.270). Again, from 
The Communist Manifesto: “labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a 
commodity, like every other article of commerce” (MECW, 6, p.490). Capitalism 
therefore corrupts the inherent value of work. Workers lose the opportunity to live a 
truly human life when work represents no more than a mere means to our survival. 
Under such conditions, work loses its unique ontological connection to humanity.  
In relation to this idea, Marx discusses the extent to which, within a capitalist mode of 
production, we are alienated from “the act of production within the labour process” 
(MECW, 3, p.275). He claims that “labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not 
belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself 
but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his 
physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind” (ibid., p.274). 
Later he argues:  
“The simplification of the machine, of labour is used to make a worker out of the 
human being still in the making, the completely immature human being, the 
child—whilst the worker has become a neglected child. The machine 
 
23 This is similarly echoed by Hannah Arendt when she writes that in modern societies “Whatever we 
do, we are supposed to do for the sake of “making a living”” (1958, pp.126-127). 
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accommodates itself to the weakness of the human being in order to make the 
weak human being into a machine” (MECW, 3, p.308) 
Here the inherent value of work is further corrupted by the dehumanising experience 
of capitalist labour, where work activity is not only removed from our control but 
actively represents a barrier to exercising our humanity. In particular, we can see the 
extent to which this is related to the way in which capitalist labour fails to exercise our 
capabilities or realise our individual potential. This idea is echoed in The Communist 
Manifesto, with the claim that “the work of the proletarians has lost all individual 
character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage 
of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily 
acquired knack, that is required of him” (MECW, 6, pp.490-491). We can therefore 
see how the inherent value of work is lost in a system that transforms work into a 
dehumanising process, one that limits the potential of individuals to develop skills and 
capacities. Work is devalued when it is simplistic, repetitive, and treats the individual 
worker as a tool rather than a human being.  
In a famous passage on work in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels reiterate this 
critique of a distribution of labour that limits our potential, whilst also presenting a 
more attractive vision of work: 
“as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, 
exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot 
escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must 
remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in 
communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each 
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general 
production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, 
fisherman, shepherd or critic” (MECW, 5, p.47). 
We can therefore see, again, how the capitalist mode of production dehumanises us by 
limiting us to discrete tasks. Instead, work should affirm our humanity by providing a 
sphere in which to develop a range of skills and capacities as we see fit. Those 
restricted to the singular life of the hunter or the fisherman fail to realise their 
capacities that could be exercised through the experience of sheep herding, just as a 
life of industrial factory production can fail to exercise an individual’s human capacity 
for artistic creativity. In order to realise the inherent value of work in human life, we 
should ensure that we have the opportunity to realise a range of skills in our work 
activity.  
A related argument, I think, can be found in Grundrisse, when Marx argues, contrary 
to Adam Smith, that it is wrong to view labour as a curse: 
“the overcoming of…obstacles is in itself a manifestation of freedom—and, 
moreover, that the external aims are [thereby] stripped of their character as 
merely external natural necessity, and become posited as aims which only the 
individual himself posits, that they are therefore posited as self-realisation, 
objectification of the subject, and thus real freedom, whose action is precisely 
work” (MECW, 28, p.530, my italics). 
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Again, the inherent value of work is found in the extent to which it provides a space 
in which to realise our potential. To take on aims of our choosing, and overcome 
difficult challenges24 through our own initiative and ingenuity. To strive to develop 
new capacities, rather than allow ourselves to ossify through a life of simplicity and 
mediocrity. In other words, the inherent value of work is found in the extent to which 
it allows us to live a full human life, rather than one that is diminished, curtailed, and 
circumscribed.  
We can therefore see how, within Marxist thought, there is an approach to work, in 
the abstract, that views it as essentially valuable to human life. Work offers more than 
a means to our existential continuity, but also a source of deeper ontological meaning. 
To work is to be human. It provides a space in which to develop our capacities and 
realise our potential. However, the value of work is corrupted under capitalism. The 
estranged, or alienated labour encountered within the capitalist mode of production 
degrades “spontaneous, free activity to a means…[and] makes man's species-life a 
means to his physical existence” (MECW, 3, p.277). Under such conditions we are 
denied the opportunity to live an essentially human life in which our labour expresses 
our ability to flourish and not just merely survive. 
To what extent does this approach to work help us to specifically think about 
precarious work? We may argue that precarious forms of capitalist employment are 
particularly alienating and dehumanising, or else emphasise this general feature of 
working life under capitalism more clearly. The value of work as an expression of our 
humanity is further undermined when our work is not just reduced to a mere means of 
survival, but cannot even necessarily guarantee that. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, precarious working conditions are often associated with instances of in-work 
poverty, with unpredictable incomes making it harder for workers to make ends meet. 
In the United Kingdom, the TUC has estimated that insecure work is often 
accompanied by a severely diminished income in contrast to those employed on less 
precarious conditions. They found that “compared to the pay of an average employee: 
workers on a zero-hours contract experienced a 34 per cent hourly pay penalty; 
workers in agency work had a 20 per cent hourly pay penalty; those in casual work 
had a 39 per cent hourly pay penalty, and those in seasonal work a 37 per cent lower 
hourly rate” (TUC, 2017a, p.14). Indeed, recall how many Uber employees in the 
United States have been forced to live in their vehicles as the low and unstable nature 
of their income has left them unable to afford a home (for example, see Green and 
Levin, 2017). The proximity to, and reality of, poverty experienced by many in the 
today’s precarious labour market drives home the extent to which their work 
represents an attempt to survive, rather than an expression of their humanity. It is 
necessary as a means to food, clothing, shelter and the bare necessities of life, rather 
than something that transcends our physical needs and allows us to flourish. 
Perversely, it may be when waged work fails as a means to sustaining human life that 
this aspect of capitalism becomes more clearly visible. 
Beyond this, one could argue that the relentless presence of precarious work in the 
lives of those employed in it reiterates the dehumanising commodification of 
 
24 See also Elster, 1986. 
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individuals within capitalism. Life becomes defined by the spectre of work: waiting 
by the phone in the uncertain anticipation of the next shift, devoting more time to job 
searches, or catching up with work outside the workplace so as to curry the favour of 
your employer. Indeed, Guy Standing has argued that precarious working conditions 
can involve “a blurring of workplaces, home places and public places”, while “Virtual 
workplaces have proliferated, with employees working ‘at home’ or wherever they 
want” (2011, p.38). In this sense, there is no escape from work. The precarious worker 
is constantly reminded of their commodification in the market and the existential 
necessity of their labour; that they live to work rather than live through work. To 
succeed in the precarious labour market, you cannot clock off, you must always be 
available to work. Anywhere. Any time.   
However, in addition to the idea that work’s inherently valuable role in human life has 
been undermined by the capitalist system, the Marxist tradition can also be seen to 
contain a second, more explicitly political theory of work. Here work is viewed not 
just as an essential part of the human experience, but as a distinct sphere of social 
power.  
In particular, Marx emphasises the extent to which work, under capitalism, provides a 
focal point for class conflict. As described in The Communist Manifesto, industrial 
societies are riven into two antagonistic classes, the Bourgeoisie and Proletariat 
(MECW, 6, p.485). Engels clarifies this in a note to the 1888 English edition of The 
Communist Manifesto: “By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, 
owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By 
proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production 
of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live” (ibid., p.482, 
footnote *).  
By virtue of their materially-defined class position, then, the Bourgeoisie leverages 
power over the Proletariat in order to exploit them. Workers, compelled by the 
necessity to survive, have little choice but to feed the profits of the capitalist class by 
selling their labour power for less than its actual productive value (MECW, 35, p.227). 
Indeed, “the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so 
far as the interest of the ruling class requires it” (ibid., p.499). Workers are therefore 
subject to “THE RULE OF CAPITAL OVER LABOUR” (MECW, 3, p.250, original 
capitalisation), they are forced to serve the interests of the Bourgeois class.  
In this way, work is at the heart of modern class struggle. All workers, due to their 
position in the class dichotomy are reliant upon the property-owning class to whom 
they must sell their labour in order to survive. The Bourgeoisie as a class exercise 
power over the entirety of the Proletariat as a class. It is therefore able to dictate to the 
Proletariat, for example, the terms of the working day (cf. MECW, 35, p.243), and the 
level of wages paid (cf. MECW, 3, p.235). By virtue of their class position, any 
capitalist will prevail over any worker in determining the conditions of employment. 
The reliance of the worker on the capitalist means they will always cave to the 
conditions set by one capitalist or another. “Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist. 
The capitalist can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the 
capitalist” (ibid.). The shape of working life, for all of us, is therefore the result of the 
72 
 
property-owning Bourgeoisie exercising class-power over those without property of 
their own.  
This collective class-power, however, also takes a more proximate and individualised 
form. Indeed, each workplace itself becomes a space in which individual capitalists 
exercise their power over individual workers: 
“Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into 
the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into 
the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they 
are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. 
Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they 
are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, 
by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this 
despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful 
and the more embittering it is” (MECW, 6, p.491). 
In Capital, too, Marx echoes the idea that individual workers are placed under the 
controlling power of individual capitalists, describing the “barrack discipline” 
(MECW, 35, p.426) of the workplace, where each employer “formulates, like a private 
legislator, and at his own good will, his autocracy over his workpeople…The place of 
the slave-driver's lash is taken by the overlooker's book of penalties” (ibid., p.427).  
We therefore see the extent to which, within the Marxist tradition, work is approached 
as a distinct sphere of power. The Bourgeois capitalist exercises great personal powers, 
comparable to the military commander, the autocratic despot, or the slave-master. 
Workers must meet the demands and follow the rules set by their employers and are 
compelled to follow them due to the existential necessity of working for one employer 
or another. Unemployment carries a heavy cost when selling your labour is your only 
means of survival. Such a situation makes resistance to the controlling power of the 
capitalist unlikely in the extreme.  
Others (especially Roberts, 2017 and Leipold, 2017), however, show that Marx 
describes a further form of power that is relevant to the sphere of work. In contrast to 
the power exercised by capitalists, either as individuals or as a class, over workers, 
this other power is a property of the capitalist system as a whole. This “inhuman” 
(MECW, 3, p.314) or “social” (MECW, 6, p.499) power subjects both capitalist and 
worker alike (cf. Roberts, 2017, p.102).  
In particular, William Clare Roberts has argued that we should read Marx as 
describing capitalism as a system that compels individuals to follow market 
imperatives. It is the power that binds people to the capitalist system, that makes us all 
dependent on its continuation. This is the power that compels us to conform to the 
demands of the market: to compete, to seek profit, and to, ultimately, perpetuate the 
system (ibid.). This independent, uncontrollable power of market forces can be 
witnessed, for example, in the tendency towards crisis that Marx theorises will lead to 
the eventual collapse of the capitalist system: 
“Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of 
property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and 
of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of 
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the nether world whom he has called up by his spells...It is enough to mention 
the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time 
more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society” (MECW, 6, 
p.489) 
This systemic power of the market can also be found in Marx’s discussion of alienated 
labour. Here he argues that “the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful 
becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the 
poorer he himself—his inner world—becomes, the less belongs to him as his own” 
(MECW, 3, p.272). In other words, by producing commodities within the capitalist 
market, workers are creating the very products that they will need to consume in order 
to survive. The system sustains itself and further subjects human beings to its 
impersonal power.  
We can therefore see how the Marxist tradition approaches work as a distinct sphere 
of power. In working life, workers are subjected to the power of the capitalist class as 
a whole, as well as their individual employer. Meanwhile, the whole of capitalist 
society is subject to the impersonal, systemic power of the market. Regardless of 
whether we agree with this particular analysis of work under capitalism, it is important 
to note that the Marxist tradition takes seriously the power dynamics that exist in the 
sphere of work. This contrasts starkly with those free market and libertarian theorists 
introduced above who, as we have seen, regularly overlook or underplay important 
forms of power that exist within the workplace and wider labour market.  
With this approach to power in mind, how does the Marxist tradition of political 
thought help us to evaluate precarious working arrangements in the contemporary 
labour market? On this account, we should conclude that all capitalist labour is 
precarious. The wages, conditions, and employment status of all workers are 
conditional on the needs and decisions of their employers. As Marx recognises, “it is 
just the capacity of the capitalist to direct his capital into another channel which either 
renders the worker, who is restricted to some particular branch of labour, destitute, or 
forces him to submit to every demand of this capitalist” (MECW, 3, p.236). In other 
words, because the capitalist owns and controls the means of production she will 
always retain the option to move her operations elsewhere, or to divert her capital into 
a new, more profitable line of business. This means that no worker can ever consider 
their job truly safe. All work under capitalism is insecure, temporary, and precarious. 
 
This idea is captured perfectly by Ellen Wilkinson in her book The Town That Was 
Murdered. As Member of Parliament for Jarrow, in the North East of England, 
Wilkinson had witnessed how the 1934 closure of Palmer’s Shipyard, the town’s main 
employer, had led to mass poverty among her constituents. “In capitalist society”, she 
wrote, “vast changes can be made which sweep away the livelihood of a whole town 
overnight, in the interest of some powerful group, who need take no account of the 
social consequences of their decisions” (Wilkinson, 1939, p.7). Following years of 
mass unemployment in Jarrow, and a largely unsuccessful march to London in 1936 
by workers who sought to highlight the town’s plight, a new steelworks was eventually 
built in Jarrow on the site of the old shipyard. Despite local enthusiasm for this new 
source of employment, Wilkinson saw only the continuing insecurity of work under 
capitalism: “When the works are built they will still be subject to the toll of profit, the 
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exigencies of a system where they can be closed at the will of people far away to suit 
a financial policy” (ibid., p.212). 
 
In this way, the Marxist tradition is able to provide a powerful political account of 
labour market precarity – one that takes seriously the distinct power dynamics that 
occur within the sphere of work. However, we may conclude that a Marxist critique 
of precarity could be over-inclusive. The Marxist must argue that, given the fact that 
employment can always be withdrawn by the employer, all wage-labour is, to some 
extent, essentially precarious. Simultaneously, the Marxist must argue that precarious 
work is dehumanising and alienating, in so far as it is an instance of capitalist wage-
labour. These claims may be true, but such a conclusion seems unsatisfactory. In 
particular, it remains unclear whether the conceptual resources offered by Marxism 
allow us to say anything specific about the distinct subset of wage-labour that is the 
central focus of this thesis. Precarious working arrangements may make the alienation 
and class-antagonism of capitalism more vivid, but it is not clear that a Marxist 
approach can provide the resources to articulate the distinct political significance of 
contemporary precarious work. How do we articulate the nuanced differences between 
the relatively secure employment of some wage-labourers, and the zero-hours-
contractor, or the gig economy worker where un- or under-employment is not just a 
theoretical possibility but a daily concern?   
 
One approach would be to consider arguments such as those offered by Sanford 
Schram (2015), who suggests that contemporary precarity represents a “Return to 
Ordinary Capitalism”. After the relatively stable period of work witnessed in industrial 
economies during the mid-twentieth century, the mask of capitalism has slipped and 
the effects of its power over individuals is once again felt fully. As precarious working 
arrangements become increasingly ubiquitous in the twenty-first century, the 
similarities with the casualised hiring practices endured by the industrial working 
classes of the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries become more vivid (cf. 
Whiteside, 2017). In the era of the zero-hours contract, are we returning to a version 
of the unreformed capitalism that was the target of Marx’s original criticisms? 
 
Applying such an account to the case of precarious work in the contemporary labour 
market, however, still seems insufficient. Given the power of capital over labour, it 
appears that Marxists must remain committed to arguing that all forms of employment 
under capitalism are precarious, regardless of how formally secure they appear. We 
are therefore left unable to normatively distinguish between the more immediate 
uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence of the worker on a zero-hours-contract, and the 
more distant precarity of their colleague who enjoys a more long-term, full-time 
contract with a comfortable salary. At the same time, the Marxist must condemn the 
alienation and subjection to capitalist power experienced by precarious workers on the 
grounds that this is the experience of all workers in a capitalist system. It seems 
unsatisfactory to say to the zero-hours contract worker, that, normatively speaking, the 
way their working life is organised and governed is politically significant and 
normatively problematic only insofar as it is a form of capitalist wage labour. This 
doesn’t allow us to distinguish why her working conditions may present unique 
normative questions that are not present in cases of secure, full-time work. In other 
words, Marxism provides insufficient resources for evaluating between different 
models of capitalism. For Marxists, capitalism must be overthrown tout court. But this 
offers little help for deciding how best to organise and govern working life within the 
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constraints of a resilient, entrenched capitalist system. How, then, can we articulate 
what is normatively better or worse about precarious working arrangements in the 
contemporary economy in comparison to other, potential or actual, models of capitalist 
employment?  
 
In order to say something more specific about the contemporary forms of precarious 
work that are the central focus of this thesis, we will need to analyse in further detail 
what it is about the power-dynamics of these cases that makes them distinct from the 
general insecurity of  all employment relations under capitalism.  
 
Feminism. 
It would be naïve in the extreme to suggest that there is a single, homogenous feminist 
account of work. Indeed, as each new wave of feminist scholarship has evolved, so 
too have the analyses of working life put forward by feminist scholars and activists25. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a key, central idea that unites feminist accounts 
of work: that working life is both a product of, and context for, unequal gender 
relations. The task of feminist scholarship is, then, in this regard, to illuminate the 
power-dynamics associated with this inequality more vividly (cf. Okin, 1989, p.6).  
In this section I will seek to briefly explore some of the ways gender inequality can be 
seen to impact working life, emphasising the feminist idea that working life is 
intrinsically shaped by the structural vulnerability of women in gendered societies. I 
will then show how these feminist ideas can inform our thinking about contemporary 
precarious work. I will highlight how gender permeates the precarious labour market, 
with women26 remaining structurally vulnerable, and disproportionately affected by, 
such working arrangements. In other words, I will show how feminist scholarship 
alerts us towards the gendered power-dynamics associated with precarious work.  
But what does it mean to talk about gender? Gender is tangentially related to biological 
sexual characteristics, but manifest in the myriad ways by which individuals are 
socially classified and categorised along a binary man-woman distinction. This 
distinction is itself the result, be it intentional or otherwise, of various historical factors 
and social forces. Gender is therefore a social construct, the product of human 
interpretation and comprehension of the social world, rather than any natural attribute 
(Haslanger, 2006, pp.17-19). As Sally Haslanger explains, “one is a female by virtue 
of some (variable) set of anatomical features, and one is a woman by virtue of one’s 
position within a social and economic system...being a woman is not an anatomical 
matter...but a social matter” (Haslanger, 2006, p.20).  
This system of gender becomes politically significant to the extent that it 
institutionalises various “rights and restrictions, both formal and informal” (Okin, 
1989, p.5). That is to say, gender explains why one group in society is routinely and 
persistently privileged or disadvantaged relative to the other. Or, in the words of Susan 
 
25 For a concise overviews of the evolving contours of feminist thinking on work, see Wharton (2000), 
as well as Ferguson, Hennessy, and Nagel (2004).  
26 However, we should be mindful that ‘women’ are far from a homogenous group (cf. Nuti, 2019, p.6). 
Indeed, the experience of women in the labour market may vary greatly, and in ways that are deeply 
politically significant, as a result of factors such as their racial or class background and the levels of 
social power this confers (cf. Wharton, 2000, p.179; Müller, 2018, p.2). 
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Okin: “the real experience of "persons," so long as they live in gender-structured 
societies, does in fact depend on what sex they are” (1989, p.11).  
Feminist scholars have sought to highlight that working life is intimately shaped by 
this gender inequality in a number of ways. Most clearly, they have emphasised the 
extent to which a gendered division of labour permeates both the formal labour market 
and the home.   
Feminists have long recognised that, within the home, women in heterosexual 
relationships are more likely to perform the majority of unpaid household and 
childcare tasks (Okin, 1989, p.149; Wharton, 2000, p.170; Power, 2009, p.17). Indeed, 
data from the Office for National Statistics suggests that, in the UK, women continue, 
on average, to perform more than double the amount of cooking, child care, and 
housework performed by men (ONS, 2016). Carole Pateman argues that this social 
expectation that women will perform an unequal share (if not all!) of domestic labour 
extends from “a sexual contract”, a social understanding upheld between men and 
women, “which establishes orderly access to women and a division of labour in which 
women are subordinate to men” (1988, p.119). This social ordering of men and 
women, entrenched and perpetuated over time through formal institutions such as 
marriage, positions women as inferior to, and dependent upon, the male breadwinners 
for whom they provide free labour.  
This dependence is even more acute where women do not perform paid labour outside 
the home. In such circumstances, as Pateman describes, “[A] wife obtains her means 
of support (‘protection’) from her husband, and also the means to perform her tasks. 
She is dependent on the benevolence of her husband and can only endeavour to obtain 
a ‘good master’” (ibid, p.129). The traditional role of housewife therefore places 
women at a distinct structural disadvantage relative to men. Not only are they expected 
to perform the majority of household tasks, but they also remain reliant on the 
continued goodwill of their husbands to keep them financially secure.  
Within the traditional, heterosexual relationship, then, there is a deeply unequal 
power-dynamic that places women at the mercy of men. This dependency reduces the 
ability of women to leave abusive partners, or leaves them vulnerable to destitution in 
the event of divorce (Okin, 1989, p.152). The gendered division of labour within the 
home is therefore not just an issue of fairness, but a symptom of deeper power 
inequalities that exist between men and women in patriarchal societies. Work inside 
the home is a product of, and context for, the exercise of power, by men over women.  
This power dynamic is reflected within the formal labour market too. As with domestic 
labour, the division of wage labour within capitalist labour markets is also sexually-
differentiated and segregated (Pateman, 1988, p.132). There have always been women 
who have engaged in work outside the home, however the tasks and occupations 
performed by women have traditionally tended to be different to those performed by 
men (cf. Bradley, 1989). For example, writing towards the end of the twentieth 
century, Okin describes the phenomenon of “pink-collar labor ghettos” (1989, p.141), 
that is the restriction of women to particular sections of the labour market such as 
nursing, teaching, and domestic service. This gendered ghettoization of the capitalist 
labour market is both deeply entrenched and resilient, even as more women have 
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joined the workforce. For example, a 2019 report produced by the House of Commons 
Library showed that although the female employment rate in the United Kingdom is 
at the highest it has been since records began in 1971, the most common sectors of 
employment for women are health and social work (21% of all jobs held by women at 
September 2018), wholesale and retail (14%), and education (12%). Meanwhile only 
19% of small and medium enterprises in the United Kingdom were led by women in 
2017. As of June 2018, only 29% of the directors of FTSE 100 companies were women 
(Powell, 2019, p.3). In addition to leadership roles, men are also more likely than 
women to work in skilled trades as well as associate professional and technical 
occupations (ibid., p.7). There may now be more women in the formal labour market, 
but their segregation into “women’s jobs” has not yet been effectively disrupted. 
This gender segregation within the labour market is compounded further by the fact 
that it is accompanied by sexually-differentiated wages and conditions. The same 
report by the House of Commons Library found that, in the United Kingdom, median 
weekly earnings for female employees working full-time in April 2018 were a full 
£100 lower than male full-time employees, £509 for female employees compared to 
£609 for male employees (Powell, 2019, p.11). Looking across all employees in April 
2018, a gender pay gap in median hourly pay of 17.9% existed for men and women. 
As the report notes, “[t]his is because a much higher share of women than men are 
employed part-time and part-time workers tend to earn less per hour than those 
working full-time” (ibid.). Indeed, 41% of women in employment in the UK were 
working part-time in 2018, compared to around just 13% of men (ibid., p.4). Women 
are therefore less able to make the same financial returns from wage-labour as their 
male counterparts. Through their segregation in low-paid, predominantly part-time 
sectors of the labour market, women are systemically disadvantaged.  
Okin suggests that the disproportionate share of part-time work performed by women 
is a result of the expectation that women should “bend to meet the needs of the family” 
(1989, p.155). In other words, women must circumscribe their own availability for 
paid work due to the demands placed on them by the gendered division of labour in 
the home. When the paid work ends, the unpaid work of mother, homemaker, and wife 
begins. In the words of Arlie Hochschild, “[m]ost women work one shift at the office 
or factory and a "second shift" at home” (Hochschild and Machung, 2003, p.4). In this 
way, the segregation of women in part-time work, and the gender pay gap this helps 
to perpetuate, can be viewed as a product of the unequal power relations between men 
and women introduced above. The social expectation that women should supplicate 
themselves to the needs of men and the family creates a labour market, and indeed a 
society, that is patriarchal in its structure. As Okin states: 
“full-time employers assume, in innumerable ways, that “someone” is at home at 
least part-time during the day to assume primary responsibility for children. The 
traditional or quasi-traditional division of labor is clearly assumed in the vast 
discrepancy between normal full-time working hours and children’s school hours 
and vacations” (Okin, 1989, p.155). 
Work in the formal labour market, as in the home, is therefore a product of the unequal 
power relations that exist between men and women in patriarchal societies. Given 
traditional assumptions about women’s role being a domestic one, as well as the 
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historical segregation of women to particular occupations, workplaces have become 
socially coded and understood as masculine spaces. For example, Pateman describes 
how even for women working alongside female colleagues, “to enter paid employment 
was to cross a boundary; they saw their female workplace ‘as part of another world – 
the male one – and therefore essentially dominated by men” (1988, p.141). 
Meanwhile, for men, “[s]pending eight hours each day in the workplace and bringing 
home a wage packet is central to masculine identity, to what it means to be a man; in 
particular, hard, dirty manual labour has been seen as man’s work” (ibid., 1988, 
p.140). 
 
As products of patriarchal power, then, work and the spaces in which it takes place, 
can also become contexts or settings for subsequent iterations of these power-
dynamics, becoming a space in which gender is “enforced, performed, and recreated” 
(Weeks, 2011, p.9). The workplace can represent such a context for gender in a 
number of important ways. This is most explicitly evident in the sexual harassment 
and domination of some women by some men within the workplace. For example, 
Pateman describes the disciplinary impact of “sexual banter” that many women 
experience in the workplace, as well as their subjection to “unwelcome sexual 
advances” by colleagues, or the insinuation that career progression or continued 
employment are “conditional upon sexual access” (1988, p.142). In this way, women 
do not inhabit the labour market as workers on an equal standing with male colleagues, 
but as sexualised and objectified women (ibid.). 
 
However, the enactment and recreation of gender roles within the workplace can take 
more subtle forms. For example, Kathi Weeks suggests that “Gender is put to work” 
when “workers draw upon gendered codes and scripts as a way to negotiate 
relationships with bosses and co-workers, to personalize impersonal interactions, or to 
communicate courtesy, care, professionalism, or authority to clients, students, 
patients, or customers” (2011, p.9). Gender can materialise within the workplace in 
the form of dress codes, the type of work one is told or expected to do (and not do), or 
the manner in which they are told or expected to perform it.  
 
One example of this is in the gendered performance of emotional labour. As defined 
by Arlie Hochschild, emotional labour: “requires one to induce or suppress feeling in 
order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in 
others…This kind of labor calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it 
sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to our 
individuality” (1985, p.7). The expectation of who will perform this kind of labour, 
when, and where, is typically informed by an individual’s gender. As Mirjam Müller 
observes: 
 
“Take the example of academia, where female researchers disproportionally to 
their male counterparts perform emotional labour in their jobs. This includes 
listening and advising students on personal insecurities, or giving pep-talks to 
their male colleagues. This requires time and energy that men simply do not have 
to expend as much as women” (Müller, 2018, p.9).  
 
In this way, the performance of gender – actualising gendered stereotypes and 
adopting gendered behaviours – can be integral to the performance of work. Work can 
therefore be seen as both a product of these gender norms, as well as a context for their 
enforcement and reproduction within society.  
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For feminist theorists, then, work, both in the home and in the formal labour market, 
is deeply compromised by its relation to the gendered power dynamics of a patriarchal 
society that systemically disadvantages women relative to men. However, it is crucial 
to emphasise that this system does not just make women vulnerable to particular men, 
be they husbands, employers, or work colleagues (though this is, of course, important). 
We should also recognise that women are made structurally vulnerable, in a variety 
of different ways, as a result of the gender system itself (cf. Okin, 1989, p.134; Young, 
2011, p.45). As we have seen, this vulnerability can take multiple forms within 
women’s working lives: they are vulnerable to systemic wage inequality, to the 
unequal and sexually-segregated distribution of labour, to dependency on male 
breadwinners, and so on. The system of gender functions in this way, endemically 
disadvantaging women, precisely because of the role that all women occupy within 
the social structure of gender relations. To this extent, the feminist analysis of work 
and its political significance is informed by understanding the ways that the 
organisation and governance of work is implicated in the structural injustice of gender 
inequality in a patriarchal system. 
 
This requires some unpacking. “Structure”, in the social-scientific sense, is 
notoriously difficult to define (cf. Sewell, 1992, pp.1-2). However, one way we can 
understand social structures is as the abstract patterns or networks of social relations 
(cf. Haslanger, 2016, p.125). Sally Haslanger has shown how we can identify 
structures by abstracting out from particular systems of social relations - for example, 
a family – in order to find a general structure shared by all families. “We can then 
distinguish the individual in a system (me), from the position within the structure 
(parent, spouse)” (ibid., p.118). We can then shift our attention to this structural 
position, rather than the particular agent who happens to occupy that position in any 
individual instance. However, social structures and the positions individuals occupy 
within them come to have political implications when they come to impose formal or 
informal rules or constraints on individual agency (Young, 2011, p.53).  
This is not to suggest that structures determine human agency – indeed, structures are 
themselves the cumulative product of individuals actions over time (ibid.) – but they 
do provide the social context in which agency can be exercised, shaping its scope and 
tenor (e.g. Sewell, 1992, p.4; Giddens, 1993, pp.133-134, Young, 2011, p. 53). As Iris 
Marion Young describes, structures “appear as objective, given, and constraining. 
Social structures do not constrain in the form of the direct coercion of some individuals 
over others; they constrain more indirectly and cumulatively as blocking possibilities” 
(2011, p.55). Or, in other words, structures have the potential to “canalise” the range 
of actions, or limit the “Fields of Social Possibility” available to people in certain 
structural positions (Haslanger, 2016, p.123; Hayward, 1998, p.12). Social boundaries, 
such as rules, laws, and norms “limit what they can do and what they can be. As agents 
act and interact within structural limits, they develop expectations about what it is that 
one does, and what it is that one ought to do, in particular contexts” (Hayward and 
Lukes, 2008, p.14). 
This understanding of social structures appears to be the one that is implied when 
feminist theorists such as Okin describe the structural vulnerability of women in a 
patriarchal system. It is because of their structural position in this system, and their 
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relation to the formal and informal norms, rules, and expectations this system creates, 
that women are disadvantaged relative to men in working life. This vulnerability is 
structural precisely because it is explained by an individual’s structural position, rather 
than simply the vicissitudes of relationships with particular agents; and it is structural 
because these vulnerabilities are replicated and reproduced in a patterned and 
predictable way across society. It is because women occupy a subordinate structural 
position within a patriarchal system that they are vulnerable to unequal divisions of 
domestic and caring labour, to sexually segregated occupations, to in-work harassment 
and humiliation, and a deep-rooted and long-standing gender wage gap. Even though 
some women may avoid these outcomes, all women nonetheless remain disadvantaged 
by this system. To the extent that work is a product of, and context for, unequal gender 
relations, this structural vulnerability shapes every woman’s working life.  
But how does this structural vulnerability play out in the precarious labour market? 
What can a feminist analysis tell us about the political significance of precarious work? 
Women are, and always have been, disproportionately engaged in precarious forms of 
work (cf. ACTRAV, 2012, p.38). For example, writing about the long history of 
female precarity in Italy, Laura Fantone argues: 
“precarity has been a permanent and traditional feature of life in southern Italy 
for many generations of women, taking the form of submerged labour with no 
contract, black markets and illegal economies (where there is no safety or rights), 
family self exploitation, characterized by no clear division between work and 
house chores, and informal hiring practices through familial connections that 
have no long term guarantees” (Fantone, 2007, p.10). 
When writing about the sexual segregation of the labour market, Okin also observes 
that: 
“whether such women enter clerical, sales, or service work, or train for one of 
the predominantly female professions such as teaching or nursing, they are 
heading not only for the relatively more flexible hours or greater replaceability 
that most of these jobs afford but also for low pay, poor working conditions, and, 
above all, blocked mobility” (Okin, 1989, p.144).  
And the over-representation of women in forms of work that provide only an 
unpredictable income and little certainty of continuing employment is replicated in the 
precarious sections of the contemporary labour market. For example, Nina Power 
shows how temporary employment agencies in the United Kingdom often have 
feminine names “like 'Office Angels' and 'Capability Jane', enticing young women into 
secretarial work that will be extremely unlikely to last more than 13 weeks at any given 
location” (2009, p.19). Research conducted by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) has 
also found that the majority of those employed on precarious zero-hours contracts in 
the UK (55%) are female (TUC, 2016, p.32). Indeed, in the UK, almost 11% of women 
are in insecure work, and women account for 58% of the increase in insecure jobs 
since 2011 (TUC, 2017a, p.9). This trend can be seen even more starkly elsewhere, 
for example, research conducted in 2012 found that one third of women in Spain, and 
two-thirds of women in Korea, are employed on fixed-term contracts (ACTRAV, 
2012, p.38).  
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A central reason that women have been disproportionately represented in part-time, 
casual, and temporary forms of employment is the unequal division of labour within 
the home. If women must still disproportionately perform domestic labour and fulfil 
child-rearing responsibilities, they are less able and less likely to accept work that 
requires them to work typical hours (Okin, 1989, p.155; Vosko et al., 2009, p.16). In 
this way, these precarious forms of work can be seen as a product of  patriarchal gender 
relations. Because of the enduring social expectation that women should be the 
primary care givers and perform most, if not all, of the cooking, cleaning, and other 
domestic tasks, their opportunities within the formal labour market remain 
constrained. In this sense, women’s structural vulnerability within a patriarchal 
system plays out within the precarious labour market. Precarious forms of work are 
both a response to women’s diminished availability for paid work as a result of the 
expectation that they will perform unpaid labour in the home, and emblematic of 
women’s subsequent disadvantage in the labour market.  
 
However, work is also a space in which patriarchal gender norms and gender roles are 
enacted, recreated, and reproduced. If, following Pateman, work and workplaces have 
traditionally been coded as masculine, the image of precarious work is, conversely, 
feminine (Power, 2009, pp.21-22). It has been suggested that there has been a 
confluence of increasingly precarious work with a “feminization” of labour (ibid., 
p.20; Morini, 2007). Not only are women more likely to be employed in precarious 
forms of work, but these roles require typically feminine characteristics. In precarious 
forms of work, it is the feminine traits of flexibility and servility that are required of 
all workers. As Christina Morini puts it: 
 
“the figure of social precariousness today is woman…precariousness, mobility 
and fragmentation become constituent elements of the work of all persons 
irrespective of gender. The model advanced is pliable, hyper-flexible and in this 
sense it draws on the baggage of female experience” (Morini, 2007, p.43).  
 
Indeed, the precarious forms of work can be seen to reflect the template of women’s 
working life in the home. For example, Okin observes that, for housewives, “her hours 
of work are highly unscheduled…she can be called on at any time of the day or night, 
seven days a week” (1989, p.151). Pateman, too, describes how “a housewife is her 
own boss…[she] can decide what to do and how and when to do it…But the husband, 
the boss, is there at other times…The demands of his work largely determine how the 
housewife organises her time” (1988, p.130). In the precarious labour market, “all 
work has become women’s work” (Power, 2009, p.22). It demands that workers, like 
the traditional housewife, must be perpetually on-call, flexible, and – despite the 
veneer of autonomy - subordinate to the demands of the boss.  
 
A feminist analysis of precarious work, then, alerts us to the significant, gendered 
power dynamics at play in cases of precarious work, and suggests that the political 
significance of such working arrangements relates to the ways in which such work 
represents both a product of, and context for, unequal gender relations. The experience 
of women, and of men, in the precarious labour market is the result of gendered power 
dynamics that (i) enforce the expectation that women will perform the greater part of 
unpaid domestic labour, (ii) leave women disproportionately and systematically 
vulnerable to diminished working hours, conditions, and wages; and (iii) reinforce 
gendered stereotypes, characteristics, and behaviours within working life.  
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However, in this regard, feminist theorists must view precarious work as no different 
from all work. Precarious working arrangements may provide an opportunity to 
consider a vivid instance of women’s structural vulnerability in the labour market, but 
women are structurally vulnerable wherever they are located within the labour market. 
Like Marxists, feminists can show us that the way we organise and govern work is 
compromised by social – in this case, patriarchal - power. But in this respect, 
precarious work is no different from any other form of work. All work, both in the 
home and in the formal labour market, is both a product of, and context for, the 
structural vulnerability of women to men. In this sense, it remains unclear whether 
feminism provides sufficient resources to analyse what is particularly and uniquely 
significant about precarious working arrangements. 
 
Conclusion. 
By analysing the approaches to work that can be found within the major traditions of 
contemporary political theory we can see that we could normatively respond to 
precarious work in a number of ways: (i) precarity is either an enshrinement, or a 
corruption, of the inherent value of work in human life; (ii) precarity is a boost, or a 
barrier, to the instrumental value of work as a vehicle for some important value; (iii) 
precarity is a function of power within the sphere of work.   
The first approach is to view work as inherently valuable to human life. We can find 
this approach adopted across both the libertarian and Marxist traditions. For the free-
market libertarian, work and the wider labour market are seen as crucial embodiments 
of our natural liberties and rights of self-ownership, and so should be spared from 
paternalistic external interference from those who wish to maintain some theoretical 
pattern of justice. As we have seen, this free-market libertarian approach provides 
scant resources for challenging contemporary precarity. Insofar as precarity is the 
outcome of uncoerced market exchange, then we must consider it a just outcome. 
Moreover, libertarian theorists such as Nozick and Tomasi consider redistributive 
welfare institutions, institutions that could mitigate labour market precarity, to be 
grave infringements of our individual freedom. To this extent, precarity, for the free-
market libertarian, is entirely consistent with upholding the essential value of work as 
an exercise of our freedom and self-ownership. 
The Marxist tradition also views work as inherently valuable to human life. Indeed, 
work, as a creative exercise of our capacities and development of our potential, is how 
we express the essence of our humanity. However, for Marxists, this connection of 
work to our species-being is corrupted by work under the capitalist system. Here work 
loses its special ontological significance for humanity and is reduced to a mere means 
of existential survival. Work becomes dehumanising, hindering the realisation of our 
potential through simplistic, monotonous, specialised labour that treats the individual 
worker as a tool and a commodity. In this way, Marxist theorists provide us with a 
normative conceptual vocabulary through which we can understand contemporary 
precarity. As with all wage-labour under capitalism, the Marxist would consider 
precarious work as performed only as a means to basic survival, not as an expression 
of flourishing humanity. To the extent that precarity allows work to become an all-
consuming feature of our lives, the Marxist may argue that it emphasises the 
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dehumanising commodification and alienation of labour under capitalism. Precarity 
highlights the debasement of work within capitalism. 
The second approach to work considers the extent to which work acts as a vehicle for 
distributing some important value, such as human flourishing, individual autonomy, 
or self-respect. This approach is most clearly present in the liberal-egalitarian 
tradition, particularly among those who have continued John Rawls’ investigations 
into the role that meaningful work should play in achieving distributive justice. In this 
sense, we are encouraged to analyse the extent to which individuals are able to attain 
some crucial value through their working life. As we have seen, precarious working 
arrangements can, in some circumstances, act as a barrier to attaining these values in 
significant ways. In particular, precarity can be thought to prevent work acting as an 
important social basis of self-respect. In contrast to the laissez-faire approach of free-
market libertarian theorists, the approach of liberal-egalitarian theorists also permits 
interference with the organisation of work where it is found to prevent individuals 
enjoying sufficient access to important liberal values. In this sense, the approach to 
work found within liberal-egalitarian thought could underpin a normative critique of 
certain precarious working arrangements, as well as an argument for forms of 
extensive interference within the labour market that could make working life less 
precarious.  
However, this instrumental approach to work is also shared, to an extent, by libertarian 
theorists such as Tomasi. Here work is similarly valued to the extent that it offers an 
important source of self-respect, however, it is argued that precarity may be a pre-
condition of this self-respect. Indeed, as we have seen, Tomasi holds that the 
experience of financial risk provides individuals with a sense that they are effective 
directors of their own lives whose actions make a difference. Mollycoddled by 
institutions of social protection, individuals will lose the sense of personal self-esteem 
that they can attain through their independent navigation of a precarious economic 
landscape. Precarity, on this view, ensures that work can act as a basis of self-respect.  
Finally, rather than considering work through its relation to value, we can approach 
work as a distinct sphere power. Here we can engage in the more explicitly political 
(rather than moral) pursuit of understanding the particular forms of power to which 
individuals are subjected within working life. This approach to work is displayed 
clearly within the Marxist and feminist traditions.  
For Marx, work under capitalism is seen to involve the exercise of power by 
capitalists, both as individuals and as a class, over workers. In addition, Marx also 
shows us the extent to which work acts as a site of more impersonal forms of systemic 
power, whereby individuals are compelled to conform to market forces that exist 
independent of particular agents. The workplace and the wider labour market, 
therefore, no longer appear as sites of free exchange, but of control and discipline. 
Crucially, by viewing work through the Marxist account of work as a sphere of power, 
we can see that all wage-labour is inherently precarious. As capitalists always retain 
the power to rescind the employment contract and divert their capital elsewhere, 
nobody can consider their position secure.  
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Feminists also view working life as intimately shaped and informed by social power, 
in particular the power that an unequal system of gender relations exercises over 
women in a patriarchal society. All work, including precarious work, is both a product 
of, and context for patriarchal power, leaving women structurally vulnerable in 
manifold ways.  
We can therefore see that how we approach work as political theorists matters. 
Considering work as a sphere of power allows us to normatively evaluate the particular 
power dynamics at play in our working lives, without necessarily adopting any 
assumptions about the value of work itself. This is not to say that the values associated 
with work are not important. Nor that approaching work as a sphere of power means 
that we do not discuss important values (such as freedom), or that approaching work 
as related to value means that we overlook power-dynamics completely (for example, 
cf. Schwartz, 1982). However, questioning the inherent or instrumental relation of 
work to particular values, and questioning the forms of power present in our working 
lives are distinct questions. In particular, by focussing on understanding the power-
dynamics present in the sphere of work, we need not adopt any assumptions about the 
value of work itself, which as we have already seen may have potentially problematic 
implications. With this in mind, the focus of the remainder of this thesis will be to 
examine in greater detail the particular and unique forms of power that are present 
within increasingly precarious labour markets and workplaces. I will show that this 
power is dominating and deleterious to freedom.  
  
85 
 
-   CHAPTER 4   - 
A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF PRECARIOUS WORK. 
 
Introduction. 
In the previous chapter we explored the extent to which the political significance of 
precarious work can be conceptualised and analysed according to libertarian, liberal 
egalitarian, Marxist, and feminist approaches. In this chapter I will show how the 
republican tradition of political thought provides us with the resources to successfully 
capture what is distinctly significant about precarious working arrangements.  
In particular, I will argue that the republican concept of domination allows us to 
illuminate, and subsequently condemn, the specific power dynamics associated with 
precarious work. Precarious work exposes workers to distinct forms and combinations 
of interpersonal and structural domination.  
In the first instance, precarious working arrangements necessarily involve 
employment relationships that subject the worker to extraordinary levels of 
discretionary employer power. Precarious working arrangements also make workers 
vulnerable to further instances of interpersonal domination beyond the employment 
relationship itself, by transforming relationships with family, friends, and economic 
agents such as landlords, payday lenders, and so forth, into dominating relationships 
of dependency. Finally, as a result of the structural position precarious workers occupy 
in this system of domination, they are vulnerable to a further, distinctly structural form 
of domination. This arises as a result of precarious workers’ liability to a ‘precarity 
trap’, or the vicious cycle of insecurity and dependence that encourages precarious 
workers to submit further to their disadvantaged position.   
According to this republican-inspired theory, precarious work can now be seen to 
represent a specific, politically significant  threat to individual liberty. Indeed, 
freedom-compromising domination is shown to be an essential, constitutive feature of 
precarious working arrangements. Crucially, the precise nature of this domination in 
cases of precarious work is distinct from the domination that may arise in more typical, 
and formally secure forms of employment.  
I will begin by providing an overview of the republican tradition of political thought, 
and explore how the central concept of freedom as non-domination has been 
articulated within the work of this tradition’s most influential contemporary 
proponent, Philip Pettit. I will then show how the precarious working arrangements 
can be seen to generate particular forms of interpersonal domination between 
employers and workers as a result of employers’ capacity to wield extraordinary 
discretionary power over the lives of those who work for them. Following this, I 
explore the extent to which the case of precarious work illuminates a distinct form of 
structural domination, challenging the standard republican understanding of 
domination as a strictly interpersonal phenomenon. I conclude by showing why this 
republican theory of precarious work is stronger and more successful than the 
alternative approaches considered in the previous chapter. 
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Republicanism and domination. 
The republican tradition of political thought encapsulates those historical thinkers such 
as Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Rousseau and Paine, among others, who 
focussed on ideas of popular sovereignty, the common good, deliberation and 
participation, and the concept of freedom as non-domination (White, 2011, p.562-
564). In recent decades republican ideas have enjoyed a renaissance driven in large 
part by the so-called Cambridge School of intellectual historians, most notably J.G.A. 
Pocock (2003) and Quentin Skinner (2012). However, the republican revival has 
arguably been given its most comprehensive and influential articulation in the so-
called “neorepublican” political philosophy of Philip Pettit.  
Neorepublicanism has been described as drawing on the classical republican tradition 
as an inspiration for contemporary political philosophy. The core idea of this tradition, 
it is argued, is that a free person is one who is not vulnerable to the arbitrary will of 
others. Such freedom relies upon a free state to promote republican freedom without 
becoming a dominating presence itself. This is prevented through promoting a 
conception of good citizenship that values vigilant preservation of the undominating 
state (Lovett and Pettit, 2009, p.11).  
This republican revival has seen a revision of the dichotomous view of liberty as either 
positive (simply put, freedom as self-mastery) or negative (freedom from interference) 
presented by Isaiah Berlin27. Berlin argues that the negative conception is to be 
favoured as it avoids the tyrannical implications of a positive conception of liberty 
that, in the infamous words of Rousseau, may allow people to be forced to be free 
(Berlin, 1969, p.131). Pettit instead has argued that studying the history of republican 
thought highlights a rival conception of negative liberty; freedom from domination 
(e.g. 1997a; 2012; 2014, etc.).  In this sense, Pettit argues that domination is 
exemplified by the master-slave relationship where one can interfere arbitrarily in the 
choices of the dominated (Pettit, 1997a, p.22). This means that republican liberty can 
explain why a slave with a particularly kind master is still unfree even if they do not 
face any actual interference, or why one remains unfree even under a benign 
dictatorship.  
Whilst I will predominantly focus on Pettit’s articulation of republicanism in this 
chapter this is not to suggest that the republican tradition itself is monolithic. Indeed, 
the term republicanism can be understood in a number of different ways. For example, 
we can separate the neo-Athenian republicanism of Hannah Arendt (1958; 1963; 
1968) and its focus on freedom as political participation from the more explicitly 
Roman-inspired republicanism of Skinner and Pettit that focuses on freedom from 
domination. More recently, John P. McCormick has further distinguished two 
traditions within republicanism: the oligarchic model and the democratic model. 
McCormick describes the oligarchic model as “electoral and senatorial”, whereby the 
people confer power onto a small, usually wealthy, elite and have little ability 
themselves to challenge government decisions. This is contrasted with the democratic 
model that grants the people a more active role in the decision-making process and the 
means to challenge the power of the wealthy elites. McCormick argues it is the former 
 
27 See, especially, Skinner (2012).  
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that has been revived by Cambridge school republicans, including Pettit (McCormick, 
2011, pp.6-11). Nevertheless, as the most influential and comprehensive articulation 
of contemporary republican ideas, Pettit’s work will remain the central focus of this 
chapter and will be taken as representative of mainstream republican theory.  
Before I show how Pettit’s articulation of the republican idea of freedom as non-
domination can help to capture the political significance of precarious working 
arrangements, I must first explore what Pettit means by domination. This is an 
important task as his definition of domination has rarely been static; evolving as it has 
over more than two decades of work on the subject. I believe there have been two key 
shifts in Pettit’s definition of domination. The first is the shift of focus from 
arbitrariness to control as the main marker of domination, while the second is the shift 
away from stressing the traditional idea of liberty through the law found in the 
republican tradition, towards a concession that non-dominating interference (including 
through the rule of law) does represent a type of harm to liberty. Although these two 
shifts do not perfectly sync up temporally, for the sake of clarity (and parsimony), I 
will argue that we can separate Pettit’s work on republicanism into two broad groups: 
early and later. 
Early Pettit  
In the majority of his earlier journal articles and book chapters published on 
republicanism, as well as his highly influential 1997 monograph, Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government, Pettit’s conception of domination can be seen to 
be made up of four parts: i) domination is something only agents, be they individual 
or corporate, and not “a system, network or whatever” can do, ii) domination occurs 
when an agent has a “capacity to interfere”,  iii) “on an arbitrary basis”, iv) “in certain 
choices that the other is in a position to make” (1997a, p.52; c.f.: 1993, p.27; 1996, 
p.578; 1997b, p.59; 1997c, p.115; 1998, p.296; 1999, p.165; 2002, p.341; 2004, p.155; 
2005a, p.87; 2005b, p.30; 2006a, p.281). In short, domination for Pettit amounts to the 
capacity, realised or unrealised, for an identifiable agent to intentionally, and 
maliciously, interfere in choices another should be able to make themselves. One is 
therefore free to the extent that others do not wield discretionary power over their 
lives. 
Like Berlin, Pettit remains concerned about intentional interference. Indeed, Pettit 
explains that interference must be a “more or less intentional attempt to worsen an 
agent’s situation of choice”; it cannot occur by accident, for example an obstacle 
falling in your path or through competition for scarce resources, and it cannot be a 
bribe or reward. Interference can, however, include restraint, obstruction, coercion, 
manipulation and agenda fixing. Interference worsens an agent’s choice situation by 
changing the options available, changing the payoffs assigned to different options or 
controlling which outcomes will result from which options. (1996, pp.578-579; 1997a, 
pp.52-53) 
However, despite remaining concerned by interference, here Pettit is distinguishing 
his republican conception of unfreedom from the Berlinian notion (inspired by the 
likes of Hobbes and Bentham) that all interference qua interference is inimical to 
liberty. For republicans, Pettit argues, it is only an agent’s capacity for arbitrary 
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interference that makes another unfree. By arbitrary, Pettit means that the agent can 
decide to interfere “with impunity and at will”, where there is no need to justify the 
interference to, and there is no threat of retaliation, resistance, or punishment from, 
the victim or others (e.g., 1996, p.580). In this way one is made unfree when one is 
reliant on the goodwill of another to remain uninterfered with.  
This idea is important for two reasons. Firstly, it means that one can be made unfree 
by domination, even when there is no actual interference taking place. For Pettit, one 
is made unfree because of their objective relationship with another, where that person 
is in a position over you that allows them to interfere in your life without regard for 
any interests other than their own. As Pettit explains, “the power-victim acts in the 
relevant area by the leave, explicit or implicit of the power-bearer; it means that they 
live at the mercy of that person, that they are in the position of a dependent or debtor 
or something of the kind” (1997a, p.63). For Pettit, such relationships create a distinct 
political psychology of “fear and deference”, which prevents people from engaging 
with each other as equals (1993, p.33; 1996, p.586; 1997a, p.64; 1997b, p.65; 1998, 
p.296; 2005b, p.30). What concerns republicans like Pettit is that, even in the absence 
of actual interference, victims of domination must constantly second-guess the whims 
of those they are dominated by. They must “fawn or toady or flatter” (Pettit, 1997a, 
p.5) in order to ingratiate themselves to their master. They must “tug the forelock” or 
“bow and scrape” (ibid., p.87), constraining their choice and action to pre-empt the 
desires of the powerful in an attempt to avoid harsher interference. As a result, the 
dominated cannot live a life on their own terms.  
However, Pettit’s definition of freedom also differs from the idea of freedom as non-
interference in the fact that some interference, providing it is non-arbitrary can be 
consistent with one’s liberty. Interference will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is 
forced to track the relevant and avowable interests of those subject to it (Pettit, 1997a, 
p.65; 1997b, p.63; 1997c, p.115; 1999, p.166; 2004, p.155; 2005a, p.93). In making 
this point, Pettit argues that a suitably republican state can impose coercive law and 
yet not represent a source of domination in and of itself (e.g. 1997a, p.66). More 
specifically, a state that is forced to track the interests of its citizens may impose 
interference that reduces domination in the private sphere (dominium) without 
becoming a source of domination in the public sphere (imperium) (1997a, p.112). 
Suitably nonarbitrary interference will fail to represent a threat to republican liberty 
as it will not allow agents to stand over others with the capacity to interfere at will and 
with impunity. They can interfere, but only with your permission and only within a 
strictly limited context. As such, the interference will represent the subjects’ interests, 
not those of the agent undertaking the interference.  
Indeed, in his earliest writings on republican liberty (particularly 1993; 1996), Pettit 
goes as far as to say that, far from representing the threat to liberty envisaged by 
Hobbes or Bentham, the interference associated with a fair rule of law can in fact be 
constitutive  of one’s freedom as non-domination. For example, in his 1993 paper, 
“Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican”, Pettit focuses on the republican tradition 
of arguments, particularly prevalent in the work of James Harrington, which state that 
liberty is “liberty-by-the-law” (p.32). This idea is further expanded in Pettit’s 1996 
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paper “Freedom as Antipower”. For Pettit, “antipower”28 is one’s ability to repel 
dominating power and command non-interference. Antipower is promoted through the 
rule of law; the introduction of protective institutions, the regulation of resources that 
empower agents to dominate others, and the introduction of measures that enhance 
people’s capacity to resist domination, for example, state education, social security, 
and medical care (1996, pp.588-592). The idea here is that nonarbitrary interference 
associated with a fair rule of law can constitute one’s freedom by providing the 
resources to resist the dominium of others, whilst failing to simultaneously represent 
a source of imperium in and of itself. This idea is perhaps best summarised when Pettit 
writes “as the antibodies in my blood constitute my immunity to certain diseases, the 
ordinances of nonarbitrary law under which I live constitute my status as a free, 
undominated citizen” (Pettit, 2002, p.347). 
The key themes in this early literature on republicanism and domination by Pettit can 
therefore be seen to be a concern about vulnerability to arbitrariness, as opposed to 
suffering any and all forms of actual interference, as well as a belief that such 
vulnerability can be reduced, if not eliminated, by a fair rule of law. Any interference 
such laws may enact on citizens, providing it tracks the relevant interests of those 
subject to it, will not threaten freedom as non-domination. In fact it will constitute it 
by providing the grounds from which people can resist the need to rely on the goodwill 
of the powerful.  
Later Pettit  
Turning to his more recent work, however, we see that Pettit’s focus has shifted away 
from arbitrariness to problems of control (e.g., 2006b, p.135; 2007, p.4; 2008a, p.102; 
2009, p.42; 2010, p.73; 2012, p.58). Domination therefore comes to be defined as the 
imposition of “alien control” over the choices of another agent, where alien control 
undermines an agent’s capacity to choose by intentionally raising the probability that 
they will choose according to the dominator’s judgment (Pettit, 2009, pp.42-43). Such 
alien control can take the form of intentional interference such as “obstruction, 
coercion, deception, and manipulation” that demonstrably imposes the dominator’s 
will on another agent (ibid., 2010, p.74).  
However, as before, alien control need not take the form of actual interference. Alien 
control can also be imposed through what Pettit describes as invigilation, the 
intentional monitoring of another with the ability to interfere should they deviate from 
your will (ibid., 2006b, p.137; 2008a, p.103; 2009, p.44; 2010, p.74; 2012, p.61). Pettit 
perhaps best illustrates the idea of invigilation with the example of a horse that is given 
free reign. The horse is not truly free if the rider has loosened their grip on the reigns 
only to intervene should the horse deviate from the path the rider wishes to take (2010, 
p.708).  
Finally, when such invigilation becomes recognised by the agents subject to it, alien 
control can take the form of intimidation or inhibition, leading to caution or deference, 
self-censorship or self-ingratiation (Pettit, 2009, p.44; 2010, p.74; 2012, p.61). Such 
 
28 The idea of antipower is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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efforts to avoid interference will not remove the control, but are merely an attempt to 
make it “more palatable” (2006b, p.137).  
The idea of alien control builds on an argument made by Pettit in his 2006 paper, 
“Freedom in the market”, that unlike the liberal notion of freedom as non-interference, 
republican liberty is a chooser-based view of freedom rather than a choice-based view. 
This means that rather than focussing our concern on the extent to which choices 
remain unobstructed, Pettit argues we should be concerned with the status of the 
chooser among others (2006b, p.134). This idea connects to a distinction that Pettit 
makes in all but his earliest publications on the subject of republican freedom; the 
distinction between conditioned liberty and compromised liberty (1997c, p.126; 1999, 
p.164; 2002, p.347; 2006b, p.132; 2011, pp.693-694). Whilst the interference 
associated with a fair rule of law, or indeed “natural impediments” might condition 
my liberty by reducing the range within which I can enjoy my free status, only 
domination can compromise my freedom. As Pettit succinctly puts it, conditioned 
liberty may affect “the worth of social freedom, not its presence or absence” (2006b, 
p.132).  
The idea of interference merely conditioning rather than compromising freedom 
overlaps with the idea of non-arbitrary interference introduced above. Indeed, in more 
recent work, Pettit updates this idea by referring to non-alien forms of control that 
track the interests of the subject of interference rather than representing an imposition 
of another’s will (Pettit, 2009, p.46). A recurring example used to illustrate this is of 
Ulysses instructing his shipmates to lash him to the mast so as to protect him from the 
sirens. He may be constrained, but this interference is carried out according to his will, 
not the will of others (e.g., 2004, p.151; 2006b, p.135; 2010, p.75).  
This distinction between conditioning and compromising liberty overlaps to a great 
extent with the earlier idea that, unlike the liberal conception of freedom as non-
interference, for republicans the interference associated with a fair rule of law is not 
abrogative of freedom. The distinction between conditioning and compromising 
liberty is a useful one, allowing republicans to focus their concern on what it means to 
possess free status, rather than questioning every limit on the range of choice that we 
face in our life. It intuitively articulates why liberals are wrong to equate all constraint 
or obstruction with unfreedom. For example, this distinction can help to explain why 
we may feel more wronged through being forced to avoid a certain path because of 
another’s bullying intimidation as opposed to it being made impassable by a natural 
barrier. 
However, to another extent, it can be seen to weaken the earlier idea that law can be 
constitutive of freedom itself. Far from arguing, as he did in 1993 and 1996, that liberty 
can be achieved through the law, he is now making his republicanism more palatable 
to traditional liberals by conceding that the law does harm liberty, to the extent that it 
conditions it. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that the interference associated with 
coercive, though non-dominating, law might not make one “unfree” but does make 
them “nonfree” (2002, p.347). Elsewhere he distinguishes between republican 
freedom as “social freedom” and the “freedom outright” that is conditioned by non-
dominating interference (2006b, p.132).  
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In more recent publications, then, we can see that Pettit has refined his definition of 
domination and altered the language he uses to articulate these republican ideas. 
Domination is now described as an agent’s capacity for alien control over another, 
where one is able to impose their will on someone else through interference, 
invigilation, or intimidation. Non-alien control, as described in the example of 
Ulysses, or through a fair rule of law that tracks your own interests, does not 
compromise your freedom - it does not remove your personal possession of free status 
- but it does condition your liberty by reducing the range within which you can enjoy 
your freedom.  
Consistencies: agents, intentionality, the mixed constitution and vigilant citizenry 
Despite these changes to Pettit’s theory over time, other aspects of his 
neorepublicanism have remained largely consistent. Whether articulated in the 
vocabulary of ‘arbitrariness’ or ‘alien control’, Pettit’s conception of domination is 
intended to describe the freedom-compromising consequence of being vulnerable to 
another’s capacity to interfere, regardless of whether or not this interference is ever 
actually exercised, or whether this capacity is fully appreciated by either party. When 
this capacity is visible to and acknowledged by the dominated agent, however, it is 
likely to encourage a demeanour of self-censorship, fear, and deference, further 
compromising their ability to live a free and independent life.  
Importantly, domination is always conceived by Pettit as a strictly interpersonal 
phenomenon that relies on an intentional agent. Domination is also deeply politically 
significant, representing as it does a threat to individual civic freedom, and 
subsequently informing a model of constitutional republicanism that relies on a mixed 
constitution and vigilant, contestatory citizenry to protect against state imperium, or 
public domination.  
As we will explore further later in this chapter, Pettit has recently written about a 
“structural form of domination”, explaining that it is “usually because of the ways a 
society is organized culturally, economically or legally, that some people have such 
power in relation to others that they dominate them” (2012, p.63), it is clear that his 
conception of domination is one that remains focussed on what intentional agents do 
to each other. By “structural form of domination”, Pettit is merely saying that such 
systems facilitate, or are instrumental to, agential domination. Indeed, he describes 
these as an “indirect” source of domination (ibid.). Structural phenomena may 
underpin an agent’s ability to dominate another and provide them with the power to 
interfere arbitrarily, but structures cannot be seen to directly dominate in and of 
themselves. For Pettit, structural constraints are a “secondary offence against 
freedom” (2002, p.342), conditioning rather than compromising freedom (ibid.). 
Structural phenomena, therefore, may reduce the range of options that one can choose 
from, but, for Pettit, they do not subject you to “an alien will” (2012, p.58). This is 
something that only agents can do directly to one another.  
This is consistent with the rest of Pettit’s literature on domination where he is emphatic 
that domination is always perpetrated by a “more or less” intentional agent, and never 
a “system or network, or whatever” (for example, 1996, p.578; 1997a, p.52). Indeed, 
Pettit is explicit that domination is inflicted by actual human beings, either as 
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individuals or in the form of a corporate agency such as the state. He is concerned with 
a “distinctly human” phenomenon (2006b, p.135), while any source of constraint will 
not represent a form of domination “so far as it is the cumulative, unintended effect of 
people’s mutual adjustments” (ibid., p.139). For Pettit, this is because a dominator 
must be able to impose their arbitrary or alien will on another in order to intentionally 
harm them. This is not to deny that systems or structures cannot possess forms of 
power, but that a dominating power must be intentional to the extent that a dominator 
can be blamed for the things they do; that what they do is not beyond their control 
(Pettit, 1996, pp.603-604). The importance of this strict interpersonal approach to 
freedom will be explored further later in the chapter. 
Finally, Pettit’s work has consistently supported a particular republican form of 
constitutionalism29 that aims to provide equal freedom as non-domination for citizens 
through a mixed constitution and a conception of a vigilant citizenship that tracks and 
contests public decisions and the power of the state (2013, p.170). By “mixed 
constitution”, Pettit is referring to the introduction of particular forms of constitutional 
constraint that prevent individual or sectional interests dominating a community. Pettit 
takes inspiration from, what he describes as, the “Italian-Atlantic” tradition of 
republicanism found in the work of Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Madison, and 
others, who broadly support a mixed constitution that implements a fair rule of law, 
separation of powers, and representation through election or lottery (ibid., pp.169-
172). The idea here is that no one individual, or group of individuals, will be able to 
dominate the rest through complete control of state power. Their ability to interfere is 
checked by constitutional institutions, thus ensuring freedom from tyrannical 
government.  
For Pettit, non-domination is further promoted by giving citizens the ability to 
invigilate and contest public decisions (ibid., pp.170-171). This leads Pettit to develop 
a republican political model founded on a democracy that is both “electoral and 
contestatory” (2000). Such a model allows citizens to ensure decisions track their 
interests and thus sufficiently control government interference to the extent that it 
cannot represent a form of imperium in their lives (Pettit, 1997a, pp.183-185). Even if 
such contestation fails to reverse a government decision, Pettit believes that the 
complainant can remain free of domination. Contestation allows the state to prove to 
citizens that decisions are being made with reference to interests all citizens can 
reasonably share, and are reached in line with the procedure of a fair rule of law. Even 
a decision that goes against you can therefore be seen as “on a par with a natural 
accident” rather than an example of discretionary power (ibid., p.198). 
However, such freedom from non-domination can only be truly guaranteed, Pettit 
claims, if republican ideals “win a place in the habits of people’s hearts” by embedding 
laws and institutions with a broader system of norms that promote non-domination 
(ibid., p.241). This would ensure that society at large is vigilant in the face of 
domination and will recognise any attempt at private dominium or public imperium as 
deviant. There is therefore a normative incentive for non-dominating behaviour in 
addition to the threat of legal sanction (ibid., p.280). This will increase the costs placed 
 
29 The republican political programme will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  
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on the powerful were they to attempt to wield their power to harm others, meaning 
they can no longer interfere with impunity or at will. They could not stand in the 
position of a dominator over others. Furthermore, by advocating a civic virtue against 
domination, Pettit seeks to ensure that republican government is underpinned by a 
republican civil society, and supported by a popular aversion to dominating 
relationships wherever they occur. The public will stand on the lookout for arbitrary 
or controlling discretionary power, ready to resist it. This vigilance will, in turn, 
discourage powerful agents from attempting to dominate others.  
We can therefore see how the contemporary republican political philosophy presented 
by Philip Pettit rests on a core idea that freedom exists in the absence of dominating 
relationships. Unlike the traditional liberal version of freedom as non-interference, 
Pettit argues that republicans are instead concerned with the capacity to wield 
discretionary power, regardless of whether this involves any actual interference. 
Simultaneously this conception of freedom allows for a distinction between acceptable 
and unacceptable forms of interference, in particular arguing that the interference 
associated with a fair rule of law need not be completely inimical to one’s liberty. To 
ensure that such a system of laws remains non-dominating, Pettit argues that a 
republican political system must check and disperse state power and ensure citizens 
can vigilantly contest public decisions to ensure they track common interests.  
Having outlined the key elements of Pettit’s contemporary republicanism, I will now 
show how these republican conceptual resources can be successfully deployed to 
identify and understand the full political significance of precarious working 
arrangements in the twenty-first century labour market.  
Precarious work and interpersonal domination. 
In Chapter Two we saw how the concept of ‘precarity’ is derived from the Roman law 
of precarium. This typically referred to a right of tenancy, whereby land or property 
that had been loaned to others could be reclaimed by the lender at any time (cf. OED 
Online, 2016). Such etymological roots suggest a close relation between the concept 
of the precarious and the traditional republican idea that living in a condition of 
dependence on the will of another, where you live at their mercy, is inconsistent with 
one’s enjoyment of individual liberty (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.32; Skinner, 2012, p.84). To 
be precarious in this socio-economic sense, is to occupy a position of vulnerability to 
another’s capacity to interfere at will and with impunity. The central argument of this 
chapter, and, indeed, this thesis, is that the integral connection between the precarious 
and domination can also be identified in contemporary examples of precarious work 
such as zero-hours contract, temporary, and gig economy work.  
Indeed, such precarious working arrangements comprise distinct forms of 
interpersonal employment relationships that necessarily expose workers to 
extraordinary levels of dominating, discretionary power; power that the republican 
tradition of political thought tells us directly compromises individual liberty.  
We can unpack this claim in detail. By discretionary power, I am referring to the 
capacity of an agent – in this case the individual or firm that hires a worker on a 
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precarious basis and (often) pays them for their labour30 – to interfere on an arbitrary 
basis (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.52), that is, at will and with impunity (cf. Pettit, 1996, p.580).  
This capacity for interference can be seen in the uncertain access to work that is a 
fundamental aspect of precarious working arrangements. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
compared to typical employees who have greater clarity over their working hours and 
length of contract, those employed on a precarious basis are vulnerable to 
unpredictable and unstable patterns and durations of work. The on-demand nature of 
such arrangements means that work can be demanded, denied, or discontinued 
completely without the need for reason or notice. Recall the examples of precarious 
working arrangements introduced in Chapter 2: 
The nanny and housekeeper working on a zero-hours contract: 
“I’m often not sure when my work will start until 9pm the night before and 
sometimes work random shifts and hours…I never know when I will have a day 
off…My hours are often changed at very short notice, which means my earnings 
for the week can suddenly be cut in half” (TUC, 2017a, p.26).  
The waitress working on a zero-hours contract: 
“I get given shifts last minute and other times turn up only to be told to go home 
(without pay)…Many occasions, a shift has been cancelled 30 minutes before it 
was due to start. Also, started a 5-hour shift, sent home 30 minutes or on average 
2 hours later” (TUC, 2017a, p.32). 
The temporary Amazon employee: 
“After nine months, Amazon would either take you on permanently or cast you 
aside with no more compunction than if you had been a sack of rotten potatoes. 
In practice, you were extremely lucky even to make it to nine months” 
(Bloodworth, 2018, p.19). 
Such examples, typical of precarious working arrangements in the contemporary 
labour market, emphasise the extent to which workers are vulnerable to severe 
interference by their employers. Employers have the capacity to call upon their casual 
workforce when it suits them, and drop workers altogether as soon as they are surplus 
to requirements or the exigencies of the profit motive. Workers have few, if any, means 
to resist or repel this interference, and instead must be always “at the beck and call of 
potential users of their labour” (Standing, 2011, p.129), on call and on standby for the 
next job. 
Such interference disrupts the precarious worker’s ability to effectively plan their own 
life. They can never be certain of when they may need to work, or how long a period 
of employment will last. Such interference also disrupts the income of precarious 
workers, potentially undermining their ability to make ends meet. Such domination 
therefore can also carry an existential as well as political significance. Work may dry 
 
30 As we saw in Chapter 2, precarious working arrangements such as those associated with the so-called 
“gig economy” can involve ill-defined employment relationships, with workers hired, for example, as 
‘independent contractors’ rather than typical employees. Nevertheless, I will refer to such hiring 
relationships as employment relationships in this chapter.  
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up, a new position may not be found in time, and, as a result, an individual may quickly 
find themselves unable to pay the rent, the mortgage, the utility bills, and so on.   
The ability for employers to disrupt incomes of precarious workers in other ways also 
emphasises the capacity for arbitrary interference that is integral to precarious working 
arrangements. For example, recall Uber’s unilateral ability to cut prices with little 
reference to the impact this could have on drivers’ income. Again, we can see how 
precarious workers are vulnerable to precisely the kind of arbitrary interference that 
republicans view as antithetical to liberty.  
This is not to claim that precarious working arrangements are the only form of working 
arrangements that involve domination. Indeed, Pettit himself has implied that the 
workplace may be a common site of domination (for example, 1993, p.25; 1996, 
p.585; 1999, p.167; 2013, p.174)31. Domination is exemplified, he says, “by the 
employee who dare not raise a complaint against an employer, and who is vulnerable 
to any of a range of abuses, some petty, some serious, that the employer may choose 
to perpetrate” (1997a, p.5). Others have gone further and argued that the capitalist 
employment relationship is inherently dominating (e.g. Gourevitch, 2015, Leipold, 
2017, Roberts, 2017). Whether or not this is the case is beyond the immediate scope 
of this thesis. My claim here is that, in order to understand the political significance of 
precarious work, we must understand the distinct forms of domination that it 
comprises, and that allow us to distinguish such working arrangements from more 
typical employment relationships.  
The forms of domination identified as central to precarious working arrangements are 
distinct because of the extraordinary levels of discretionary power that are available 
to employers. What makes this discretionary power extraordinary is its scope and 
intensity. In terms of scope, to the extent that a typical, salaried employee hired on a 
permanent contract is vulnerable to the arbitrary will of their employer, their 
immediate domination is largely limited to the domain of the workplace (cf. Pettit, 
1997a, p.58). The jurisdiction of the boss does not typically extend beyond the office 
door, the shop floor, or the factory gate. For the precarious worker, however, the 
capacity for arbitrary interference wielded by their employer extends much further into 
their personal time and space. Emblematic of this is the image of the precarious worker 
waiting by the phone in anticipation of work, unable to make full use of their “free” 
time due to the expectation that they must be on-call and ready to work at short notice. 
It is this extension of the employer’s power into the private lives of workers that Guy 
Standing captures when describing the “blurring of workplaces, home places and 
public places” (2011, p.38) experienced by precarious workers.   
The distinct intensity of the arbitrary interference associated with precarious work is a 
function of the worker’s increased vulnerability and disposability. The precise 
intensity will always vary from case to case. As we saw in Chapter 2, contextual 
factors can mitigate or exacerbate one’s precarity. For example, undocumented 
migrant workers are made “hyper-precarious” (Lewis, et al., 2015) as a result of their 
relationship to bureaucratic systems of border security. Nevertheless, we can make a 
 
31 Further analyses of the workplace as a site of domination can be found in Gaus, 2003; Hsieh, 2005; 
White, 2011; Breen, 2015; etc. 
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general claim about all precarious workers, that their vulnerability to discretionary 
power is particularly, or distinctly intense. Not only is this intensity found in the 
gravity and jeopardy of the potential interference – the risk of job loss, poverty, 
destitution and so on – but also in the way that precarious working arrangements 
enable employers to place higher demands on their workforce. As we have seen, 
atypical work contracts combined with new technology have allowed for an 
acceleration of performance monitoring and efficiency maximisation at work. In the 
case of app-based firms such as Uber in the so-called “gig economy”, managers are 
able to use the app technology to communicate directly with drivers and encourage 
them to work longer and harder (cf. Scheiber, 2017). Recall too the example of the 
temporary Amazon warehouse worker: 
“instructions, usually an admonishment to speed up, would filter through to our 
devices in an instant: ‘Please report to the pick desk immediately’ or ‘Your rates 
are down this hour, please speed up.’ We were ranked from highest to lowest in 
terms of the speed at which we collected our items from the shelves…I was 
informed during my first week that I was in the bottom 10 per cent in terms of 
picking rate. ‘You’ll have to speed up!’ I was told by one of the agency reps” 
(Bloodworth, 2018, p.16). 
Precarious workers, then, face a type of domination that is distinct in scope and 
intensity. The capacity for interference wielded by the employer and her 
representatives can extend further into the worker’s life and elicit more demanding 
levels of control over the worker’s actions. The social and financial jeopardy 
associated with job loss or even a temporary disruption to working patterns provides 
the employer in cases of precarious work with access to uniquely severe and wide-
ranging levels of dominating power. This would not be the case were they to hire their 
workers on more typical, permanent contracts that provide greater clarity and certainty 
over the duration, remuneration, and requirements of work.  
However, the crucial insight offered by the republican tradition of political thought is 
that it is the capacity for such interference that compromises individual liberty, even 
if this capacity is never exercised or even acknowledged in actuality. This challenges 
the idea that atypical contracts provide workers with greater independence or freedom. 
This is the argument put forward by the former CEO of Uber, Travis Kalanick (2016), 
who claimed those driving for the company value their “freedom” as “independent 
contractors” to choose when and how to work. A republican analysis shows that even 
if such workers are provided with a superficial veneer of autonomy, the precarious 
nature of their employment means that they only enjoy this according to the whim of 
their employer. Ultimately employers such as Uber retain the power to suspend any 
driver from the app with no notice or reason given. For all the rhetoric that atypical 
working arrangements allow workers to ‘be your own boss’, we can see that such 
arrangements actually serve only to further empower employers, leaving workers 
vulnerable to the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence of precarious work.  
To the extent that workers happen to escape any severe interference – if they are able 
to maintain something like stable working patterns and income streams – they do so 
only by the leave, pleasure, or discretion of their employer. The dominating 
relationship between the precarious worker and her employer in such instances takes 
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a form that Pettit describes as ‘invigilation’. Whether the worker is cognisant of the 
fact, the autonomy they enjoy over their working life can only be enjoyed to the extent 
that it tracks the will of their employer, who retains the capacity to intervene as and 
when they see fit.  
However, when this power is acknowledged or recognised by the victim of 
domination, Pettit explains that invigilation can turn into intimidation or inhibition. 
Although a particular subjective response is not necessary for the diagnosis of 
domination, it can alert us to its presence. As we have seen, according to the republican 
tradition of thought, a psychology of domination typically involves self-censorship, 
fear, and deference (Pettit, 1997a, p.64; 2012, p.61). Victims of domination, aware of 
their vulnerability to a powerful other, are likely to attempt to ingratiate themselves in 
the eyes of their dominator through sycophantic behaviour, or otherwise limit their 
choices and actions in order to pre-empt that dominator’s will.  
There is an intuitive argument to be made about the parallels between the subjective 
experiences of precarity and domination. Guy Standing describes the experience of 
precarity "fed by fear and is motivated by fear” (2011, p.20). This fear arises from an 
awareness of one’s insecure position in the precarious labour market; “knowing that 
one mistake or one piece of bad luck could tip the balance”, “knowing that what one 
is doing is not for one’s own purpose” (ibid.). And this fear manifests itself in the 
pressure for precarious workers to implicate themselves in their own domination; self-
inflicting the control desired by their employer. This is what being your own boss in 
the precarious labour market really means. As Standing again states, precarious 
workers are “are induced to intensify their effort and the hours they spend in their 
labour, for fear of falling short of expectations” (2011, p.118). This is evident in the 
need for Amazon temps to “make rate”, for Uber drivers to maintain their performance 
rating, and for zero-hours contract workers to keep on the good side of their boss if 
they hope to get a shift. For example, the Guardian journalist, Dawn Foster writes 
about her experience of working on a precarious zero-hours contract: “What was 
interesting was the way it made others act: we realised currying favour with the boss 
was the way to ensure we made enough to make the job worth our while, but also that 
overt sycophancy would have the opposite effect” (Foster, 2016). Such self-censorship 
and ingratiation, according to the republican conception of freedom as non-
domination, is inconsistent with living a life of one’s own as a free and equal citizen.  
Precarious working arrangements, then, create distinct, dominating relationships 
between worker and employer. Employers have a capacity to wield extraordinary 
levels of discretionary power that compromise the freedom and livelihood of 
precarious workers as a result of their ability to demand, deny, or discontinue work 
with little or no notice and with little threat of resistance. Regardless of the content of 
one’s work, to the extent that it is organised and governed according to a precarious 
arrangement, such as that associated with zero-hours contract, temporary, and “gig 
economy” work, it makes the worker unfree.  
Domination should be viewed as fundamental and intrinsic to precarious work. It is 
the political interpretation of the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependence that defines 
precarious work. Its uncertainty lies in the capacity for potential interference, even 
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when this is not exercised. Its jeopardy is found in the severe social, political, and 
economic consequences of that capacity for interference, not least in the fact that it 
compromises civic freedom and the ability to live a life of one’s own. And its 
dependence is clear in the reliance of workers on the arbitrary will of an employer who 
wields the capacity to interfere in their life at will and with impunity at any time. Were 
this capacity for arbitrary interference to be extinguished, such working arrangements 
would no longer be precarious. The insecurity and instability associated with an 
employer who can demand, deny, or discontinue work with little or no notice would 
be eradicated.  
However, the interpersonal relationships of domination between employer and 
worker, whilst perhaps the clearest and least controversial, are just one manifestation 
of domination within the precarious labour market.  
Precarious work and structural domination. 
In addition to the interpersonal domination precarious workers face from their 
particular employers, we can see that they are also vulnerable to a distinct form of 
structural domination. The organisation and governance of precarious work within the 
contemporary labour market places individual workers in a structural position of social 
vulnerability, exposing them to myriad forms of potential interpersonal domination 
from a variety of possible sources. This structural situation has the capacity to, in and 
of itself, generate an arbitrary and dominating form of power, that has the potential to 
constrain the ability of individual workers to live an independent life of their own.   
As we saw in the previous chapter, structures can be understood as the abstract patterns 
or networks of social relations (cf. Haslanger, 2016, p.125). Focussing on structures 
allows us to understand the more general consequences of the positions that 
individuals occupy within the systems of social relations, rather than the more specific 
consequences of particular interpersonal interactions. We saw this clearly in the 
section on feminism in the previous chapter, with the idea that, independent of the 
particular interpersonal relationships they may be party to, all women are structurally 
vulnerable as a result of their position in a patriarchal society (cf. Okin, 1989, p.134; 
Young, 2011, p.45). 
Within contemporary republican scholarship there has recently been increasing focus 
on the role that social structures play in domination (for example, Einspahr, 2010, 
p.16; Pettit, 2012, p.63; Laborde, 2013, p.522; Coffee, 2015, p.55; Gourevitch, 2015, 
pp.106-107; etc.). As introduced above, Pettit has acknowledged the existence of an 
“indirect or structural form of domination”, recognising that it is “usually because of 
the ways a society is organized culturally, economically or legally, that some people 
have such power in relation to others that they dominate them” (2012, p.63). As 
previously explained, this assumes that structures play a facilitatory role, explaining 
why powerful agents have a capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in the lives of 
others.  
Domination is therefore a structural phenomenon, for Pettit, insofar as it is a function 
of the structural position of the agents concerned. A dominates B because of A’s 
power, relative to B, in the particular A-B relationship structure. For example, A might 
represent a husband who dominates his wife (B) by virtue of the power granted to 
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husbands within a patriarchal society. Nevertheless, domination remains an 
interpersonal transaction. It is the particular agent, A, who personally dominates by 
wielding arbitrary power over B. For Pettit, social structures themselves cannot be 
considered a direct source of domination in and of themselves. Wife B cannot be 
dominated by the system of patriarchy alone. This is because, for Pettit, structures 
themselves do not represent a particular, intentional will that can be held responsible 
for the effects of arbitrariness (Pettit, 1996, pp.603-604). To dismiss this stipulation 
“would be to lose the distinction between securing people against the natural effects 
of chance and incapacity and scarcity and securing them against the things they may 
try to do to one another” (ibid., 1997a, pp.52-53). 
Others, however, have challenged Pettit’s limited definition of structural domination. 
For example, Alan Coffee has argued that “social structures, systems and ideas should 
not be considered merely as enablers of domination, but as sources of potentially 
arbitrary power in their own right” (Coffee, 2015, p.55). Coffee suggests that arbitrary, 
structural power is represented by systems of social norms that the relevant, affected 
agents have had no opportunity to shape (ibid., p.54).  
Thinking specifically about the forms of structural domination that occur within labour 
markets, Alex Gourevitch has provided a comprehensive analysis of the nineteenth 
century American ‘labor republican’ tradition, arguing that a distinct conception of 
structural domination can be identified within it.  
This more expansive understanding of domination emerged from a specific historical 
debate around how to universalise freedom (Gourevitch, 2015, p.14). This need to 
universalise republican liberty arose due to what Gourevitch calls “the paradox of 
slavery and freedom” (ibid., p.19). As we saw above, republican thinkers have often 
defined liberty in contrast to slavery (e.g., Pettit, 1997a, p.22). However, this does not 
mean that republicans have always been critical of actually existing systems of slavery. 
Indeed, Gourevitch has shown how classical republicans often presupposed slavery as 
a necessary means of protecting the liberty of citizens. For example, slavery was 
thought to be a stabilising feature of the ancient Greek and Roman republics, with 
freedom considered a privilege for some, not a right for all (ibid., pp.23-30). 
However, Gourevitch has shown that when republican ideas were revived in the new 
context of the early American republic, these classical attitudes towards slavery 
clashed with the new, enlightenment principle of human equality. Freedom could not 
be withheld from any section of society if each individual deserves equal liberty 
(Gourevitch, 2015, pp.31-32). The early American republic would therefore provide a 
crucible in which the ideas of freedom and equality would be forged together. Some, 
including Southern slave-owners, would maintain that republican liberty and the 
development of virtues for republican citizenship required slavery. Others, however, 
would attempt to universalise republican liberty by abandoning slavery and shaping 
an ideal of free labour (ibid., p32; pp.36-37). 
One group were those Gourevitch terms ‘laissez-faire republicans’, who argued that 
so long as labour was entered into through a voluntary contract it would be consistent 
with free labour and thus allow all workers to enjoy republican liberty (Gourevitch, 
2015, p.43). So long as workers were not forced to work for a particular employer, 
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fthey would not become subject to a dominating will (ibid., p.47). The legal self-
ownership, and the ability to freely exit an employment contract guaranteed by the 
abolition of chattel-slavery was believed to provide sufficient protection from 
domination as no wage-labourer would be dependent on the will of their employer - 
each worker could negotiate the terms of their employment contract and voluntarily 
accept or decline it. 
In contrast to these laissez-faire republicans, the labor republicans would argue that 
this kind of wage-labour was fundamentally in conflict with the ideal of universalising 
republican liberty. Gourevitch has shown how this labor republicanism was 
concentrated around, though not unique to, the political organisation known as the 
Knights of Labor, and in particular the central figures of Terence Powderly, George 
McNeill, William H. Sylvis, and Ira Steward (Gourevitch, 2013, p.594). As 
Gourevitch shows, these labor republicans of nineteenth century America 
reinterpreted the classical aversion to slavery, with specific reference to key republican 
thinkers such as Algernon Sidney, to distinguish “the condition of subjection from its 
original defining instance - chattel slavery” (ibid., 2015, p.103). Slavery may have 
been legally abolished after the Civil War, but in the mass wage-labour of the 
industrial revolution labor republicans identified a new form of dominating, unfree 
labour.  
The labor republicans highlighted three distinct ‘moments’ of domination encountered 
by wage-labourers. Taking these in reverse order, the third moment of domination 
encapsulates the domination that occurs within the workplace itself. As Gourevitch 
states, “a contract necessarily involved subjection of the worker to the employer 
regardless of how that employer then used his power...to labor republicans, the whole 
point of the contract was that the worker had consented to evacuate his will, to suspend 
its exercise for the period of employment” (Gourevitch, 2015, pp.112-113). Labor 
republicans railed against this third moment of domination by protesting against the 
overbearing and capricious uses of power by employers in the workplace. These 
included employers arbitrarily deducting wages, abolishing lunch breaks, as well as 
sexually harassing workers (ibid., pp.111-114). Not only were workers compelled to 
sell their labour for less value than it created, but they were also subject to the daily 
whims of employers. 
The second moment of domination describes how particular employers are able to 
exploit a worker’s structural disadvantage in order to arbitrarily extract as much value 
as they see fit (Gourevitch, 2015, p.110). As Gourevitch summarises, “The more 
extreme the economic need and the greater the competition among workers, the greater 
the latter’s dependence on an employer. The more intense the dependence, the more 
the employer could impose his will on the terms to which a worker consented” (ibid., 
p.111). Importantly, this suggested to labor republicans that merely regulating wage-
labour, for example through the imposition of maximum working hour legislation, 
would only ever reduce the range of employers’ arbitrary powers - not abolish them 
tout court (ibid., pp.110-111). For example, an employer may be legally required to 
pay you no less than x, but it remains dependent on their arbitrary will how much more 
than x you are paid. 
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However, most importantly for our purposes here, Gourevitch describes the first 
moment of domination experienced by wage-labourers as a structural form of 
domination. Here he points to the consistent idea shared by labor republicans that 
workers were compelled to sell their labour regardless of whether the contract was 
voluntary. Given unequal property distributions, workers are forced to sell their labour 
or otherwise starve. Removing the choice to withhold their labour from the market 
undermines the laissez-faire republican argument that workers have a property right 
to their labour and thus can wield it freely (Gourevitch, 2015, pp.106-107). Because 
the distribution of property was intentionally protected and upheld by all property 
owners and employers, workers were effectively dominated by this entire class. 
Regardless of any particular worker’s ability to choose a particular employer, that 
worker was nonetheless forced to sell her labour to one employer or another (ibid., 
pp.108-109; 2013, p.602). 
To be clear, labor republicans did not claim that nineteenth century wage-labourers 
were forced to work in the same way as the bonded slaves of the antebellum South. 
They recognised that wage-labour offered some opportunities for independence that 
were not available to chattel slaves, and that wage-labour could, in some cases, provide 
people with the means to become independent property owners themselves. However, 
they were clear that the majority of propertyless workers were made dependent by 
their need to earn wages from someone else. “They were free to “give themselves a 
master,” but they could not choose not to have one” (Gourevitch, 2015, p.109). As a 
result, all workers are effectively dominated by the “many masters” (Gourevitch, 
2013, p.602) whose contribution to a system of unequal property compels them to sell 
their labour to one employer or another. For Gourevitch this means that structures, 
such as the property system “can be a source of domination” (ibid., p.607). 
Gourevitch is clear he is not claiming that “a structure can have intentions or doing 
[sic] the dominating, but rather there are dominating agents who dominate by creating 
certain structures through intentional actions” (2013, p.606). In this sense, then, 
Gourevitch’s account of structural domination does differ significantly from that 
offered by Pettit. For Pettit, structures underpin a particular agent’s ability to dominate. 
For Gourevitch, various agents dominate by virtue of their ability to produce and 
maintain forms of structural constraint. Structures mediate the collective dominating 
power of diverse, diffuse agents who may never have any actual personal interaction 
with the dominated inviduals. This makes the “structural domination” identified by 
Gourevitch appear anonymous or impersonal. It is experienced by the dominated as a 
relationship between themselves and a structure, rather than between themselves and 
a particular, identifiable powerful agent. 
Gourevitch, then, provides one detailed account of how structural domination is 
encountered by all workers within the capitalist labour market. However, the case of 
precarious work shows that this is just one form that structural domination can take. 
Indeed, precarious working arrangements can be seen to generate a distinct form of 
structural domination that helps illuminate further the shapes that domination can take 
within the labour market.  
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As we saw in Chapter 2, precarious working arrangements can make individuals 
vulnerable to a wide hinterland of agents beyond the confines of a particular 
employment relationship. For example, we have seen how some precarious workers 
become dependent on potentially arbitrary feedback of customers in order to keep their 
job. This has led to some precarious workers adopting methods designed to curry 
favour with customers and cultivate higher feedback ratings (cf. Knight, 2016). Recall 
Alex Wood’s observation that “customers, rather than managers, are […] the ones who 
must be pleased, whose orders must be followed, whose ideas, whims and desires 
appear to dictate how work is performed” (2019, p.3).   
But precarious working arrangements also create additional forms of dependency 
beyond the immediate sphere of working life. Indeed, we have seen the 
unpredictability of income associated with precarious work can make workers 
dependent on the goodwill of landlords, payday lenders, family members, or the 
bureaucracy of the welfare state. Recall, for example, the research by Citizens Advice 
that found that, in Britain, those with volatile incomes are five times more likely to 
turn to high-cost credit services, potentially leading to unsustainable levels of personal 
debt (Citizens Advice, 2018). And we have seen how these multiple additional forms 
of dependence made pertinent by precarious working arrangements contribute to a 
‘precarity trap’, creating a vicious cycle by which workers become increasingly 
dependent on the precarious work that in turn places them at the mercy of manifold 
other agents.  
These additional forms of dependency can each be viewed as potential forms of 
interpersonal domination. Should they arise, the precarious worker will be subject to 
the capacity for the landlord, payday lender, or whoever, to interfere arbitrarily at will 
and with impunity. Precarious work, then, can be seen to make individuals vulnerable 
to a wide cast of “many masters” waiting in the wings to dominate them.  
However, we can also see that precarious workers are vulnerable to a distinct form of 
structural interference or constraint that precedes these further instances of 
interpersonal domination. Indeed, this structural capacity for constraint pertains even 
if a particular precarious worker is able, by luck or happenstance, to avoid falling into 
any particular forms of interpersonal domination beyond the workplace. This is the 
constraint of the ‘precarity trap’ itself, locking individuals in a cycle of dependency 
on the job that generates their social vulnerability.  
We can illustrate this with a hypothetical example. Amy is employed on a zero-hours 
contract, and as a result is vulnerable to fluctuations in her working patterns and 
income with little or no notice. It is entirely possible that Amy experiences no adverse 
consequences as a result of her precarious working arrangement – she may be lucky 
enough to maintain something like a regular pattern of work, successfully plan her 
own life and manage her finances accordingly. But inherent to her position within a 
precarious system of work relations is the potential that Amy may, suddenly and 
unpredictably, experience significant interference in her ability to make a living. For 
example, her employer, Brenda, may decide, for whatever reason (be it entrepreneurial 
or personal) that she no longer wants to pay Amy the hourly wage she is currently 
receiving; that she no longer wants Amy to work as many shifts as she presently does; 
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that she no longer wants to hire Amy at all. That Amy is dominated by Brenda, in the 
interpersonal way that is standardly understood by contemporary republicans such as 
Pettit is, I hope, clear.  
However, also immanent to Amy’s position is the potential that her insecure working 
arrangements will place her in positions of dependence on a wide array of other actors. 
For example, as a result of the sudden disruption to her income, Amy may become 
dependent on the goodwill of her partner Charlie to help her financially for the 
duration that she is unable to make ends meet through her own work. This places Amy 
in a vulnerable position relative to Charlie, who may now have the capacity to make 
demands of Amy in exchange for continued financial support. She may fall dependent 
on her landlord, Deborah, hoping that leniency may be shown when she is late with 
the rent. She may become dependent on Emma, the payday lender, who, recognising 
Amy’s vulnerable position, is able to charge her extortionate levels of interest in 
exchange for short-term credit. Again, if any of these subsequent forms of 
interpersonal relationships arise, republicans such as Pettit would view them as typical 
examples of domination. 
The immanent potential of these subsequent forms of interpersonal domination, 
however, generates a specific power dynamic that has the potential to constrain Amy, 
even if she happens to actually avoid falling into any of these secondary dominating 
relationships. Their potential alone is enough to exert a controlling influence on Amy’s 
freedom of choice and action within her working life. The potential of further 
domination and dependence as a result of economic disruption, perversely, increases 
Amy’s dependence on her precarious job. To the extent that she acknowledges and 
recognises this dynamic, consciously or unconsciously, she is likely to double down 
on her efforts to curry favour with her employer, Brenda. She is likely to work harder, 
and longer, acquiesce to worse conditions, or more intense performance targets. The 
pressure to do so, importantly, does not come from her particular interpersonal 
relationship with Brenda, but as a result of her general structural position within the 
precarious labour market and the society in which this is situated. The dominating 
power she experiences, in this instance, is not a property of any particular, identifiable 
agent, but of the structure as a whole.  
Why should this dynamic be conceptualised as structural domination? The constraint 
associated with the precarity trap does not necessarily represent simple interference. 
Instead it is the potential of this interference that is of concern, whether or not it 
actually takes place. Again, a particular precarious worker may, by luck or skill, avoid 
the worst implications of their structural position. But they nevertheless remain 
structurally vulnerable to the potential of this constraint by virtue of their position 
within the precarious labour market. As a result, this capacity for constraint is 
distinctly structural. It is not a property of some particular, identifiable agent. It is a 
property of the structure of precarious work, the social ecosystem that is comprised of 
the way that working life is organised and governed, and the relation of this work to 
the wider labour market, economy, and society in which it is situated.  
In contrast to Pettit’s conception of structural domination, then, the conception of 
structural domination that is pertinent to the precarious labour market implies an 
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alternative ontology of power – one that shares more similarity with the feminist 
tradition of political thought, with its account of women’s structural vulnerability, than 
it does with Pettit’s republicanism.  
Power, or the capacity to bring about effects (Morriss, 2002), can be conceptualised 
in a number of ways within social theory. Firstly, it can be described, broadly, as a 
uniquely agential property. For example, Robert Dahl has described power as a 
resource that one agent can wield against another: “A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (1957, pp.202-203). 
More recently, Steven Lukes has reconfirmed this agent-centred understanding of 
power, arguing that, “When specifiable individual or collective actors, separately or 
together, by acting or not acting, can make a difference (and thus be held accountable), 
it becomes appropriate to use the language of power” (Hayward and Lukes, 2008, p.8). 
In this sense, power is a property that some powerful agent/s can wield over others, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, through action and inaction. Crucially, on this 
view of power, there will always be some particular agent whom we can hold 
responsible for the effects that their exercise of power (or lack of it) impose on the 
actions of the powerless. 
To the extent that Pettit adopts a structural ontology of power in his account of 
domination, it remains what Hayward would describe as a structural account of 
“Power-with-a-Face” (1998, p.6).  
“A’s power depends not only on the powers she has as an agent capable of 
choice and in individual with personal abilities and desires, but also on her 
social powers, or those differential capacities for action and dispositions to act 
that derive from her participation, with B, in a relatively enduring relationship” 
(ibid., p.7) 
In other words, although, Pettit recognises the role of social structures in empowering 
certain agents to wield a capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the lives of others, the 
account of power relations still focuses on the relationships between particular, 
identifiable powerful and powerless agents (cf., Hayward, 1998, p.8). 
Others, however, have attempted to articulate “structural” accounts of power, where 
power is not restricted to specific instances of one agent affecting the actions of 
another. In this sense, one “structural” account of power might involve focusing on 
the social power agents can draw on as a consequence of their social position. Such an 
account, for example, could help explain why teachers wield power over their students. 
This is a social form of power that teachers hold regardless of which particular 
individual occupies the structural position of ‘teacher’ (for example, Isaac, 1987). 
However, such an account retains an ontology of power that ultimately describes one 
agent exercising power over another. Others, however, have attempted to “de-face” 
power (Hayward, 1998, p.9) by emphasising the way in which structures themselves 
can constrain human action.  
This is not to say that social structures completely determine individuals’ actions. A 
more plausible view is that structures are at once the constructs of human agency, 
whilst simultaneously providing the context in which agency is exercised (e.g. Sewell, 
1992, p.4; Giddens, 1993, pp.133-134). As Iris Marion Young describes, structures 
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are “the accumulated outcomes of the actions of the masses of individuals enacting 
their own projects, often uncoordinated with many others. The combination of actions 
affects the conditions of the actions of others, often producing outcomes not intended 
by any of the participating agents” (2011, pp.62-63).  
As we saw in the section on feminism in the previous chapter, one of these outcomes 
might be to “canalise” the range of actions, or limit the “Fields of Social Possibility” 
available to people in certain structural positions (Haslanger, 2016, p.123; Hayward, 
1998, p.12). In other words, the form and range of possible action is shaped, in some 
contexts, by the social position people occupy. Social boundaries, such as rules, laws, 
and norms “limit what they can do and what they can be. As agents act and interact 
within structural limits, they develop expectations about what it is that one does, and 
what it is that one ought to do, in particular contexts” (Hayward and Lukes, 2008, 
p.14). For example, we might think of the ways in which women are systematically 
disadvantaged economically relative to men. Given the structural constraints of gender 
relations and a system of wage-labour that generally distributes a higher income to 
men than women, it is predictable that even women in egalitarian heterosexual 
relationships will take on a child-rearing role and depend on their more highly-
remunerated male partner to provide for the family financially (Okin, 1989; Cudd, 
2006; Haslanger 2016). Given the structural position of women, “it is rational for them 
to choose options that keep them subordinate”, moreover “those whose choices are 
similarly constrained will tend to act in similar ways” (Haslanger, 2016, p.124). 
Although women have agency in this system, forms of structural constraint will make 
certain courses of action unduly costly or seemingly impossible. Their actions 
therefore become constrained and predictable, and can serve to reinforce and 
reproduce the original source of structural constraint. 
Importantly, this constraint is an epiphenomenal or emergent property of our social 
relations, and not causally linked to any specific inter-agential relationship. As 
Clarissa Hayward argues, “These overall patterns are unintended. They are the result 
of “various agents pursuing their respective interests.” They are not caused by the 
choices and actions of morally responsible “bad men”” (ibid. p.17). 
The potential for a similar form of structural constraint immanent to the system of 
precarious working arrangements operates in a similar way, emerging as a 
consequence of various agents pursuing their interests over time. Employers seek 
flexible labour to meet the fluctuating demands of the market. Workers accept the 
offer of work to make ends meet. Payday lenders, and others seek to take profit from 
those whose working arrangements make them both likely to need a short-term loan 
to fill gaps in income, and unable to attain credit elsewhere. And so on.  
As a result of their structural position in this system, precarious workers are vulnerable 
to falling in to this precarity trap; a trap that simultaneously intensifies their 
dependency on the job and the dominating employer they work for, and places them 
at the mercy of manifold other agents in society. To the extent that this capacity for 
interference in their lives remains unacknowledged or unactualized, we can see that 
the structural domination operates as something akin to the invigilation Pettit 
highlights in cases of interpersonal domination. Although the dominated agent may 
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not have yet experienced the harshest consequences of their dominated status, they 
remain dominated by virtue of their vulnerable relationship to the structure of the 
precarious labour market.  
To the extent that this capacity for interference is acknowledged or actualised, we can 
view the structural domination as operating more as a form of intimidation or 
inhibition. This is most visible in the stress and anxiety faced by those in the precarity 
trap. The ever-present need to self-improve and self-promote, to sell yourself, to refine 
your personality, network relentlessly and spend leisure time gaining skills in order to 
set yourself apart from others and increase your value in the precarious labour market 
(Standing, 2011, p.122). To ‘go the extra mile’, ‘wear a smile’ and wait by the phone 
ready to work as soon as they are required. This is the phenomenon that James 
Chamberlain has described as “The Construction of the Flexible Worker”. This is a 
“subtle” form of domination that creates “subjects more committed than ever to 
devoting their energies to the demands of work by adaptability and a spirit of self-
entrepreneurialism” (Chamberlain, 2015, p.97; p.92). The potential costs of 
nonconformity (or rewards for conformity), mean it is predictable that, to a large 
extent, those within this structural position will feel the need to “stick to the script” 
(Hayward and Lukes, 2008, p.15). It is entirely in their interest to do so. The alternative 
is unemployment, poverty, or destitution.  
However, it can be argued that the concept of domination should be essentially limited 
to describing interpersonal unfreedom. That domination requires a dominus, an agent 
(individual or corporate) that we can hold directly responsible for their exercise of 
dominating arbitrary power over another agent. For example, Sharon Krause has 
argued that “Domination, as Pettit conceives it, requires a conscious capacity for 
control on the part of the dominant party, whereas much of the racism and sexism and 
other cultural biases that currently constrain the life-chances of members of 
subordinate groups in the USA are largely unconscious and unintentional, and they do 
not always involve control” (2013, p.188). Krause agrees that these unconscious and 
unintentional constraints represent a form of unfreedom, she argues, because they 
deny agency to individuals, preventing them from acting effectively in the world or 
present a stable identity of their choosing (ibid., p.200). However, she argues that this 
should be conceptualised as compromising a second form of freedom, separate from 
the republican concept of freedom as non-domination, freedom as non-oppression. 
Unlike the oppression described by Krause, the structural constraint associated with 
precarious work should be conceptualised as a form of dominating, alien control. 
Although there is no particular dominus in this instance, the precarious worker is 
nonetheless vulnerable to potential, structural interference as a result of their structural 
position. This interference is arbitrary to the extent that workers have little chance (or 
power) to effectively shape, resist, or authorise the structural constraint that binds them 
(cf. Coffee, 2015, p.54). By claiming that this structural constraint is arbitrary is not 
to imply that structures have some independent will. Any actual interference 
associated with this structural domination will be exercised by agents. Indeed, 
precarious workers are placed in the perverse position where self-interest dictates that 
they acquiesce to this vicious cycle of dependency, or face even worse consequences. 
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In other words, such structural constraint often means that precarious workers are 
implicated in their own domination.  
So, to summarise, precarious working arrangements generate multiple, distinct forms 
of domination. The dominating power of the employer is integral to precarious work, 
where all precarious workers are vulnerable to the capacity for their employer to 
exercise extraordinary levels of discretionary interference in their lives. Precarious 
working arrangements also expose workers to multiple further forms of potential 
domination, whereby they are vulnerable to falling under the power of some other 
powerful agent as a result of their vulnerable social and economic status. A further, 
distinctly structural form of domination is generated as a result of workers’ vulnerable 
social position. This structural form of domination manifests in the ‘precarity trap’, 
the vicious cycle of vulnerability and dependency that constrains the opportunity for 
precarious workers to break out of their situation. Collectively, these forms of 
domination compromise the freedom of precarious workers, preventing them from 
living an independent life of their own.  
Conclusion: The political significance of precarious work.  
The republican-inspired analysis in this chapter shows precarious working 
arrangements to be politically significant due to the multiple, distinct forms of 
dominating power they generate, power that compromises the free status of precarious 
workers and their ability to live an independent life of their own, both within the 
immediate confines of the workplace and in wider life. Indeed, were these forms of 
domination absent, such work could no longer be defined as precarious. Without the 
extraordinary levels of discretionary power that allow employers to demand, deny, or 
discontinue work at little or no notice, work would be more secure, stable, and less 
dominating.  
This domination-based approach captures the political significance of precarious work 
in a way that is more successful and more satisfactory than the alternative approaches 
considered in the previous chapter, whilst also complementing many of the valuable 
insights that these alternative approaches offered.  
As with the libertarian approach sketched in the previous chapter, the republican 
approach to precarious work takes seriously the importance of individual freedom 
within working life. However, in contrast to the libertarian approach, the republican 
approach illuminates the important threats to liberty that can arise after the 
employment contract has been signed. Like the Marxist and feminist approaches, the 
republican approach considers work and the employment relationship as more than a 
legitimate product of uncoerced, free exchange – it is a context for politically 
significant power dynamics, regardless of how these came into being. Where 
libertarian thinkers such as Tomasi view state interference in the affairs of sovereign 
economic agents as representing the central threat to freedom, the republican approach 
outlined here highlights the extent to which work and employment relationships can 
be the site of dominating arbitrary power that compromises the ability for individuals 
to live independent lives of their own.  
Indeed, republicans such as Pettit have argued that the introduction of a conception of 
freedom as non-interference in the eighteenth century was a historically contingent act 
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designed to further the interests of the burgeoning commercial class (for example, 
1993, p.15; p.34). By reconceiving freedom as non-interference rather than non-
domination, early liberals could legitimise a more laissez-faire economics and 
deregulation of trade by the state, while also presenting a form of freedom that could 
be universalised without the need for a radical reshaping of the position of powerless 
groups in society such as women and servants (Pettit, 1997b, pp.67-73). This impulse 
is echoed in the apolitical status of the employer in contemporary libertarian analyses 
of work, and in the defences of precarious working arrangements that have entered 
popular discourse thanks to those such as Travis Kalanick who have sought to 
emphasise the supposed ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ available to precarious workers. Such 
accounts fail to consider the dominating power of the individual or firm that hires 
workers on precarious terms, and who enjoys, as a result, the capacity to inflict 
significant interference by demanding, denying, or discontinuing work, or otherwise 
disrupting the ability of their workforce to earn an income and make ends meet. 
Crucially, such power is deleterious to liberty regardless of whether the circumstances 
are the result of seemingly voluntary market exchange, and regardless of whether or 
not any actual interference takes place. Freedom is compromised, for republicans, 
when individuals live under the shadow of potential interference as well as when this 
capacity of interference is actually exercised against them. For republicans, the power 
available to employers within the precarious labour market is not benign or 
uncontroversial, it is a politically significant threat to individual liberty. Reclaiming 
the vocabulary of individual liberty from free market libertarians is a crucial step 
towards not only understanding the significance of precarious work, but also 
challenging its presence in contemporary society.  
In contrast to liberal egalitarian approaches to precarious work, the republican 
approach remains largely ambivalent to the content of people’s work or the extent to 
which this content aligns with particular liberal ideals such as flourishing, autonomy, 
or self-respect32. For republicans, the pertinent question is not whether working life is 
meaningful or not, but whether it is free. As we saw in the previous chapter, whilst 
some cases of precarious work may undermine the ability of workers to realise these 
liberal values, there is nothing about precarious work in and of itself that means that 
the actual work activity cannot be complex, varied, and self-directed to an extent that 
could be described as meaningful. Viewed through a republican lens of freedom as 
non-domination, however, we can see that, regardless of the nature of the work 
activity, where work is organised and governed on precarious terms it will always 
offend against individual liberty due to the extraordinary levels of discretionary power 
this extends to employers. In other words, precarious work, even if it is in some cases 
subjectively meaningful, is always necessarily and inherently dominating.  
 
32 However, it is likely that subjection to domination in working life will significantly harm the self-
respect of precarious workers. For example, Nien-hê Hsieh has argued that without protection from 
arbitrary interference at work, “it is difficult to understand how individuals will be able to advance their 
ends with self-confidence, and perhaps even maintain a sense of self-respect” (2005, p.125). Allowing 
individuals to occupy a position of vulnerability to arbitrary interference, Hsieh suggests, “is to treat an 
individual as lacking in standing or in worth. It is the absence of treating another individual with 
respect…It is difficult to imagine situations more damaging to developing a sense of self-worth and 
self-confidence than to be in such a position” (ibid.).  
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In common with the Marxist approach to precarious work, the republican approach 
acknowledges the sphere of work as a distinct sphere of social power, and in particular 
the problematic forms of discretionary power that employers enjoy over their workers 
in capitalist labour markets. However, in contrast to the Marxist approach, the 
republican approach allows for a more precise analysis of the specific, distinct power 
dynamics at play in various forms of capitalist employment.  
According to a Marxist approach, precarious work alienates and dehumanises workers, 
and subjects them to the power of the capitalist class. But this is the case for all wage 
labour under capitalism. At best, precarious work in the contemporary labour market 
may be a particularly intense or  vivid example of capitalism’s defects, but beyond this 
a Marxist approach does not provide the conceptual resources with which to 
understand what is distinct about precarious work compared with more typical, and 
formally permanent, employment. The republican account, on the other hand, allows 
us to do just this. It allows us to emphasise the particular and distinct power-dynamics 
associated with precarious working arrangements, and the specific forms of 
domination these generate. This is not necessarily to disagree with the overall Marxist 
diagnoses of economic relations under capitalism. Nevertheless, the more nuanced 
republican approach allows us, within the non-ideal circumstances of actually-existing 
capitalism to discern between different variants of capitalist employment. 
Finally, when compared to the feminist approach, the republican approach, again, 
provides greater scope for a more nuanced analysis of the distinct political significance 
of precarious work. This is not to discount the feminist analysis of women’s structural 
vulnerability in the labour market – indeed, we have seen that women are particularly 
affected by precarious work in the contemporary labour market – however, a 
republican approach allows us to articulate the specific power-dynamics associated 
with precarious working arrangements. According to the feminist analysis precarious 
working arrangements are a product of, and context for, patriarchal gender relations. 
But this is the case for all work in a patriarchal system. The republican analysis allows 
us to identify how precarious work is particularly politically significant as a threat to 
freedom as non-domination. Indeed, this allows us to say something more specific 
about the status of women in the labour market. If women are disadvantaged by a 
labour market structured by patriarchal gender relations, they are particularly 
disadvantaged by a labour market that disproportionately subjects them to the distinct 
domination of precarious work.  
We have also seen how the republican approach can embrace the feminist account of 
structural vulnerability and articulate the extent to which such vulnerability can expose 
individuals to structural forms of domination. In this way, the insights of the feminist 
tradition of political thought can supplement the republican conceptual vocabulary of 
freedom as non-domination to more thoroughly comprehend the ways in which 
precarious working arrangements compromise individual liberty. It is in articulating 
these distinct forms of domination, both interpersonal and structural, that the 
republican theory of precarious work is able to capture the political significance of 
such working arrangements most clearly.  
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-   CHAPTER 5   - 
ANTIPOWER AND THE REPUBLICAN SOLUTIONS TO PRECARIOUS WORK. 
 
Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the republican concept of domination allows us 
to illuminate the political significance of precarious work in the contemporary labour 
market. By exposing individuals to specific forms of dominating interpersonal and 
structural power, precarious work should be viewed as a serious threat to the liberty 
of those subject to it. If this is the case, then opposition to precarious working 
arrangements, and the domination generated by them, should be embedded within the 
wider republican political programme; a programme that seeks to practically advance 
freedom as non-domination throughout society. In this chapter, I will evaluate what 
shape this opposition could take by exploring practical ways to regulate, restructure, 
and remedy the precarious labour market, and assessing the capacity of these policy 
solutions to combat domination.  
In the first part of this chapter I will explore the political programme associated with 
the republican tradition of political thought; the practical policies and institutional 
regimes through which republicans attempt to promote the value of freedom as non-
domination. I will show how the historical republican aversion to political domination 
by autocratic monarchs has broadened into a political project that aims to eradicate 
sources of domination in all spheres of social life. I will then show how Philip Pettit 
has provided the clearest articulation of how the political pursuit of non-domination 
could be realised and institutionalised in contemporary societies. In particular, I will 
explore Pettit’s idea of antipower, - the legally and institutionally supported capacity 
to repel and neutralise dominating power (cf. Pettit, 1996, p.589) - as well as the 
specific forms that this could take. 
I will then consider how this kind of antipower could be institutionally constituted in 
order to counter the specific forms of domination that have been identified within the 
precarious labour market. In part two of this chapter I will consider the extent to which 
robust labour laws and market regulation could help guard individuals against 
domination. Part three will consider potential ‘exit’-based forms of antipower, that is 
the means by which individuals can effectively withdraw from situations of 
domination. In particular I evaluate the protection against domination that can be 
offered through suitable welfare state provisions or, more ambitiously, via a so-called 
universal basic income. Finally, in part four, I will consider how providing precarious 
workers with a robust, contestatory, voice can help to counteract their vulnerability to 
domination. Here I will suggest that a renaissance in trade unionism represents a 
particularly promising strategy for promoting this form of antipower within the 
contemporary labour market.  
I will not suggest here that there is one specific policy proposal that can offer sufficient 
and flawless protection against domination. Rather, the conclusion of this chapter 
points towards a combination of these strategies as representing the strongest bulwark 
against domination, even if it is not certain that this domination can be completely and 
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immediately eradicated. This combination of institutional measures, I suggest, would 
represent (at least) the foundations of a republic that is economic as well as political.  
It is also important to note here that the proposals offered in this section are intended 
to be transitional towards achieving freedom as non-domination. That is, they are 
offered as more immediate, though potentially (often, probably) imperfect, responses 
to the domination associated with precarious work. They are offered as proposals that, 
after taking into account the constraints of actually-existing political and social reality, 
could be considered reasonably achievable. That is not to say that more ambitious, and 
radical solutions to domination in the labour market (for example, the replacement of 
capitalist wage-labour with the cooperative ownership and control of economic 
enterprises (cf. Gourevitch, 2015)), are neither desirable or necessary. Rather, the 
point here is to, taking into account the present political weakness of labour relative to 
capital, offer modest, though nevertheless significant and effective, protections against 
domination that could be more or less achievable in the short-term.  
However, insofar as the proposals put forward in this chapter are intended to be 
realistically attainable, they should not be viewed as conservative, unimaginative, or 
backward-looking. It is true that regulatory law, welfare states, and trade unions 
already exist, in some form or another, and have arisen as a result of resistance to 
particular past injustices in the labour market. Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest 
that the problem of precarious work in the twenty-first century can be solved by 
returning to a perceived golden age of employment in the Europe of the mid-twentieth 
century, when social democratic policies helped make employment secure, welfare 
states generous, and trade union power robust. As with all forms of nostalgia, it is 
unlikely that such a golden age ever truly existed (cf. Barbier, 2002, p.28; Ettlinger, 
2007, p.322). But more importantly, any political response to contemporary precarious 
work must be sensitive to the specific contours of contemporary political and 
economic reality and the specific challenges of our age. As I will argue in this chapter, 
labour regulation, welfare state policies, and trade unions must all respond to 
contemporary precarious work in innovative ways in order to effectively begin 
addressing the specific forms of domination that such work creates.  
The republican political programme. 
In the previous chapter I introduced the republican tradition of political thought, and 
unpacked its central value of freedom as non-domination. But how can this value be 
realised practically? Here I will show how republican theorists have sought to embed 
freedom as non-domination within a political community, a republic, that is 
appropriately structured in order to provide citizens with effective legal and 
institutional defences against dominating power. In this way, the free status associated 
with republican liberty must always be “institutionally constituted” (Pettit, 1997a, 
p.106), that is, non-domination arises only where appropriate social and political 
institutions are in place. 
As Quentin Skinner explains in his Liberty Before Liberalism, republicans have 
classically held that “it is only possible to be free in a free state” (2012, p.60). In other 
words, the enjoyment of republican liberty, as an intersubjective civil and political 
status, is directly correlated to the way that social and political institutions are 
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constituted within a state. Historically this idea has most clearly manifested in the 
republican aversion to the arbitrary power wielded by autocratic monarchs. For 
example, Skinner points to James Harrington’s archetypal seventeenth-century 
republican critique of monarchical domination. Under the rule of a sultan, Harrington 
argues, any citizen of Constantinople is “merely a tenant of his head liable to lose it as 
soon as he speaks or acts in such a way as to cause the sultan offence” (ibid., p.86; cf. 
Harrington, 1992, p.20). Vulnerability to the discretionary will of an absolute monarch 
is incompatible with the civil and political liberty of republican citizenship.  
In order to possess freedom as non-domination, then, republican citizens require 
institutional protections from the potential misuse of political power. This power must 
be made non-arbitrary. Again, contemporary republican scholars often point to 
Harrington as representatively capturing the idea that republican liberty rests on the 
establishment of a political system that constitutes “an empire of laws and not of men” 
(Harrington, 1992, p.8; cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.20; Skinner, 2012, p.75; etc.). In other 
words, in order to enjoy republican liberty, you must live in a state where everyone is 
equally bound by the fair and consistent rule of law, reducing the tyrannical potential 
of one’s civil and political rights becoming dependent on the goodwill of some 
powerful ruler. Only under such a rule of law can one enjoy the intersubjective status 
of free citizen. As Skinner summarises: 
“you must ensure that you live under a political system in which there is no 
element of discretionary power, and hence no possibility that your civil rights 
will be dependent on the goodwill of a ruler, a ruling group, or any other agent 
of the state. You must live, in other words, under a system in which the sole 
power of making laws remains with the people or their accredited representatives, 
and in which all individual members of the body politic - rulers and citizens alike 
– remain equally subject to whatever laws they choose to impose upon 
themselves” (2012, p.74)  
Crucially, republicans do not view this rule of law as representing a source of 
unfreedom in and of itself. Although laws will by their very nature constrain the range 
of action and choice available to people, by inhibiting the potential for state 
domination and by not representing a source of arbitrary power in and of itself, the 
law can be entirely consistent with republican freedom as non-domination. More than 
this, as we saw in the previous chapter, it can in fact be constitutive of one’s republican 
liberty. For republicans, liberty is “liberty-by-the-law” (Pettit, 1993, p.32), not from-
the-law.  
Although historically the republican tradition has predominantly been concerned with 
the kinds of political institutions that will protect the political liberty of a small number 
of (usually) wealthy, (usually) male citizens (cf. Pettit, 1997a, pp.95-96), modern and 
contemporary thinkers, taking inspiration from this tradition, have sought to 
universalise republican liberty and eradicate all forms of dominating power, in social 
as well as political life. Domination by the state and those in political power remains 
a crucial threat to liberty, but domination can also arise as a result of the social power 
inequalities associated with race, gender, economic class, and so on (cf. Laborde 2008; 
Coffee, 2015; Gourevitch, 2015; etc.). In other words, we should recognise that 
republican freedom is not only secured through the formal, political constitution of a 
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free state, but also by the legal, institutional, and social foundations of free society (cf. 
Gourevitch, 2011, p.432).  
Among contemporary republican thought, the clearest and most developed articulation 
of the kinds of legal and institutional architecture required for the maintenance of 
republican freedom in contemporary society has been offered by Philip Pettit. In 
particular, Pettit’s 1996 article, “Freedom as Antipower” provides a concise 
description of the way republican liberty can be protected through the legal and 
institutional generation of antipower. Pettit explains, “[a]ntipower is what comes into 
being as the power of some over others – the power of some over others in the sense 
associated with domination – is actively reduced and eliminated” (1996, p.588). It 
consists in the capacity to reliably expect freedom from arbitrary interference – not 
through some accident, luck, or skill – but through a legally and institutionally 
constituted ability to counter and repel potential domination. Where antipower is 
present, the powerful are prevented from interfering arbitrarily, at will or with 
impunity (ibid., pp.588-590). In this respect, the power of the powerful is not 
supplanted, rather those at risk of potential domination are fortified and empowered 
in a way that checks, and ultimately disarms, the social and political resources that 
could enable those in positions of power to dominate others.  
Pettit argues that this kind of antipower could be promoted through three kinds of 
social and political institutions: (i) protective institutions; (ii) regulatory institutions; 
and (iii) empowering institutions.  
By ‘protective institutions’, Pettit, echoing the classical republican trope of the 
‘empire of laws’, points us towards the importance of a fair, and nonvoluntaristic, 
system of law (1996, p.590). In particular, Pettit shows how the rule of law associated 
with the criminal justice system can protect individuals against domination by acting 
as a deterrent against the imperious exercise of arbitrary power. Should interference 
be exercised in disregard of the law, the criminal justice system will reliably oppose 
and rectify this injustice (ibid.). The rule of law therefore protects individuals from 
domination by disarming the capacity to interfere arbitrarily that would otherwise be 
held by powerful agents in society. For example, those with superior strength, in the 
absence of a suitable legal system, would be able to dominate others with impunity. 
The presence of a fair rule of law provides citizens with the confidence to pursue their 
own lives, content that any such arbitrary power could not be used against them 
without robust and effective rebuke by the state.  
Related to these rule-of-law constraints on the potential for domination, ‘regulatory 
institutions’ can further curtail the potential for powerful actors to interfere in the lives 
of others at will and with impunity. For example, the potential for political domination 
can be defused through regular democratic elections and institutionally-enforced 
separation of powers (Pettit, 1996, p.591). Crucially, among these antipower-
promoting ‘regulatory institutions’, Pettit also considers the kinds of regulatory 
measures that can be taken against economically-powerful actors. For example, 
“regulations against unfair dismissal, the employment of children, and dangerous 
working conditions; against monopoly power and misleading representation; against 
insider trading and inadequate accounting; and so on” (ibid.). These kinds of market 
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regulations limit the extent to which economically-advantaged agents, including 
employers, can wield power in a way that undermines the freedom of others.  
‘Empowering institutions’ encompass those institutions that actively provide 
individuals with the capacity to resist dominating power. Here Pettit particularly 
emphasises the importance of welfare-state institutions, such as “universal education 
and universal access to culturally important services like transportation and 
communication” as well as “measures like social security, medical care, accident 
insurance, and legal aid” (1996, pp.591-592). Such institutions, he argues, provide 
individuals with capabilities to challenge potential dominators and prevent social 
vulnerabilities, such as ill health or unemployment, leaving them open to exploitation.  
In addition to these formal, legal vehicles for promoting antipower, Pettit also argues 
that the more informal social institutions, such as those associated with a vibrant civil 
society, can also provide the protection, regulation, and empowerment necessary to 
limit the potential for domination. This could include normalised forms of social 
rebuke against dominating behaviour, or the effect of organisations such as “trade 
unions, consumer movements, prisoners' rights organizations, environmental 
movements, women's groups, [and] civil liberties associations” (Pettit, 1996, p.592). 
For Pettit, “competitive market forces” (ibid.) can also promote a form of antipower. 
I will challenge this particular assumption later in this chapter. For now, I simply want 
to emphasise that the republican political aim is to support institutions that prevent 
agents maintaining an unquestioned capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary 
basis and with impunity. Institutions that can successfully achieve this aim should be 
viewed as centrally important features in the construction of a republican society.  
In later work, Pettit has emphasised the development of a further institutional strategy 
for promoting this kind of antipower within a republic: contestatory democracy (e.g. 
1997a, pp.186-187; 1999; 2000; etc.). This describes a layer of institutionalised 
democratic participation, additional and complementary to existing forms of electoral 
democracy, that provides citizens with the editorial capacity to challenge the political 
decisions that will impact their lives in an impartial forum (Pettit, 1999, p.164). This 
contestatory capability ensures that legislative, administrative, and judicial authorities 
consider and respect the interests of those their decisions will affect, preventing such 
authorities from wielding discretionary power in accordance with their own private 
will (ibid., 1997a, pp.183-184). Importantly, contestation does not mean that citizens 
have a right to veto unfavourable decisions, only to ensure that these decisions have 
been made in a procedurally fair and non-arbitrary way, that takes the interests of 
affected citizens seriously (ibid., p.198). For example, citizens may be upset at the 
prospect of a new housing development in an area of natural beauty. These citizens 
may not succeed in over-turning this public planning decision, but contestatory 
procedures would at least provide them with confidence that the development is being 
pursued, for example, to meet a shared interest in increasing the stock of public 
housing, rather than any arbitrary whim, personal animus or casual disregard towards 
the aggrieved citizens. Pettit suggests this contestatory power could be procedurally 
established through institutions such as parliamentary committees, formal 
bureaucratic inquiries, or quasi-judicial tribunals (ibid., p.196). Such bodies would 
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provide citizens with the institutional means to check public power in order to ensure 
that it is not used to dominate them.  
This vision of contestatory democracy echoes an idea, present throughout the history 
of republican thought, that the enjoyment of liberty and the ongoing maintenance of 
the republic is always fragile, indeed, precarious. For this reason, the tradition has 
emphasised the importance of popular vigilance against the threat of tyrannical 
domination. As Pettit describes, a recurring theme within republican thought has been 
that citizens should continuously challenge and scrutinise the decisions and actions of 
those in power in order to check the potential for corruption – “[t]he price of liberty is 
eternal vigilance” (1998, pp.308-309).  
A particular, and explicitly class-conscious, manifestation of this theme of republican 
vigilance has been identified within the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli. John 
P. McCormick describes how Machiavelli, concerned with the inclination of wealthy 
elites towards the social and political domination of less powerful citizens, favoured a 
constitutional model that could provide common citizens with access to class-specific 
political institutions. Modelled on the plebeian tribunate of the Roman Republic, this 
would allow citizens to not only constrain the power of socio-political elites, but to 
proactively influence and more directly author political decisions themselves 
(McCormick, 2011, pp.5-7; p.168)33. Indeed, in The Discourses, Machiavelli 
emphasises the importance of “tumult” or “discord” between the elites and the general 
populace for the maintenance of liberty within a republic (2003, p.113). He argues: 
“every city should provide ways and means whereby the ambitions of the populace 
may find an outlet…The demands of a free populace…are very seldom harmful to 
liberty for they are due either to the populace being oppressed, or to the suspicion that 
it is going to be oppressed” (ibid., pp.114-115). 
We can therefore detect a more Machiavellian understanding of how to provide 
republican citizens with institutionally-constituted antipower in the face of freedom-
threatening domination. Citizens should have access to class-specific institutions that 
allow them to vigilantly challenge, contest, and indeed pre-empt, the dominating 
potential of powerful agents in their community. By institutionally-embedding an 
ever-present friction and air of suspicion between these two groups, the powerful will 
be prevented from exercising discretionary power with impunity as there will be a 
clear institutional-means for popular sanction against their actions. Simultaneously, 
such institutions will provide citizens with the power to make sure their interests and 
ideas are taken seriously when political decisions are made. Taking inspiration from 
Machiavelli, McCormick has, for example, suggested that this kind of class-conscious 
antipower could be achieved through the creation of a modern People’s Tribunate. 
This body would empower randomly selected nonwealthy citizens with both 
legislative powers, as well as various powers to hold elected, invariably wealthy, elites 
 
33 It should be noted that, while McCormick himself views Machiavelli’s politics as radically distant 
from the classical republican tradition (cf. 2011, p.168), given that Machiavelli’s central concern is 
freedom from domination, I have chosen here to consider Machiavelli’s more democratic, and authorial 
politics as an important variant of republicanism.  
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accountable (McCormick, 2011, pp.183-184). In this way, citizens can be confident 
that their freedom from elite domination is constitutionally secured.  
To summarise, then, the republican political program is focussed on the promotion of 
antipower, the legally- and institutionally-constituted capacity to repel and disarm the 
potential for domination. Antipower can be promoted via at least four broad types of 
political institutions: (i) protective institutions; (ii) regulatory institutions; (iii) 
empowering institutions; and (iv) contestatory institutions. Where such antipower is 
generated, citizens will be able to vigilantly guard against potential domination in 
society, from both public and private sources, and call on the resources of the state to 
intervene where their freedom from domination is threatened. 
As we have seen, promoting antipower through such institutions can be seen to reduce 
or even eliminate domination, without representing a source of domination in and of 
itself. Whilst there will be elements of coercion necessary for the establishment of 
antipower-promoting institutions (for example, coercive raising of public revenues 
from citizens to fund antipower institutions, or the legal constraint of certain socio-
economic activity that is identified as a source of domination), this interference is 
consistent with those affected individuals’ freedom as non-domination. Such 
interference is transparent, applied consistently (Pettit, 1996, p.590), and located 
within a system that ensures the interests of each citizen is taken seriously. It is 
therefore non-arbitrary and thus non-dominating. Although it may limit your range of 
actions and choices, such interference does not offend against the value of republican 
liberty. Pettit explains this reasoning with relation to the example of taxation:  
“[w]hen a government taxes people under a well-ordered system of law, it need 
not dominate them, since the interference involved should not be arbitrary; it 
should be designed to track people’s interests according to their ideas. The 
taxation will restrict the area in which those who are taxed enjoy undominated 
choice, for it deprives them of certain resources, but that is a much lesser offence 
than domination itself” (Pettit, 1997a, pp.149-149). 
However, I believe we can say more than this. Any interference associated with 
antipower institutions is non-dominating to the extent that this interference is 
constitutive of an individual’s free status. Taxation, and other forms of state 
interference, is non-dominating when it allows for the establishment of institutions 
that – like the antibodies in my blood (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.108) – constitute my 
immunity to domination. If, for republicans, liberty is liberty-by-the-law, then it is also 
liberty-by-taxation, liberty-by-regulation, and liberty-by-civic-obligation, provided 
these are embedded within a suitably democratic and non-arbitrary political context. 
The associated interference of such institutions is not just a price worth paying for 
non-domination, it is emblematic of my republican liberty and my ability to command 
the resources of my shared community to protect and respect this status.  
Armed with institutionally constituted antipower in this way, citizens will be able to 
enjoy a status of intersubjective equality with others that comes with freedom as non-
domination. As Pettit powerfully describes:  
“[T]he enjoyment of non-domination…goes with being able to look the other in 
the eye, confident in the shared knowledge that it is not by their leave that you 
117 
 
pursue your innocent, non-interfering choices; you pursue those choices, as of 
publicly recognized right. You do not have to live either in fear of that other, 
then, or in deference to them. The non-interference you enjoy at the hands of 
others is not enjoyed by their grace and you do not live at their mercy. You are a 
somebody in relation to them, not a nobody. You are a person in your own legal 
and social right” (Pettit, 1997a, p.71). 
This ability to walk tall and confidently meet others as equals is the effect of the 
presence of appropriate antipower institutions within a community. Where citizens are 
protected and empowered by each other, and where they have the capacity to 
effectively contest against threats to this status, they are able to enjoy republican 
freedom.  
The republican ideal of non-domination has long informed the political strategies of 
socialist and labour movements and their criticisms of the capitalist system of wage-
labour (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.143; Gourevitch, 2015; Leipold, 2017; Roberts, 2017). This 
ideal should again be deployed to underpin resistance to the particular forms of 
domination associated with precarious work in the contemporary labour market. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will ask, what kinds of institutions can promote the 
antipower necessary to counter this domination? I will consider three broad strategies 
for the promotion of antipower: (i) state regulation, (ii) exit, and (iii) voice34. As we 
will see, no single strategy offers a magic bullet against all domination that arises 
within the precarious labour market. However, establishing a legal and institutional 
framework that embraces a combination of these strategies, I argue, would offer 
individuals the kind of protection and empowerment necessary to significantly limit, 
if not entirely eradicate, the domination they experience as a result of precarious 
working arrangements.  
State regulation. 
As we have already seen, regulatory law, including that which governs employment 
relationships and the wider economy, forms a significant strand of the contemporary 
republican political programme. Such regulation can be a tool for republicans where 
it is used to limit the extent to which powerful agents can use their power to interfere 
arbitrarily and with impunity in the lives of others. For example, Pettit has explicitly 
stated that “employment law will play a vital role in defining and protecting important 
liberties within the context of asymmetrical and potentially troublesome relationships” 
(2014b, p.139).  
This republican rationale appears, indeed, to be integral to the design of suitable labour 
regulations within our societies. As the sociologist, Alex Wood, remarks: 
“labour laws exist to recognise the vulnerable position of employees due to their 
livelihood being dependent on the person hiring them. This dependency means 
that the consequences of ending employment are potentially much more severe 
for the worker (losing their livelihood) than for their employer (having to replace 
 
34 This is not intended as an exhaustive list of potential strategies, but rather, for the sake of parsimony, 
takes inspiration from the three central strategies considered by Elizabeth Anderson in her article 
“Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Recovering Republican Insights” (2015, p.66). This triptych 
itself can be seen to draw inspiration from Hirschmann’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (cf. Anderson, 
2015, p.66).  
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the worker). The asymmetrical nature of this relationship requires special 
protections, such as minimum wages, so as to limit exploitation” (Wood, 2019, 
pp.2-3). 
The philosopher, Elizabeth Anderson, puts this another way, describing how 
regulation can subject “the authority of managers to rule of law constraints so as to 
protect workers against arbitrary rule” (2015, p.67). In this way, state regulation of the 
economic sphere, and of working life in particular, can be seen as an extension and 
reinterpretation of Harrington’s classical republican idea that freedom requires “an 
empire of laws and not of men” (1992, p.8). Rather than allowing powerful economic 
agents to exercise total discretionary power over others, labour law and market 
regulation means that they are only able to exercise this power insofar as they do so in 
line with a nonvoluntaristic rule of law. By reducing the scope and intensity with 
which employers can exercise power, the vulnerability of their employees to 
domination can be also be lessened. Indeed, many forms of labour regulation such as 
minimum wage laws, or workplace health and safety standards already exist to address 
such vulnerabilities that exist within the labour market (cf. Anderson, 2015, p.48).  
If regulation of the labour market, as well as the wider sphere of economic activity, 
can be viewed as an important form of antipower necessary for the protection of 
republican liberty from potential domination, what specific regulatory measures could 
republicans deploy in order to counteract the specific forms of domination associated 
with precarious working arrangements?  
The most direct legalistic, regulatory approach that could make work less precarious, 
and, by extension, less dominating would be to introduce an outright ban on the 
particular working arrangements associated with precarity. For example, in the United 
Kingdom there are increasing efforts to ban zero-hours contracts. A commitment to 
banning these types of contracts was offered in the Labour Party’s 2015, 2017, and 
2019 election manifestos (cf. 2015, p.13; 2017, p.47; 2019, p.61), and such a ban has 
also been vociferously supported by the Trades Union Congress (e.g. Klair, 2018). In 
the Republic of Ireland, zero-hours contracts have already been banned in almost all 
circumstances with the passing of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
(2018), suggesting that such a ban is not only desirable, but also tangibly achievable 
within advanced capitalist economies.  
Beyond zero-hours contracts, we can also consider the way that national and local 
governments have introduced bans on particular gig economy firms from operating 
within their jurisdictions. For example, in September 2017 Transport for London 
suspended Uber’s license to operate in the city. Although this suspension was justified 
on the grounds of public safety and security concerns (cf. Transport for London, 2017), 
it highlights the potential for state regulators to disrupt the business models of firms 
that profit from precarious working arrangements. By using the law to prevent such 
firms from operating, the legal framework that permits the normalisation of precarious 
work can be challenged. 
Such bans, far from being a sign of a heavy-handed overreach by the powers of the 
state that threatens freedom, is entirely compatible with republican liberty, if not 
actively necessary for its enjoyment. As Pettit argues, “the republican state which 
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wants to promote non-domination is bound to expect contract law, not just to facilitate 
voluntary agreements among different agents, but to play a regulative role in 
disallowing contracts that involve terms under which one party has the possibility of 
dominating the other” (1997a, p.165). To the extent that we can show that precarious 
working arrangements generate domination, we are justified on republican grounds to 
outlaw them.   
But outright bans need not be the only regulatory response to precarious work. Indeed, 
such bans could worsen the situation of precarious workers by causing undue distress. 
For example, individuals may fear that a ban on a gig economy firm like Uber will 
mean they lose their (albeit imperfect) source of livelihood completely, or their access 
to much needed flexible working conditions. Therefore, an alternative regulatory 
approach could instead see existing labour rights and protections updated, or new legal 
safeguards introduced, in order to respond dynamically to the changing labour market 
and the proliferation of precarious working arrangements within it.  
Individuals engaged in precarious working arrangements, for example zero-hours 
contracts, routinely miss out on important employment rights such as sick pay and 
maternity pay because they are classed as ‘workers’ rather than ‘employees’ (cf. 
European Parliament, 2016, p.124). One radical response to this problem has been 
offered by the jurist Andrew Stewart and economist Jim Stanford. They suggest that 
this regulatory distinction between different categories of worker should be abandoned 
altogether, and that, instead, protections should be applied universally to all those 
performing work (Stewart and Stanford, 2017, p.430).  
However, as recent tribunal decisions in the United Kingdom have shown, many 
precariously-employed workers in Britain may actually be missing out on rights, such 
as minimum wage and holiday pay, that they are already legally entitled to as so called 
“limb (b) workers” (for example, see case of ‘Uber BV & ors v Aslam & ors’, 2018). 
Such workers do not necessarily need new rights extended to them, but should instead 
have their existing rights extended through the proper enforcement of the 
nonvoluntaristic rule of law. Rather than allowing employers to obfuscate and side-
step their responsibilities, regulators should ensure that labour regulations are enforced 
effectively and consistently across the labour market. It is precisely this kind of 
effective and consistent enforcement of law – such that it represents an ‘empire of law’ 
– that republicans call for. By extending and enforcing existing rights and protections 
to all workers, regulators would help rebalance the asymmetrical power dynamics 
associated with precarious forms of work, where the provision of these rights is 
currently ceded to the discretion of the individual employer.  
In addition to extending existing rights, regulators should also seek to introduce new 
forms of protection that address some of the more particular vulnerabilities 
experienced by precarious workers. However, in the United Kingdom, the 
government’s recent ‘Good Work Plan’ proposes only providing workers with a new 
right to request a more stable contract (HM Government, 2018). This is both a 
sideways step, and one that is wholly insufficient. A ‘right to request’ does nothing to 
redress the discretionary power that is available to employers as a result of precarious 
working arrangements. Whether the employer accepts the workers request is left 
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entirely to their own arbitrary will. A ‘right to request’ is no right at all. It entrenches 
the domination of the worker by the employer rather than eroding it.  
Again, in this respect, the Republic of Ireland is ahead of the United Kingdom. 
Alongside banning zero-hours contracts in the majority of circumstances, the 
Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (2018) also grants Irish workers a right 
to a minimum payment if they turn up for a shift but are sent home by their employer. 
This legislation also creates a right to guaranteed hours of work that reflect an 
individual’s normal working patterns. By creating new employment rights in response 
to the particular vulnerabilities faced by precarious workers, the Irish government has 
reduced the scope and intensity of dominating power available to employers. 
Importantly, this legislation does not unnecessarily discourage individuals from freely 
choosing flexible working arrangements, instead it empowers them to negotiate 
working arrangements on the basis of their own needs. In this respect at least, Irish 
workers are no longer dependent on the arbitrary whims of their employers. They are 
able to secure, by right, regular working hours and streams of income that allow them 
to plan and pursue their own lives more effectively.  
Regulation can therefore be seen to offer a promising source of protection against the 
domination associated with precarious working arrangements. By banning certain 
practices or providing legal safeguards to workers, the scope for discretionary 
employer interference is constrained. Workers need no longer feel forced to wait by 
the phone to hear if they have been given a shift that day, and will feel less compelled 
to bend over backwards in order to curry favour with an employer who can grant or 
withhold work as she sees fit. Crucially, and in contrast with libertarian critiques of 
state intervention in the market (e.g. Tomasi, 2012), this regulation does not offend 
against freedom from a republican standpoint. It may limit an individual’s ability to 
exercise their free status in certain ways (e.g. their ability to enter into a zero-hours 
contract), but it does not undermine this free status pro tanto so long as the regulatory 
law tracks that individual’s interests, namely a superseding interest in freedom as non-
domination (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.65). By representing a form of antipower, protecting 
and empowering vulnerable individuals against the arbitrary whim of employers, such 
regulation can be viewed as constitutive of one’s republican liberty. 
However, this is not to suggest that a regulatory approach to the domination associated 
with precarious work is an all-things-considered flawless one.  
For example, even if we are able to successfully legislate against the specific forms of 
domination unique to precarious working arrangements, capitalist labour markets, no 
matter how tightly regulated, will retain elements of domination. So long as we work 
under the authority of a capitalist employer, that employer will enjoy access to 
arbitrary power over our working lives. Regardless of the regulatory and legal 
protections that are put in place, there will always be a gap through which this 
dominating power can penetrate.  
One reason for this is that when entering a labour contract, terms of employment “can 
never be entirely specified in advance and the exact work details are left vague and 
open-ended” (Wood, 2019, p.2). Even if workers are given contractually guaranteed 
hours and wages, there will be numerous elements of the working arrangement – for 
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example, the precise nature of the tasks that must be performed - that remain at the 
discretion of the employer. Regulation and legal protections may alter the degree to 
which employers can dominate their workers, but it does not eradicate this domination 
completely.  
As Alex Gourevitch has shown, this subjection to the will of employers was a central 
part of the nineteenth century ‘labour republican’ critique of capitalist wage-labour: 
“[T]o labor republicans, the whole point of the contract was that the worker had 
consented to evacuate his will, to suspend its exercise for the period of 
employment. Outside violating the very general terms of the contract, the 
employer was at liberty to do what he liked…the labor contract was necessarily 
an agreement to give up control over the seller’s will for the duration of the 
working day…the worker would, while at work, have to substitute the 
employer’s will for his own” (Gourevitch, 2015, p.113). 
Employer domination therefore persists as an inescapable element of the capitalist 
labour contract. Even if labour law and regulation can prevent dominating power being 
exercised in certain, specified ways such as those associated with precarious working 
arrangements, it cannot legislate against the unspecified whims of the employer, be 
they benign or malignant, that will arise in the day-to-day experience of working life. 
But more than this, even if protected from precarious working arrangements by 
regulatory institutions, workers within a capitalist system will remain dependent on 
the decision of one employer or another to hire them and keep them in stable 
employment. Again, this element of domination was captured by the labor republican 
tradition. The labor republicans recognised that the distribution of property compelled 
workers to sell their labour in order to survive. This dependence, they argued, 
represented “a form of domination exercised by the entire class of property owners” 
(Gourevitch, 2015, p.108). Recall, too, Ellen Wilkinson’s socialist critique of a 
capitalist system which grants employers the power to unilaterally close businesses 
and thus “sweep away the livelihood of a whole town overnight” (Wilkinson, 1939, 
p.7). If you must work to survive, then those who control access to work hold all the 
cards and, as a result, can wield immense discretionary and capricious power over you 
– as anyone who has ever applied for a job will attest. But this dominating dependence 
persists throughout one’s career as they are vulnerable to the omnipresent potential 
that the employer could let you go, or close the business altogether, to satisfy their 
own will or the interest of corporate profit.  
Under capitalism, then, even if the specific forms of domination associated with 
precarious work can be contained, workers will still be dominated. They will be 
dependent on the will of an employer to hire them and to keep them in employment, 
and they will be further subject to the varied whims of that employer’s will during the 
course of that will. Regulatory responses to the domination associated with precarious 
work would, alone, seem unsatisfactory. Regulation may help free individuals from 
precarious work, but these individuals will nonetheless remain shackled by an 
economic system over which they wield little power. For this reason, assuming the 
ongoing continuation of capitalism, republicans should argue that in addition to 
enjoying specific regulatory protections against precarious working conditions, 
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workers should also be empowered against domination through an ability to exit 
dominating employment, and through an ability to exercise democratic voice within 
the economy. As we will see, such additional measures will dramatically reduce the 
scope for employers to wield the arbitrary power granted to them under capitalism at 
will and with impunity. 
Exit. 
The value of exit as a source of counter-dominating power has long been recognised 
within the republican tradition of political thought. Consider, for example, 
Machiavelli’s favourable description of Roman plebeians who would regularly decide 
to “troop out of Rome” in order to escape the dominating conditions of the city (2003, 
p.114). And the value of exit continues to be promoted among contemporary 
republicans.  
Put simply the idea is that, by exiting a dominating relationship, an individual can 
escape the power of the dominator; they need not passively suffer when they are free 
to walk away. But, in addition, the threat of exit can also act as a check on powerful 
agents, preventing them from wielding arbitrary power with impunity by emphasising 
the potential costs of such action. For example, as Robert S. Taylor argues: 
“[t]he surest defense against domination for women in abusive marriages is exit: 
so long as divorce laws are liberal, restraining orders are effective, and reasonable 
employment opportunities and/or alternative marital prospects are present, wives 
can either flee abuse or credibly threaten exit in the hope of modifying spousal 
behaviour” (Taylor, 2017, p.3). 
In the economic sphere, the ability to freely, and confidently exit an unsatisfactory 
labour contract can be seen to represent an important form of antipower, preventing 
employers from acting with impunity. However, in the context of the labour market, 
this power of exit could take a variety of forms. The first would be a formal, legally 
protected right to exit within a competitive labour market. In other words, in an ideally 
competitive market free from indentured servitude and slavery, workers are able to 
easily leave intolerably dominating (or indeed, merely unsatisfactory) labour contracts 
and seek more favourable employment elsewhere.  
As we have already seen, Pettit has argued that “competitive market forces” can help 
to promote antipower (1996, p.592). Robert S. Taylor has explored this idea in more 
detail, arguing that in perfectly competitive markets “no firm will be in a position to 
dominate workers, given the possibility of costless exit” (2013, p.596). Elsewhere, 
Taylor explains that “empowered workers with many job options need not tolerate 
abusive foremen – and if capitalists are aware of this fact, they will rein in their 
supervisors for fear of losing good employees” (2017, pp.3-4). When there is no 
sanction against you exiting a labour contract, and there is always another employer 
waiting to welcome you with open arms, so the argument goes, one is able to be 
confident of their capacity to, at any time, escape the encroach of intolerable 
dominating power within their working lives. Simultaneously, the tangible threat of 
losing dissatisfied workers will act as a warning to employers against exercising their 
power arbitrarily in the first place.  
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However, there are reasons to think that such a formal right to exit within a competitive 
market may be an insufficient source of antipower for workers within actually-existing 
labour markets, and particularly those in sections of the labour market associated with 
precarious working arrangements. Indeed, it may be harder for workers to escape firms 
despite the presence of this formal exit right. For some this may be because of factors 
such as the oligopolic tendency within the so-called gig economy. If you are reliant on 
working for an app-based firm such as Uber or Deliveroo because their app has the 
largest customer base, or because you have cultivated a customer rating profile that 
cannot be exported to another firm, then you have to accept the employment conditions 
set by your existing employer if you are to work in that industry. For many working 
in the precarious gig economy, the freedom to exit is, increasingly, the freedom to be 
out of a job with few means to make ends meet. 
This risk that exit might carry significant costs is one that is important throughout the 
labour market. As Elizabeth Anderson notes, “workers bear substantial costs of job 
search, acceptance, and loss, and often lack important information about options. 
These labor market frictions endow employers with market power over workers” 
(2015, p.67). Such costs are particularly heavy for precarious workers who may 
already be struggling to make ends meet. For such workers, the financial cost of a 
period without the income of paid employment while they search for new employment 
opportunities could be prohibitively expensive. In societies with sizeable levels of 
unemployment, there may also be a sense that exiting work may relegate an individual 
to the ranks of the unemployed, while they themselves can be easily replaced within 
the firm by a member of the presently unemployed, who are desperate to accept paid 
work. This is the dynamic famously captured by Marx in Capital when he described 
the unemployed as a “reserve army of labour” (MECW, 35, p.626), a group ready to 
take the position of anyone bold enough to abdicate from capitalist exploitation. Where 
such a scenario pertains, the bulk of the cost of exit is borne by the worker, with much 
lower costs to the employer who can rapidly find replacements. This can be deduced 
to represent a control mechanism, discouraging individuals from exercising their 
formal right of exit even when they labour under conditions of intolerable domination. 
It is for such reasons that Taylor argues that “only if exit is legally enabled, 
economically feasible, and costly to potential abusers can it do its full job” (2017, p.4).  
The question of economic feasibility is crucial. How can we ensure that workers don’t 
just have a formal right to exit, but also the material means to exercise this right 
without fearing significant economic hardship?  
One way to ensure that exit is an economically feasible option is through the provision 
of welfare state protections. By welfare state I am referring to an “institutional 
framework under which the state assumes responsibility for the basic welfare of 
citizens and applies policies, operationalized via legislation, to that end…It is 
particularly associated with the meeting of basic needs; and it thus operates as a 
redistributive mechanism for the inequalities that occur under a market economy” 
(Harris, 2009, para. 1). Various models of welfare state exist on a continuum between 
more “institutional” and more “residualist” models. Institutional models see the state 
take more responsibility for ensuring citizens’ basic needs are met more universally, 
while residualist models see the state take a more minimal role and involve greater 
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emphasis on means-testing rather than universal provision. Typically, though, welfare 
state provisions will include measures such as health care, education, social housing, 
and unemployment insurance (ibid, para. 2-3). Regardless of the precise shape that a 
welfare state takes, the provision of certain basic services and a social safety net 
through ex post redistribution could help dampen the economic risks associated with 
exiting work, thus contributing towards the exit-based antipower that would allow 
workers to confidently resist domination by their employers.  
Philip Pettit has explicitly recognised this point: 
“Suppose that an employer has the capacity in some measure to interfere 
arbitrarily in the affairs of an employee. Employment is so scarce and the 
prospect of unemployment so repellent, that the employer can alter agreed terms 
of employment, make life much tougher for employees, or even practice some 
illegal interference in their affairs with relative ease…just the existence of 
reasonable unemployment benefits is bound to reduce the extent to which an 
employee is willing to tolerate arbitrary interference by an employer and is bound 
by the same token to reduce the capacity of the employer to interfere at will and 
with impunity in the lives of employees” (Pettit, 2007, p.406). 
The counter-dominating benefits of welfare state provision could be particularly acute 
for those in precarious working arrangements. For example, if the state guarantees a 
set of benefits that mean individuals will be able to meet their (at least) basic needs in 
the event of unemployment, they are better empowered to step away from precarious 
working conditions that they find to be intolerably dominating. More than this though, 
it gives them the power to turn down offers of such employment in the first place if 
the conditions are unacceptable. There is less incentive to acquiesce to dominating 
employment conditions when the state is committed to meeting your basic needs.  
Other aspects of welfare state provision could also be particularly impactful in this 
respect. For example, feminist analyses of precarious work have suggested that the 
availability of childcare shapes the decision of many parents, mothers in particular, to 
accept so-called “flexible” working arrangements (Vosko et al., 2009, p.16). When 
parents cannot afford to pay for childcare they form a cadre that can be exploited by 
employers offering piecemeal part-time, temporary positions that can fit around family 
life. In contrast, where childcare provision is funded by the state, as for example in 
France, parents are much more able to seek full-time employment (ibid, p.20, note 2). 
In such contexts, welfare states help to promote antipower to the extent that they 
enable workers to resist the need to accept dominating, precarious work.  
It should also be reiterated here that the redistribution necessary to maintain a welfare 
state is entirely consistent with the value of republican liberty. When adopting a 
conception of freedom as non-interference, any redistribution must be shown to 
provide more freedom from interference for the individuals who benefit from 
redistribution than the state inflicts on those it redistributes from. The onus will be on 
those who desire redistribution to show the overall improvement in noninterference 
will be large enough to warrant the costs to freedom caused by state interference 
(Pettit, 2008b p.402). However, by adopting a republican conception of freedom as 
non-domination, such calculations can be avoided. So long as redistribution is 
conducted in accordance with a fair rule of law, and in pursuit of maximising non-
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domination in society, then the redistribution necessary to maintain a welfare state is 
entirely justifiable (ibid., p.404).  
However, it is not clear that welfare states alone neutralise all forms of economic 
domination, and may, perversely, generate additional sources of domination. Despite 
redistributing some wealth from the rich to the poor, the introduction of welfare states 
does not necessarily reverse the vast inequality between these two social groups. So 
long as the wealthy submit a portion of their wealth to keep the poor out of destitution, 
their remaining affluence, and the social, economic, and political power this affords, 
may remain intact.  
John Rawls recognises this point in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. In his 
discussion of welfare state capitalism, Rawls writes that such as regime “permits very 
large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural 
resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life rests in few 
hands” (2001, p.138). For republicans this kind of elite economic control is 
impermissible (cf. Thomas, 2016, p.186). On the scales of liberty, it matters little that 
the poor are kept fed and sheltered if they remain under the dominating control of a 
more powerful group. They may be more comfortable, but they are not more free. 
Moreover, in a society where wealth and power remain concentrated in a few hands, 
any welfare state regime exists, de facto, not as a right but as a gift, extended to the 
poor by the wealthy, that can be reclaimed at any time. The wealthy remain free to use 
their social and political influence to undermine (for example, by promoting the social 
stigmatisation of welfare recipients) and, indeed, repeal welfare state measures as soon 
as these become intolerable, or politically unnecessary for furthering the interests of 
the elite. No republican can be comfortable with a system that allows the welfare of 
one group to exist dependent on the will of another. Welfare states appear to risk 
entrenching just this kind of domination.  
In addition to tolerating the concentrated power of a wealthy elite, welfare state 
regimes, particularly those that are more residualist in design, can also create new 
forms of domination in the guise of welfare bureaucracy. Alan Thomas, for example, 
has challenged the “technocratic, non-transparent, and paternalistic stamp of welfare-
state capitalist administration in its relation to its “clients”” (2016, p.189). This is 
particularly visible where benefits are means-tested, leaving people vulnerable to the 
discretionary judgment of the welfare bureaucrat. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, a number of welfare benefits can be reduced or stopped altogether if 
claimants fail to meet conditions, such as attending regular jobcentre appointments. 
However, this ‘sanctions’ regime can be seen to confer welfare bureaucrats with 
dominating, discretionary power over welfare claimants. The extent of this 
discretionary power can be seen in multiple cases of benefits claimants being penalised 
for arbitrary and capricious reasons. Many of these cases were submitted as written 
evidence to the Government’s review of benefit sanctions policy conducted by 
Matthew Oakley. Examples include a claimant who was sanctioned because their hand 
writing was too messy; a claimant who was sanctioned for providing insufficient detail 
in job reports (only for a second official to say there was no problem with the reports); 
and several reports of claimants who were sanctioned because they had allegedly not 
submitted required paperwork (only for it to turn out that this paperwork had been 
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submitted and received by officials) (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015, pp.65-67). 
The fact that certain welfare regimes can leave the fate of claimants in the hands of 
bureaucrats, vulnerable to vindictiveness as well as negligence, generates troubling 
relationships of domination. Reliant on the discretion of bureaucrats to maintain their 
welfare payments, claimants cannot interact with the welfare system as free and equal 
republican citizens.  
One way to avoid this kind of bureaucratic domination would be to make welfare 
payments a universal right. Indeed, Pettit has argued explicitly for a republican mode 
of delivering welfare that is “independent of political vagaries and bureaucratic 
whims” (1997a, p.162). This kind of universality could plausibly be achieved through 
the provision of a ‘basic income’. Though a number of different models exist, in 
general terms, a basic income would represent a minimum income paid universally 
and unconditionally to all citizens (or, in some cases, all permanent residents) on a 
periodic basis. A basic income would (i) be paid to these persons as individuals not 
households; (ii) would replace most existing forms of benefits and allowances; (iii) 
would be paid regardless of that individual’s employment status, income level or 
living arrangements; and (iv) would be set at a meaningful level, either providing 
enough to meet one’s basic needs or at least the basis for an adequate income to be 
achieved through other earnings from paid work or other forms of supplementary 
benefits for those with special needs and extra living costs (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p.3; 
McKay, 2005, pp.105-106; Standing, 2004, pp.611-612; Van Parijs, 1992, pp.3-4; 
Walter, 1989, pp.18-20). 
Advocates of basic income schemes argue that they offer several benefits over existing 
forms of state welfare. Firstly, it is argued that access to a basic income would 
significantly reduce poverty by providing all citizens with access to an unconditional 
source of income that could dampen the impact of unemployment or low-wage work 
(e.g. Fitzpatrick, 1999, p.4; Walter, 1989, p.8). Moreover, a basic income would 
reduce poverty more efficiently than existing forms of social welfare by preventing 
poverty from arising in the first place, rather than relieving poverty and its effects after 
it has been allowed to emerge within society (Walter, 1989, p.18). Others offer 
efficiency-based arguments in favour of a basic income, believing that, by replacing 
multiple forms of existing social security schemes and the bureaucratic apparatus these 
require, a basic income could offer a cheaper and more simple alternative (Fitzpatrick, 
1999, p.4). Finally, we should also recognise that a basic income would help to provide 
an important source of financial compensation to those, often women, who perform 
forms of domestic and caring labour that go unremunerated under the current socio-
economic system (cf. Gourevitch and Stanczyk, 2018, p.155). 
But there are also freedom-based arguments in favour of a basic income, not least from 
republican thinkers who perceive a basic income as instrumental to creating the social 
and economic conditions for non-domination.  
The republican tradition of political thought has a long historical association with the 
idea of basic income. Indeed, the history of basic income is often traced back to the 
eighteenth century republican thinker Thomas Paine, who proposed in his pamphlet, 
Agrarian Justice, the creation of a national fund that would endow each citizen with a 
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fixed sum of capital on reaching the age of twenty-one (1945 [1796], pp.612-613). 
More recently, a number of arguments from within contemporary republicanism have 
been offered in support of the establishment of a basic income (e.g., Dagger, 2006; 
Domènech and Raventós, 2007; Casassas and De Wispelaere, 2016; etc.).  
Philip Pettit has himself offered a republican argument for a basic income, claiming 
“[i]f I am not assured a basic income, there will be many areas where the wealthier 
could interfere with me at tolerable cost, without their being confronted by legal 
prevention of that interference” (2007, p.5). Indeed, Pettit has explicitly argued that a 
basic income would provide individuals with a greater power to exit that would in turn 
allow them to counter domination by employers: 
“Suppose there are just a few employers and many available employees, and that 
times are hard. In those conditions I and those who like me will not be able to 
command a decent wage: a wage that will enable us to function properly in 
society. And in those conditions it will be equally true that we would be 
defenseless against our employers’ petty abuse or their power to arbitrarily 
dismiss us… the most effective of all protections…would be one’s ability to 
leave employment and fall back on a basic wage available unconditionally from 
the state” (Pettit, 2007, p.5). 
The idea, then, is that a basic income could help to promote the kind of antipower that 
is generated by an economically feasible ability to exit a dominating employment 
relationship. Because citizens receive a basic income unconditionally as a right, they 
have a guaranteed safety net to help them meet their basic needs should they feel the 
need to escape paid work due to the intolerable domination of their employer. They 
would have the confidence to resist a dominating employer, while the viable threat of 
exit would act as a caution to employers, preventing them from wielding power with 
impunity.  
Empowered by this sense of financial security, a basic income could also provide a 
foundation from which workers could be able to leverage improved working 
conditions from their employers. Put simply, in a market where workers are able to 
leave work for the security of a guaranteed basic income, employers would need to 
deploy more enticing wages and workplace conditions in order to attract the labour 
required to perform productive work. By loosening the ties of dependence between 
workers and their employers, a basic income would therefore act as an empowering 
institution, restricting the power-dynamics of the market in order to neutralise the 
potential domination of employers. 
In this respect, the introduction of a basic income could be particularly impactful for 
precarious workers. The provision of a basic income would disarm the extraordinary 
discretionary power that employers hold over precarious workers: the power to 
demand extra work, to withhold work, and to deny work altogether without reference 
to the interests of the individual worker. For example, the zero-hours contract worker 
would have less to fear from a week without any shifts from their employer if they 
know they can fall back on a guaranteed income paid as right by the state. Meanwhile, 
the temporary agency worker in the Amazon fulfilment centre may feel less inclined 
to bend over backwards to meet the company’s ever-more intense performance targets 
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when they know they can walk away from the job and still have access to an income. 
The effects of their precarious employment would be mitigated by an alternative 
source of economic security that is independent from work.  
But more than just neutralising the dominating power of particular employers, a basic 
income offers the potential to extinguish the manifold potential forms of domination 
that precarious working arrangements currently expose individuals to. Providing every 
citizen with a tangible basis of economic security would mean that those employed in 
precarious forms of work would no longer be vulnerable to the multiple other forms 
of imminent domination that would lie around every corner for those who cannot rely 
on work to make ends meet. Empowered by a basic income, workers would no longer 
need to fear their employer, but they would also no longer need to fear the pay-day 
creditor, welfare bureaucrat, or rogue landlord. Access to a stable source of income, 
even if relatively small, would erode the vulnerability of precariously-employed 
workers to multiple, unpredictable sources of economic domination in crucial ways. 
Indeed, it could contribute in important ways towards dismantling the structure of the 
precarious labour market, providing workers with a route out of the precarity trap. 
They would be empowered to more effectively plan their own lives, and to walk away 
from, or evade altogether, relationships of domination. A basic income could, in this 
way, amplify the free status of workers, enabling them to more easily interact with 
others, in the economic sphere and beyond, as free and equal citizens.  
At least, this is the ideal. Despite the seeming promise that a basic income could 
represent a source of antipower for precariously-employed workers, there may be 
reasons to think that even this kind of economically enabled power of exit would 
nevertheless be insufficient for the effective resistance of domination in the labour 
market. A basic income is not a magic bullet against domination. 
The reason for this is that, although a generous welfare state, such as that associated 
with the provision of a universal basic income, might allow individuals to exit a 
particular job, it is unlikely to allow them to exit the labour market entirely.  
There are certainly feasibility questions as to whether a basic income large enough to 
free people from dependence on paid work is possible given the present social and 
political reality we find ourselves in. For example, Alex Gourevitch and Lucas 
Stanczyk (2018) have argued that a sufficiently emancipatory basic income could not 
be established until the working class was organised enough to extract it from the 
wealthy. Erik Olin Wright has, similarly, questioned whether capitalists would freely 
submit to the high taxation required to fund a large basic income, raising the possibility 
that the introduction of a basic income could inspire an “exodus of capital” (1986, 
pp.662-664). Whilst workers may be glad to see the backs of their dominating 
employers, the immediate effects of such capital flight on a broadly-capitalist society 
could be economically ruinous, fatally undermining the state’s ability to fund the basic 
income programme (or any public service for that matter)  through tax receipts, and 
removing the private sources of income that sustain workers’ ability to survive in one 
fail swoop. For this reason, any successful basic income initiative would likely, as a 
matter of pragmatic necessity, need to be set at a low-enough level that it would not 
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antagonise the capitalist class35. It is unlikely that this low-level basic income could 
enable workers to sustainably exit from the labour market completely.  
But, in addition, it has been argued that the idea that a basic income will provide only 
temporary respite from paid employment is inherent to Philip Pettit’s understanding 
of a republican right to basic income. For example, Alex Gourevitch contends, “Pettit 
must assume that the basic income he calls for is insufficient to allow workers to 
withdraw from the labor market indefinitely. It must be low enough that at least as 
much work is performed as is necessary to sustain a basic income for everyone” (2013, 
p.604). Indeed, Pettit explicitly raises this question in his article A Republican Right 
to Basic Income?, where he writes: 
“Introducing such a right is bound to raise questions of institutional feasibility. 
Would it lead too many people to opt out of the workforce, for example? And 
even if it did not, could a constitution that allowed some members of the society 
to do this – at whatever relative cost – prove acceptable in a society of mutually 
reciprocal, equally positioned members?” (Pettit, 2007, p.1).  
The suggestion here is that a basic income, or any form of welfare transfer by the state 
for that matter, should be set at a level that enables individuals to leave particularly 
dominating employment for a limited time. A basic income should help individuals 
meet their basic needs for a period after they leave a job, but should not sustain them 
indefinitely. A society with a basic income, in short, would not necessarily be a society 
without capitalist labour markets and paid employment. Afterall, Pettit’s argument 
suggests, it is this labour that will generate the tax receipts necessary to fund the basic 
income; on the grounds of fairness at least, everyone who benefits from a basic income 
should also, to the best of their ability, contribute towards the generation of that 
universal basic income by engaging in productive, paid work.  
This is crucial when we consider the impact of a basic income (or any model of 
generous welfare state provision) on precarious work. If such redistribution does not 
allow a complete exit from the labour market, it could serve to, perversely, entrench 
and, indeed, subsidise dominating forms of precarious work. A basic income could, 
certainly, help mitigate the economic insecurity associated with precarious work. It 
could also empower individuals to exit intolerably dominating incidents of precarious 
work. But a basic income does not necessarily challenge the system of precarious 
work. Indeed, it could make temporary working arrangements, zero-hours contracts, 
and gig economy employment more sustainable. Why should an employer feel obliged 
to provide secure, stable, well-paid work to their workforce when they know that the 
state is subsidising a good portion of their immediate basic needs through the payment 
of basic income? In this way, a basic income could permit, or even tacitly encourage, 
employers to treat workers even more explicitly as disposable commodities, useful 
only so far as they can provide immediate value to an employer.  
Such a situation would fail to generate the intersubjective equality necessary for 
republican liberty. To the extent that employers could be emboldened to treat 
 
35 This raises a further question of whether a basic income, the ongoing maintenance of which is 
dependent on the will of a capitalist class – where society is effectively held hostage to the 
dominating power of the wealthy - is worth having at all.  
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employees as disposable commodities in a state where a basic income would protect 
people from immediate destitution and starvation, those disposable employees would 
still not be being treated as persons worthy of respect in their own legal and social 
right (cf. Pettit, 1997a, p.71) by their employers. Employees may not, to the same 
extent, fear the immediate economic consequences of disruption to their shift patterns, 
wages, or employment status, but they would nonetheless remain vulnerable to the 
arbitrary will of an employer who can interfere in their lives with little consideration 
for their interests. In other words, a basic income could mitigate, to an extent, the costs 
of the domination associated with precarious working arrangements, but the 
relationships of domination themselves would remain intact. Indeed, a basic income 
could make these relationships of domination between employers and workers even 
more intractable.   
But more than this, if we grant that a basic income could allow precarious working 
arrangements to flourish even further, then the potential for a right to exit to act as a 
form of counter-dominating antipower could also be significantly dulled. Consider the 
case of a precarious worker who, frustrated by the domination of their present 
employer, decides to activate their right to exit. The worker resigns from her job to 
rely on the basic income payments she receives from the state. However, as we have 
discovered, these basic income payments will not be sufficient for this worker to 
withdraw from the labour market in perpetuity. They may allow her to meet her most 
basic needs only for a short period while she searches for employment elsewhere. But, 
if we grant that a state with an established right to basic income would see a 
simultaneous flourishing of temporary, zero-hours, and gig economy-type precarious 
jobs, then our worker’s exit will be all for naught. She may have been afforded some 
respite from the immediate domination of her original employer, but she will then have 
to return to the labour market to enter a new job that may very well involve a similar 
level of discretionary employer power.  
Just as this exit would ultimately have no long-term benefit for the worker’s freedom 
as non-domination, the threat of exit would not deter the original employer from 
wielding extraordinary levels of arbitrary power at will and with impunity either. 
Indeed, the exit of the worker would simply melt into the regular comings and goings 
of a temporary, transient, and transposable workforce, employed only as and when it 
suits the immediate need of the employer and their interest in maximal efficiency and 
maximal private profit.   
Taken in isolation, then, a right to exit made economically feasible by a generous 
welfare state or basic income could actually strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
domination associated with precarious working arrangements. But this is not the only 
reason that we should avoid treating a right to exit as a single magic bullet against 
domination labour market. It is important to recognise that there are additional, non-
financial, costs that could mean that a right to exit, even one made economically 
feasible, would still place a heavy burden on the exiting worker. The existence of these 
costs could severely limit the credibility of any exit threat, making a dominating 
employment relationship even more intractable. For example, Gourevitch notes that 
“a basic income cannot eliminate many costs associated with losing a job, such as the 
needs of family, ties to community, value of workplace relationships” (2016a, p.24). 
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In addition, the psychic costs associated with the emotionally- and mentally-draining 
application and rejection process necessary to eventually find another job could also 
discourage many from exercising their right to exit even from intensely dominating, 
precarious work (cf. Anderson, 2015, p.67). Reliance on the right to exit as a source 
of antipower can therefore be seen to be, potentially, highly demanding on the exiting 
worker to the extent that exit can seem prohibitively expensive even where it is made 
economically feasible. If exiting work means leaving behind valued work colleagues, 
disrupting established child care arrangements, and exposing yourself to the stress, 
anxiety, and self-doubt of the job application, then it is understandable if many 
workers would choose to stay put and continue to weather the domination that they 
already bristle under.  
Just as with regulation, a right to exit would seem to, on its own, fail to generate 
sufficient antipower to allow workers to resist the domination associated with 
precarious work in the existing labour market. Although exit-empowering institutions 
such as a generous welfare state or basic income could, importantly, help to mitigate 
the economic insecurity to which precarious workers are vulnerable, these institutions 
are not enough to dismantle the dominating power-dynamics of the precarious labour 
market. For this reason, state regulation and an economically feasible right to exit 
should be bolstered within the contemporary republican political programme by an 
emphasis on empowering workers to exercise a democratic and contestatory voice 
within the workplace and the wider economic sphere. 
 
Voice. 
What does it mean to have a capacity to exercise voice, and how can this be 
institutionally established within the economic sphere? In his Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 
Hirschman defines voice as:  
“any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state 
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, 
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion” (Hirschman, 1970, 
p.30). 
In contrast with a right to exit, then, a capacity for voice involves being able to wield 
influence in order to try to change one’s existing situation for the better, rather than 
simply giving up and exiting. As we have just seen, there may be reasons why even 
those in an intolerably dominating employment relationship may find the costs of exit 
prohibitively expensive and demanding. For this reason, it is important to provide 
individuals with robust, institutional means to voice dissatisfaction within their 
working lives and bring about effective change. It is in this respect that we can see 
how the ideal of worker voice reflects the republican value of vigilant contestation. By 
exercising voice, workers have an opportunity to hold the powerful to account and 
ensure that their interests are taken seriously.  
Within the context of the workplace and the labour market, the contestatory antipower 
associated with a capacity to exercise voice could potentially be promoted 
institutionally in a number of different ways. One way is through the establishment of 
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‘workplace democracy’. A democratic workplace is one in which “workers have an 
effective right to participate in the collective governance of the organization and 
determine, by themselves or in conjunction with others, its internal regulation and 
future direction” (Breen, 2015, p.471). However, the institutional manifestation of 
workplace democracy could take a variety of forms. Indeed, among contemporary 
republican thinkers alone, a number of different models have been put forward. A 
comparatively modest proposal can be found in Nien-hê Hsieh’s proposal for 
‘workplace republicanism’ (2005; 2008). Under Hsieh’s regime, workers would have 
a right to participate, in an editorial capacity, in the governance of firms through 
mechanisms such as workplace adjudicative bodies and committees, as well as worker 
representation on governing boards (Hsieh, 2005, p.137). Such a system, Hsieh argues, 
would ensure that the voice of workers is incorporated into the decision-making 
processes of economic enterprises, thus providing them with protection from the 
arbitrary interference that could otherwise be inflicted by management (ibid., pp.136-
137). This regime of workplace republicanism bares conscious similarities with 
Pettit’s model of contestatory democracy (ibid, p.138). The aim is not to remove the 
power of employers completely, but to make it non-arbitrary through institutionally-
guaranteed outlets for contestation by workers within the day-to-day running of the 
enterprise.  
In contrast to Hsieh’s workplace republicanism, a more ambitious form of workplace 
democracy can be identified within Alex Gourevitch’s reconstruction of nineteenth 
century ‘labor republican’ thought. Labor republicans, Gourevitch shows, sought to 
extend the republican value of popular sovereignty to the workplace by replacing the 
dictatorship of the capitalist with the shared ownership and control of cooperative 
enterprises by workers themselves (2015, pp.120-121; p.126). The producer 
cooperatives promoted by labor republicans would allow workers to exercise their 
capacity for self-government, giving them an equal share of direct control over the 
day-to-day decisions of the firm as well as a shared ownership of the cooperative’s 
productive resources. This did not necessarily mean abolishing technocratic 
management, but any managers or overseers would be appointed by, and held 
accountable to, the collective of worker-owners, rather than a private capitalist (ibid.).  
Through the labor republican model of cooperative ownership and control, the power 
of worker voice is transformed, from an editorial capacity to contest the decisions of 
a capitalist employer, to an authorial capacity to contribute cooperatively to the 
management and control of the firm. Such a system would not just smash the 
vulnerability of the worker to the caprice of their particular employer, but also their 
systemic dependence on the capitalist system of wage-labour (ibid.). Cooperative 
ownership and control would be an empowering experience, emphasising each 
individual’s capacity for self-government and political agency (ibid., pp.164-165). In 
other words, through participation in cooperative production, workers would be able 
to enjoy the full intersubjective status of equality that comes with freedom from 
domination.  
However, whilst both the workplace republicanism and cooperative commonwealth 
models can be seen to promote antipower in important ways, they suffer from 
feasibility constraints that should be taken seriously. Whilst situated in the nonideal 
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confines of actually existing British capitalism, both regimes appear difficult to 
achieve in the immediate term.  
Of the two, workplace republicanism appears the more tangible possibility. Indeed, 
one could point to examples of employee participation (to varying extents) in the 
management of private and public companies that already exist in countries across the 
OECD (cf. OECD, 2017, pp.159-160). In the United Kingdom, there was some hope 
that an element of workplace republicanism could be introduced when, in 2016, then 
prime minister, Theresa May, raised the possibility of introducing worker 
representation on company boards. However, this policy was quickly diluted when, 
during a speech to the Confederation of British Industry, May conceded that 
companies would not be compelled to appoint worker representatives (cf. Evans, 
2017). From a republican perspective, any worker representation that is permitted only 
by the discretion of the employer is no protection at all against domination. Given the 
resistance to May’s policy of worker representation, it seems unlikely that Britain will 
establish full-blooded workplace republicanism while political leadership remains 
unchanged.  
The replacement of capitalist wage-labour with cooperative control and ownership 
appears even less likely in the immediate term. Although, internationally, there are 
some high-profile examples of successful cooperative enterprises (for example, the 
Mondragon Corporation in Northern Spain, or the Evergreen Cooperatives in 
Cleveland, Ohio), it seems improbable that we are on the brink of an imminent 
transformation of productive relations and the overthrow of the capitalist system.  
Indeed, Gourevitch identifies several difficulties preventing cooperatives from 
flourishing widely in the contemporary economy: “it is hard to imagine how relatively 
poor workers could acquire enough capital to form cooperatives that could compete in 
major markets…let alone how these cooperatives could weather the long-run ups and 
downs of the market economy” (2015, p.189). But in addition to such practical 
constraints, there are fundamental political ones. Gourevitch’s labor republicans 
recognised that powerful groups are unlikely to relinquish power voluntarily (ibid., 
p.151). It is unlikely that the existing capitalist class will acquiesce to the 
establishment of a fully cooperative system (or a system of workplace republicanism, 
for that matter) on the basis of sound philosophical reasoning about the nature of 
economic liberty proffered by republican political theorists. Non-domination will not 
be gifted to workers, it must be won. 
The means for this political victory already exist. Trade unions should be seen as 
representing actually-existing vehicles for promoting antipower within the nonideal 
context of twenty-first century capitalism.  
For republicans, the counter-dominating potential of trade unions should be seen in 
two respects. Firstly, trade unions have an intrinsic value with regards to non-
domination. They represent a source of antipower in and of themselves to the extent 
that they enable the vigilant contestation of economic decisions. But they also have an 
instrumental value for republicans to the extent that unions can fight to establish and 
maintain other labour protections, such as robust market regulations or a generous 
welfare state that, in turn, promote antipower. To the extent that trade unions perform 
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these valuable counter-dominating functions, it is justifiable for a republican state to 
adopt a promotive stance (cf. O’Neill and White, 2018) towards trade unions, 
including them as central institutional pillars of a contemporary republican political 
programme. I will now address these three claims in turn. 
Trade unions, that is, formal organisations, comprised of workers, that exist to 
“maintain and improve the conditions of employment” (UNISON, n.d.) for their 
members, can be seen to represent important vehicles for the promotion of antipower 
in their own right. Indeed, as we have already seen, Pettit has explicitly highlighted 
trade unions as an example of the type of antipower institution that republicans should 
value (1996, p.592). In the first instance, trade unions can be seen to represent 
contestatory institutions. Unions amplify the voice of workers and provide a means to 
challenging the power of employers and politicising economic life more broadly. 
Unions can be seen as a way to extend vigilant republican citizenship into the 
economic sphere, enabling workers to challenge the decisions that affect their working 
lives and prevent the powerful wielding arbitrary power over them at will and with 
impunity.  
This contestatory role can be performed in a number of ways. The ultimate power 
available to unions rests in their ability to disrupt the productive process by going on 
strike. The threat of a costly strike can bring employers to the bargaining table and can 
coerce them into taking the interests of workers seriously. As Gourevitch recognises, 
“[t]he strike is a way of pressing the claim that workers, too, should exercise control 
rather than submit passively to managerial prerogatives” (2016b, p.317). Strikes 
emphasise the extent to which an employer is dependent on their workforce to keep 
their business running, giving the voice of workers more weight and providing a 
context in which the ideas and interests of workers can be communicated forcefully 
and effectively. For example, a vigilant trade union wielding the threat of sanction 
offered by the capacity to strike, can provide a way for workers to collectively bargain 
for their wages and conditions, rather than simply accept the will of the employer to 
set these unilaterally.  
The ability to contest the power of employers in this way can be particularly beneficial 
for precarious workers who are vulnerable to extraordinary forms of discretionary 
power wielded by employers. For example, in 2016 the gig economy firm Deliveroo 
backed down from a decision to change its wage structure after workers, aided by the 
Independent Workers of Great Britain (IWGB) union, went on strike in London (cf. 
Walker and Kaine, 2016). Similarly, in early 2019 the GMB union successfully 
negotiated the first collective bargaining agreement for gig economy workers, 
securing holiday pay and negotiated wage rates for those working for the courier firm, 
Hermes (cf. GMB, 2019). Such victories show how, through collective organisation, 
unions can enable precarious workers to resist the arbitrary interference of their 
employers.  
Unions can also promote antipower for workers by using their collective financial and 
organisational resources to contest decisions in the courts. Again, the IWGB has 
shown how this legalistic approach to contestation can be particularly beneficial for 
precarious workers. In particular, the IWGB has been involved in a number of ground-
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breaking court tribunals to establish that precarious gig economy workers are missing 
out on key employment rights to which they are legally entitled (cf. The Economist, 
2019). Here unions communicate the contestatory voice of workers in order to 
maintain vigilance against employers who may seek to undermine the fair rule of law. 
Unions provide an institutional basis from which workers can hold their employers to 
account and prevent them from wielding arbitrary power with impunity.  
However, the contestatory capacity provided by unions need not be directed solely 
towards particular employers. Unions also provide a space in which workers voice 
their interests and ideas, more generally on a national level. As O’Neill and White 
recognise, “unions can of course directly intervene in political debates and decision-
making to advance the interests of working people, counterbalancing the influence of 
business and the very rich… this is a matter of giving voice to ideas and interests so 
as to shape the ‘national conversation’ about policy.” (2018, p.261). In particular, 
workers can utilise unions in order to challenge and politicise the organisation of the 
labour market, and, indeed, the economy as whole. Gourevitch identifies this function 
of union activity in his analysis of strikes: “the right to strike makes sense not as a relic 
of feudal guild privileges nor just as an economically rational effort by some to 
maximize wages, but as a form of resistance to the modern labor market itself” (2016b, 
p.313). For Gourevitch, going on strike inverts the structural vulnerability of the 
capitalist wage-labourer, who is free to quit their particular job, but is nonetheless 
structurally compelled to work. By going on strike, the worker illuminates the 
structural injustice that lies at the heart of wage-labour and turns the tables on the 
particular employer who exploits that vulnerability (ibid., pp.313-315).  
This capacity for unions to provide a space in which to contest, critique, and, indeed, 
politicise, their experience of working life could be crucial for precarious workers. 
Collective organisation through trade unions offers precarious workers the opportunity 
to challenge the acceptability, permissibility, and normalisation of precarious working 
arrangements within the labour market, and to emphasise the domination they are 
vulnerable to as a result of the way work is organised and governed. Rather than 
acquiescing to the creeping precarisation of ever more areas of the labour market, 
workers can unite to demand and enforce improvements to their working lives. 
As with all forms of contestation, the ability of unions to challenge powerful decision-
makers and contest the economic status quo does not amount to a veto power. Some 
strikes will be unsuccessful, some legal appeals will fail. But the point of this 
contestation is to ensure that the interests of workers cannot easily be ignored. Unions 
provide a way for individual workers to combine their power and hold employers, and 
other powerful actors, to account, and to communicate their dissatisfaction in a way 
that forces fellow citizens to listen. The contestatory power of unions does not remove 
employer power, just as Pettit’s contestatory democracy does not remove the power 
of the state. But it does attempt to disarm and neutralise the dominating potential of 
this power. By providing a vigilant and contestatory voice, backed up by the power of 
the strike and the organised legal challenge, unions prevent employers from wielding 
power at will and with impunity. An employer may yet choose to exercise arbitrary 
power over her employees, but in a society guarded by robust trade unions she does 
so in the knowledge that workers can resist in a way that could inflict significant costs.  
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In addition to their contestatory role, trade unions can also be seen to promote 
antipower in their capacity as protective institutions. In one sense, this can be seen as 
a direct extension of the contestatory role of unions that we have just explored. Trade 
unions act to ‘protect’ the interests of their members; where they see threats to these 
interests they will act appropriately to counteract these threats, for example through 
industrial action. However, the protective role of trade unions can be more thoroughly 
illuminated by emphasising the historic insurance function that trade unions played 
(cf. Brugiavini et al, 2000, p.5). For example, in addition to campaigning for improved 
working conditions, many nineteenth century British unions also directly provided 
their members with protective benefits such as “insurance against unemployment, 
sickness, and accidents, pensions for retired members, and "death benefits" to ensure 
workers and their wives a proper funeral” (Boyer, 1988, p.319). Such benefits insulate 
workers against the caprice of their employers, and others who may seek to prey on 
the economically vulnerable.  
Although many of these functions are now carried out by welfare states, resurrecting 
this historical, protective role could be particularly beneficial for precarious workers 
who are nonetheless made vulnerable to the potential of falling into dominating 
relationships with creditors, landlords, and so on as a result of the unstable and 
unpredictable nature of their incomes. Trade unions could use their organisational 
capacities and resources to provide precarious workers with access to affordable credit 
or forms of income insurance to help them make ends meet when their precarious 
working arrangements disrupt their income for a period of time. This could, for 
example, follow the Dutch ‘broodfonds’ (literally, ‘bread funds’) model, which has 
seen workers collectively contributing to a fund that members can then draw from 
should they be unable to work (cf. Dellot and Wallace-Stephens, 2017, p.17). Such a 
model could be particularly useful for groups of precarious workers who often miss 
out on access to sick pay and consequently face the tangible jeopardy of being unable 
to work due to illness.  
The point of emphasising the historical ‘insurance’ role once played by British unions, 
however, is to illuminate the central source of trade unions’ protective capacity, 
solidarity. Unions protect the interests of workers by providing an institutional context 
that enables similarly-situated individuals to look after one another. Unions provide 
workers with the security that they will not be left to face the exigencies of life and 
the labour market alone. It is in this sense that unions can be viewed not only as 
contestatory and protective institutions, but also as institutions that promote antipower 
by empowering individuals. 
Unions represent empowering institutions to the extent that they amplify the voices of 
individual workers, providing them with the confidence to collectively challenge the 
sources of domination in their lives. Alex Gourevitch recognises this empowering 
potential in the labour movements of nineteenth century America: “[t]he experience 
of that collective power was itself an education in the way each individual’s power 
was increased through cooperative organization” (2015, p.165). This empowerment 
has been recognised, too, by empirical social scientists. For example, Daryl D’Art and 
Thomas Turner have argued that “union membership, in providing employees with an 
independent voice, functions as a check on autocratic managerial power and creates 
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in employees the sense that they can exercise some control over their working lives” 
(2007, p.108, my italics). By cultivating a vigilant, contestatory disposition and 
providing a space in which to experience effective political agency within their 
working lives, trade unions can empower individual members to counter and 
neutralise, if not extinguish completely, the dominating power to which they would 
otherwise be vulnerable. 
The collective empowerment that comes from union membership can therefore be 
understood to enable workers to claim the intersubjective equality that accompanies 
the status of free republican citizenship. Workers will be able to face their employers, 
and other economically powerful actors, “confident in the shared knowledge that it is 
not by their leave that you pursue your innocent, non-interfering choices…The non-
interference you enjoy at the hands of others is not enjoyed by their grace and you do 
not live at their mercy” (Pettit, 1997a, p.71). The presence of robust union protection 
disrupts the power dynamics of the workplace, and the wider economy, in such a way 
that significantly minimises the potential for domination. Sufficiently empowered, 
union members can be confident of their capacity to repel and resist the domination 
they encounter in their working lives. Not only will they be more emboldened to 
challenge the domination of their employers on an individual basis, but they will share 
the security of knowing that others will be steadfast in their protection of republican 
liberty.   
But in addition to acting as a direct source of antipower in their capacity as 
contestatory, protective, and empowering institutions, unions can also serve an 
instrumental role. Unions can assist in the promotion of antipower by acting as a 
backstop to guarantee the continuing function of other antipower institutions. As 
O’Neill and White highlight, “there is considerable cross- national evidence that 
higher levels of unionisation and stronger collective labour rights are associated with 
different policies and outcomes: lower earnings inequality, lower income inequality, 
more redistribution, and a more expansive ‘decommodifying’ welfare state” (2018, 
pp.261-262). Indeed, trade unions have historically been instrumental in the 
development of welfare states across the globe, and high levels of union density 
continue to be linked with higher levels of welfare expenditure (Brugiavini, et al., 
2000, p.9; Boreham et al, 1996, p.2). In this sense, the presence of robust unions 
correlates with the maintenance of another institution, the welfare state, that, as we 
have already seen, can help to promote counter-dominating antipower. By protecting 
and promoting the welfare state in this way, the presence of unions also ensures that 
welfare payments do not exist as a ‘gift’, vulnerable to the whims of the wealthy, but 
rather as a vigorously defended beachhead in a larger, agonistic and contestatory battle 
between labour and capital. When protected by unions, the elite domination that, as 
we saw earlier in this chapter, might otherwise be associated with welfare states, is 
significantly neutralised.  
In addition, we have also seen how, the legalistic function of trade unions (for 
example, taking employers to legal tribunals), can help to maintain the fair and 
consistent rule of law. By ensuring that employment law is effectively enforced, trade 
unions help to uphold the protection that regulation offers against domination. Trade 
unions are therefore not just sources of antipower in and of themselves, but also 
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display a demonstrable ability to have a positive, instrumental effect on the promotion 
of antipower by other institutional means. In combination with these other antipower 
institutions, unions can be part of an emancipatory institutional architecture – a 
republic, economic as much as it is political – that extends freedom as non-domination 
within a capitalist state.   
It is important to recognise, too, that in providing this intrinsic and instrumental value 
towards the promotion of antipower within society, trade unions do not necessarily 
represent a source of domination in and of themselves. Trade unions certainly do not 
pose a threat of domination towards employers. As Pettit recognises, “If X enjoys 
power over Y in one way, and Y enjoys power over X in another, then each is in a 
position to exact something from the other in payment for the interference, and so 
neither may interfere in the other's affairs with impunity; neither enjoys power 
simpliciter over the other, neither dominates the other” (1996, p.588). The aim of trade 
unions is to allow workers to ‘exact something’ from their employers to prevent them 
wielding arbitrary power with impunity. The power of trade unions does not replace 
the power of the employer, it merely neutralises its dominating potential. Furthermore, 
to the extent that unions inflict interference on their members, assuming that unions 
are themselves organised in a suitably inclusive and democratic way, then this 
interference will be of the non-dominating variety insomuch as it is constitutionally 
forced to track the interests of that union’s members rather than the particular will of 
some union ‘boss’. 
Because trade unions can be shown to promote antipower, both intrinsically and 
instrumentally, I argue that a republican state would be justified in not only permitting 
the presence of trade unions, but actively promoting trade union membership as a 
centrally important element of republican citizenship. Trade unions, as we have seen, 
allow republican citizens to enjoy non-domination in their economic as well as 
political lives, and as such unions should be included as an integral institutional 
manifestation of republican values within the economic sphere and should be 
promoted as an integral component of the contemporary republican political 
programme.  
A promotive stance towards trade unions goes beyond mere statutory recognition of a 
right to union membership, and instead involves the state using its legal and political 
apparatus to positively facilitate trade union activity in workplaces and the wider 
economy as a normal component of economic governance (Ewing, 1998, p.6-7; cf. 
O’Neill and White, 2018, pp.264-265). Practically such a promotive stance would 
necessitate that the state introduce a number of measures in order to embed trade 
unions as a legitimate and valuable part of the republic. These could include “clear 
duties on employers to bargain with unions in good faith” as well as the legal provision 
of “an expansive right to strike” (O’Neill and White, 2018, p.265). For example, in 
the United Kingdom, a promotive stance would certainly require the repeal of existing 
legislation such as the 2016 Trade Union Act, which introduced new rules and 
restrictions to make union organising more difficult (cf. TUC, 2017c). By taking a 
promotive stance towards trade unions, a republican government should seek to 
reverse the marginalisation of unions within the economic and political life of the state, 
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and instead endorse unions as integral institutions for the maintenance and extension 
of republican liberty.  
Such a promotive stance would be extremely beneficial for precarious workers. As we 
have seen, unions would allow precarious workers to contest the acceptability of 
precarious working arrangements, and to challenge the normalisation of such 
arrangements across the labour market. Precarious workers would also be able to 
communicate their struggles, vulnerabilities, and anxieties, in order to affect change 
within the firm, the economy, and wider society. Institutionalising worker voice within 
the republic in this way would allow them to not only resist the dominating power of 
their particular employers, but also to wield effective influence over the organisation 
and governance of their working lives. 
Conclusion: Building an economic republic.  
Precarious working arrangements generate specific forms of domination within the 
contemporary capitalist economy. For republicans, this domination should be 
understood as antithetical to liberty and the enjoyment of free and equal citizenship. 
For this reason, the construction of a republic that guarantees freedom from 
domination in the economic sphere as well as the political sphere should be of central 
importance. For some, such a republic may require the dismantlement of the capitalist 
system of production that entrenches the dependence of workers on the elite cadre that 
owns and controls productive capital. Such an ideal, though, appears a distant 
possibility given current social, political, and economic reality. Indeed, capitalism has 
thus far proved remarkably resilient, surviving crises that could have seen its 
overthrow and collapse. But the persistence of capitalism is no reason to not strive for 
greater liberty. As this chapter has shown, there are ways for republicans to promote 
antipower and extend freedom as non-domination within the confines of the capitalist 
system. For republican ideas to realise their emancipatory potential in the real-world, 
then, the institutional means for promoting this antipower must now become central 
pillars of the contemporary republican political programme.   
In this chapter I have outlined what this institutional approach to promoting economic 
liberty could look like. It should involve a combination of regulation, exit, and voice, 
embodied in robust labour law, a generous welfare state, and a promotive stance 
towards trade unionism. Such a model would provide an institutional framework and 
political ecosystem that, acting as a virtuous cycle, would enable precarious workers 
to begin resisting the specific forms of domination that they experience within their 
working lives, and provide a space in which to contest the permissibility of precarious 
working arrangements in the contemporary economy. By empowering workers against 
their employers, the political agency of workers would be embedded within an open-
ended emancipatory political project, allowing them to wield greater control over their 
economic and political futures. Rather than consigning workers to the exigencies of a 
precarious labour market that exposes individuals to manifold forms of subjugation, 
the republican model that I have outlined – a republic, both political and economic - 
would restructure the power-dynamics at the heart of economic life. Workers may, for 
now, still have to sell their labour to a capitalist, but they should at least be empowered 
to face this system, to the greatest extent possible, as free republican citizens.  
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-   CHAPTER 6   - 
…………………………………….CONCLUSION. 
 
In an interview in 1980 with the American talk show host, Dick Cavett, the actor 
Richard Burton described his youth in a South Wales mining community in the early 
twentieth century. He recounted how the miners at that time viewed themselves as “the 
aristocrats of the working class”, who carried themselves with “the arrogant strut of 
the lords of the coalface”, who could “look at the posh people pass with hostile 
eyes…because they were the kings of the underworld” (cf. Wales Art Review, 2016). 
Whilst it would be naïve to romanticise or glorify the dangerous, filthy, and back-
breaking working conditions of early-twentieth century mining, Burton’s quote does 
tell us something about the political significance of working life. That it is important 
for one’s sense of power, status, and the ability to look others, even the wealthy, in the 
eye as free and equal citizens.  
In this thesis we have seen the extent to which precarious working arrangements in the 
contemporary labour market systematically disempower, constrain, and cower the 
lives of those subject to them. Precarious work generates distinct forms of domination 
that significantly compromise individual liberty. Indeed, domination is an integral and 
defining feature of the precarious labour market.  
Precarious working arrangements such as zero-hours contracts, temporary agency 
work, and the so-called “gig economy”, grant employers extraordinary levels of 
discretionary power to demand, deny, and discontinue work with little or no notice or 
reason. This is central to the uncertainty, jeopardy, and dependency that makes such 
working arrangements precarious. It is this domination that means workers can never 
be sure whether they will continue to enjoy access to their source of livelihood; 
whether their income will suddenly be disrupted; whether they can effectively plan 
their lives. Their fate hangs in the balance, under the arbitrary control of their 
employer.  
And beyond the confines of the employment relationship, precarious working 
arrangements place workers at risk of becoming dependent upon, and being 
subsequently dominated by, various other agents with whom they interact in their daily 
lives. This omnipresent threat of domination carries the immanent potential to 
constrain workers, binding them tighter to their dependence on their precarious 
working arrangements. Precarious workers are dominated structurally by virtue of 
their position within the precarious labour market and the wider social and economic 
ecosystem that this sustains.  
Dominated in these ways, it is impossible for precarious workers to interact with the 
world as free and equal citizens, but instead are likely to live lives of “fear and 
deference” (Pettit, 1997a, p.64), constantly trying to anticipate the whims and desires 
of their employer, the market, and the multiple agents they become dependent upon 
due to their insecure and perilous economic situation.  
This republican theory of precarious work, echoing the conceptual frameworks offered 
by the Marxist and feminist traditions of political thought, considers work as a distinct 
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sphere of power; one that is a legitimate object of normative political evaluation. 
However, in contrast to Marxist and feminist approaches, a republican approach to 
precarious work enables us to evaluate the normative distinctions between such 
working arrangements and more formally secure forms of wage-labour. Precarious 
working arrangements generate distinct forms of domination that are both normatively 
significant, and absent from the “typical” employment model established during the 
twentieth century. This approach enables a more detailed normative evaluation of 
models of capitalism within the nonideal circumstances of actually-existing society.  
Focussing on the context of work as a distinct sphere of politically significant power 
relations rather than focussing on the content of work as a vehicle for some particular 
political value also avoids the controversial, and potentially illiberal, implications 
associated with ensuring all work is ‘meaningful’. Rather than prioritising a just 
distribution of meaningfulness in working life, the republican approach prioritises 
ensuring that working life is free from domination. Whether or not one’s work is 
boring, repetitive, or pointless, it should first and foremost be organised and governed 
in a way that is, as much as possible, consistent with the freedom as non-domination 
of every citizen.  
Most importantly, by analysing the freedom-compromising forms of dominating 
agential and structural power generated by organising and governing work in this way, 
the republican theory of precarious work also enables us to challenge the way that the 
political vocabulary of individual freedom has been deployed by free-market 
libertarian defenders of such working arrangements. Far from being an expression of 
the independence of workers within the market, the republican theory of precarious 
work illuminates the extent to which such working arrangements erode the ability of 
workers to live free lives of their own. Regardless of how freely such arrangements 
are seemingly established, to the extent that they compromise individuals’ freedom as 
non-domination they must be considered unjust.  
Finally, in this thesis I have begun to sketch how this injustice can begin to be 
addressed through a combination of state regulation, effective exit rights, and 
institutionalised worker voice. By embedding robust labour law, a generous welfare 
state, and a promotive stance towards trade unionism within a wider republican 
political programme, precarious workers would be more able to resist the forms of 
domination they encounter in their working lives. Empowered in this way, 
contemporary workers would be more able to enjoy the intersubjective confidence, 
freedom and equality that Burton identified in the miners of twentieth century Wales.  
A number of avenues for future research can be seen to have opened up as a result of 
this thesis. Firstly, whilst this thesis has sought to bring the concept of precarious work 
more fully into the purview of political theory and philosophy, it has focussed 
exclusively on precarious work as it is manifested within the contemporary labour 
markets of advanced industrial economies such as the United Kingdom. It may be 
important to now consider and normatively assess the specific manifestations of 
precarious labour in the Global South. For example, it has been shown that precarious 
work has existed for longer in the Global South than the Global North, and has taken 
different forms (cf. Moseotsa, et al., 2016). Experiences of precarious work are not 
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internationally universal, and it may be important to evaluate the extent to which race, 
citizenship, and post-colonial legacies inform the global distribution of precarious 
work and the particular ways this manifests within and across global labour markets.  
In this thesis I have also contributed to an ongoing debate within contemporary 
republican scholarship with regards to the conceptualisation of structural domination. 
I have suggested here that the structural vulnerability experienced by workers within 
the precarious labour market, and the forms of structural power and constraint this 
produces, should be conceptualised as a distinct form of structural domination, 
representing a discrete threat to republican liberty that is separate from the 
interpersonal domination such workers are subject to within their particular 
employment relationships. However, the suggestion that instances of domination can 
exist which are not reducible to some intentional, dominating agent is a controversial 
one. As we have seen, Pettit maintains that domination is a strictly interagential 
phenomenon. A “system or network or whatever” cannot dominate (1997a, p.52). 
Similarly, Sharon Krause (2013) has suggested that, in order to successfully capture 
the systemic, unintentional, and unconscious constraints on freedom encountered 
within society, republicans should supplement the conception of freedom as non-
domination with an account of freedom as non-oppression. Krause argues:  
“whereas domination requires intentionality and involves control, oppression 
rests on impersonal, systematic patterns of privilege and prejudice that are often 
unintentional and that do not involve relations of control. Finally, rather than 
exploit some persons for the purposes of others (the paradigm case of domination 
is slavery), oppression works through social norms and internalized habits to 
devalue and confine the individual in ways that systematically undercut her or 
his ability to be in and affect the world in ways that manifest her or his distinctive 
subjective existence. Domination and oppression often coexist, but they are 
conceptually and experientially distinct” (Krause, 2013, p.201).  
I have shown in this thesis why the structural vulnerability associated with precarious 
working arrangements can properly be conceptualised as a form of domination, 
nevertheless it may be important to consider in greater depth whether this structural 
unfreedom is, rather, a form of oppression. This may, however, ultimately be a 
semantic distinction. The central argument would remain that republicans ought to be 
concerned with such forms of structural unfreedom, and design, create, and maintain 
the social, economic, and political institutions necessary to empower and liberate all 
citizens.  
In this thesis I have begun to sketch what these institutions could look like, but further 
research is required in order to provide a comprehensive blueprint for a republic, both 
political and economic, that is relevant to the contemporary political landscape we find 
ourselves in. In particular, the practical policy recommendations outlined in this thesis, 
perhaps conservatively, assume the immediate continuation of a broadly capitalist 
economic system. Further research may be required to outline a more demanding, and 
more radical, ideal economic republic that seeks to not only maximise antipower, but 
eradicate all forms of domination in society. As we have seen, even formally secure, 
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non-precarious forms of employment generate forms of domination, for example 
empowering employers to “sweep away the livelihood of a whole town overnight, in 
the interest of some powerful group, who need take no account of the social 
consequences of their decisions” (Wilkinson, 1939, p.7). As such, it may be that a 
more radical republican account of the contemporary labour market, working within 
an ideal rather than nonideal mode of political theory, would require an end to the 
capitalist system, reviving instead something like the cooperative commonwealth 
promoted by the labor republicans of nineteenth century America.  
Nevertheless, even the relatively modest proposals outlined in this thesis, for more 
robust labour law, generous welfare states, and a promotive stance towards trade 
unionism, if enacted, would represent a significant, emancipatory improvement to the 
lives of working people in the United Kingdom. For those currently trapped in the 
precarious labour market, a republican political economy, predicated on the promotion 
of antipower throughout society, would represent a vital protection against 
domination, and provide a means by which they might gain greater security, stability 
and control over their own lives. It is this vision of freedom in the labour market, both 
attractive and, I believe, attainable, that republicans must now strive for.   
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